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  This	   thesis	   reviews	   the	   role	   given	   to	   the	   United	   Nations	   in	   American	   and	  European	   strategy	   concepts	   against	   terrorism	   and	   their	   impact	   on	   the	  organization’s	   work.	   Its	   starting	   point	   is	   the	   premise	   that	   warfare	   in	   general	  changed	  substantially	   in	   the	   last	   two	  decades	  and	   that	   terrorism	  has	  become	  a	  truly	   transnational	   issue.	   To	   elaborate	   on	   this,	   the	   literature	   on	   “new	   wars”	  (principally	   the	   writings	   of	   Mary	   Kaldor	   and	   Herfried	   Münckler)	   is	   being	  discussed.	  The	  second	  theoretical	  starting	  point	  is	  the	  neo-­‐institutionalist	  theory	  of	  International	  Law	  and	  international	  organizations	  as	  developed	  by	  Andrew	  T.	  Guzman.	   Furthermore,	   this	   thesis	   discusses	   the	   state	   of	   multilateralism	   in	  general	  and	  especially	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  the	  last	  decade.	  This	   is	  being	  done	  within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   failure	   of	   the	  UN	   in	  major	   conflicts	   (Rwanda,	  Darfur,	  Yugoslavia),	  the	  subsequent	  discredit	  and	  the	  resulting	  skepticism	  in	  regard	  to	  a	  possible	  role	  of	   the	  UN	  in	  counter-­‐terrorism	  matters.	  The	  attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,	  established	  terrorism	  as	  a	  significant	  global	  threat	  and	  led	  to	  reactions	  by	  the	  entire	  international	  community.	  By	  taking	  several	  institutional	  steps,	  the	  UN	   reacted	   to	   these	   developments.	   Yet,	   the	   reforms	   of	   the	   UN	   are	  marked	   by	  disparities	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  terrorism	  and	  in	  the	  envisioning	  of	  an	  institutional	  setting	  for	  counter-­‐terrorism	  at	  the	  UN-­‐level.	  	   The	   European	   Union	   made	   significant	   steps	   towards	   integration	   in	   the	  last	  ten	  to	  twenty	  years.	  It	  has	  become	  an	  aspiring	  and	  independent	  international	  actor	  and	  is	  perceived	  as	  such	  within	  the	  UN	  system.	  Its	  anti-­‐terrorism	  strategy	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  approaches	  of	  the	  UN.	  The	  United	  States	  generally	  has	  a	  difficult	  relationship	  with	  the	  UN	  with	  regards	  to	  counter-­‐terrorism.	  In	  the	  U.S.,	   the	  sentiment	  that	  the	  UN	  institutions	  are	  not	  fit	  to	  tackle	  the	  challenges	  is	  predominant.	  Unlike	  Europe	  and	  especially	  during	  the	  Bush	  presidency,	  there	  is	  a	  prevailing	  paradigm	  of	  regime	  change	  (the	  so-­‐called	   Freedom	  Agenda)	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   pre-­‐emptive	  military	   strikes.	  Nevertheless,	  multilateralism	  plays	  an	   important	  role	   in	   the	  American	  strategy,	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albeit	   less	   out	   of	   ideological	   conviction	   but	   more	   out	   of	   pragmatism	   and	  rationalism.	  Eventually,	   a	   convergence	   between	   anti-­‐terrorism	   strategies	   can	   be	  observed.	   Both	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic	   recognize	   the	   terrorist	   threat,	   the	  importance	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   and	   other	   international	   partners	   and	   the	  significance	   of	   resolving	   regional	   conflicts,	   and	   especially	   the	   Israeli-­‐Arab	  conflict.	  Building	  on	  a	  long	  history	  of	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  cooperation,	  this	  partnership	  has	  been	  globalized.	  What	   remains	   in	   the	   end	   nevertheless	   is	   the	   structural	   problem	   of	   an	  organization	   that	   was	   created	   to	   resolve	   disputes	   between	   states	   and	   is	   now	  challenged	   to	   cope	   with	   a	   problem	   between	   states	   and	   diffuse,	   trans-­‐national	  non-­‐state	   actors,	   which	   may	   or	   may	   not	   be	   supported	   or	   harbored	   by	   states.
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  ETA	   	   	   Euskadi	  ta	  Askatasuna	  EU	   	   	   European	  Union	  FATF	   Financial	   Action	   Task	   Force	   on	   money	   laundering	   and	  terrorism	  financing	  (OECD)	  GA	   	   	   General	  Assembly	  (UN)	  IAEA	   	   	   International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency	  IO	   	   	   International	  organization	  IRA	   	   	   Irish	  Republican	  Army	  ISS	   	   	   Internal	  Security	  Strategy	  (EU)	  LOAC	   	   	   Laws	  of	  Armed	  Conflict	  NAFTA	   	   North	  Atlantic	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  NATO	   	   	   North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  NSCT	   	   	   National	  Strategy	  for	  Combating	  Terrorism	  (U.S.)	  NSS	   	   	   National	  Security	  Strategy	  (NSS)	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OAS	   	   	   Organization	  of	  American	  States	  OSCE	   	   	   Organization	  for	  Security	  and	  Co-­‐operation	  in	  Europe	  RAF	   	   	   Rote	  Armee	  Fraktion	  TFEU	   	   	   Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  TPB	   	   	   Terrorism	  Prevention	  Branch	  (UNODC)	  TREVI	   Terrorism,	   Radicalism,	   Extremism,	   and	   International	  Violence	  network	  TWG	   	   	   Terrorism	  Working	  Group	  (EU)	  UN	   	   	   United	  Nations	  UNICRI	   	   UN	  Interregional	  Crime	  and	  Justice	  Research	  Institute	  UNODC	   	   UN	  Office	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Crime	  UNODCCP	   	   UN	  Office	  for	  Drug	  Control	  and	  Crime	  Prevention	  	  (Renamed	  UNODC	  as	  of	  October	  1,	  2002)	  UNSCR	  	   	   UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  U.S.	   	   	   United	  States	  WMD(s)	   	   Weapon(s)	  of	  Mass	  Destruction	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Introduction	  	  
“We	  only	  have	  to	  be	  lucky	  once.	  You	  will	  have	  to	  be	  lucky	  always.”	  	  –	  IRA	  statement	  after	  a	  failed	  attempt	  to	  kill	  	  
Margaret	  Thatcher	  in	  her	  hotel	  in	  Brighton,	  1984	  	  	  Starting	  with	   the	  pivotal	   events	  of	   September	  11th,	   2001,	   this	   thesis	  will	   try	   to	  show	  how	  the	  role	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  the	  global	  war	  on	  terror	  has	  changed	  and	  how	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe	  use	  it	  differently	  as	  an	  instrument	  in	  the	  war	   on	   terror.	   Even	   though	   there	   is	   a	   general	   consensus	   that	   multilateral	  cooperation	   is	   important,	   there	   are	   differences	   on	   how	   the	   United	   States	   and	  Europe	  cooperate	  with	   the	  UN.	  On	  several	  occasions,	   the	  U.S.	  acted	  outside	   the	  UN	   framework,	   using	   military	   action	   without	   a	   specific	   mandate.	   But	   is	   the	  “common	   wisdom,	   at	   least	   in	   Western	   Europe,”	   which	   Luck	   (2004)	   critically	  describes,	  “that	  Washington’s	  response	  to	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,	   has	   confirmed	   its	   penchant	   for	   unilateralism	   and	   its	   disdain	   for	  multilateral	   processes	   and	   institutions”	   (ibid.,	   p.	   74)	   really	   accurate?	   Are	  Americans	  really	  “from	  Mars”	  and	  Europeans	  “from	  Venus”	  (Kagan	  2003)?	  It	   will	   therefore	   be	   analyzed,	   how	   the	   UN	   is	   fitted	   differently	   into	  American	   and	   European	   strategies	   against	   terrorism	   and	   how	   those	   strategies	  reflect	  in	  the	  UN’s	  work.	  After	  all,	  terrorism	  is	  not	  dismissed	  as	  a	  “second-­‐order	  strategic	  concern”	  anymore	  as	   it	  was	   in	   the	  1990s,	  but	   is	  now	  widely	  regarded	  “as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  potent	  threads	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security”	  (Phillips	  2010).	  
Developments	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  Both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe	  went	  through	  some	  significant	  developments	  in	   the	   last	   10	   years.	   The	   attacks	   of	   September	   11,	   2001,	   prompted	   the	   United	  States	   to	   take	   a	   more	   active	   stance	   at	   the	   international	   level.	   Guided	   by	   the	  assertion	  of	  “state-­‐sponsors	  of	  terrorism”	  it	  engaged	  in	  two	  long-­‐lasting	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  latter	  much	  to	  the	  dismay	  of	  parts	  of	  the	  international	   community	  and	   the	  United	  Nations.	  The	   time	  period	  between	   the	  terrorist	   attacks	   and	   now	   can	   be	   divided	   into	   the	   era	   of	   George	   W.	   Bush’s	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presidency	   (2001-­‐2009)	   and	   into	   the	   new	   administration	   of	   Barack	   Obama	  (2009-­‐present).	  The	  fact	  that	  President	  Obama	  received	  a	  Nobel	  Peace	  Price	  only	  after	   a	   few	   months	   in	   office	   "for	   his	   extraordinary	   efforts	   to	   strengthen	  international	   diplomacy	   and	   cooperation	   between	   people"1	   stands	   as	   an	  interesting	  indicator	  for	  a	  possible	  (perceived)	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  U.S.	  policy.	  In	  Europe,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  gradual	  process	  of	  integration	  has	  led	  to	  an	  increasingly	  consolidated	  European	  Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy	  and	  the	  amplified	  establishment	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  global	  actor,	  also	  within	  other	  multilateral	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  UN.	  Dealing	  with	   terrorism	   is	   an	   intrinsically	   complicated	   and	   controversial	  matter.	  Apart	   from	  the	  legal	   issues	   involved	  with	  state	  actors	  operating	  against	  non-­‐state	   actors	   abroad,	   policy-­‐makers	   face	   many	   dilemmas.	   Neuhold	   (2006)	  mentions	   the	   following:	   the	   dilemma	   between	   security	   and	   the	   respect	   for	  human	  rights,	  	  the	  dilemma	  between	  the	  right	  to	  information	  and	  the	  avoidance	  of	   publicity	   for	   terrorism,	   and	   the	   dilemma	   between	   the	   need	   to	   share	  intelligence	  and	  the	  reluctance	  of	  intelligence	  services	  to	  cooperate.	  	  
Embedment	  into	  political	  theory	  The	   analysis	   of	   anti-­‐terror	   strategies	   needs	   to	   be	   conducted	   within	   a	   wider	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  looks	  at	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  warfare	  and	  the	  change	  in	  how	  armed	  conflicts	  present	  nowadays.	  This	  is	  necessary	  to	  emphasize	  the	   transnational	   character	   of	   terrorism	   and	   subsequently	   also	   anti-­‐terrorism	  and	  to	  situate	  the	  possible	  role	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	  Organization	  accordingly.	  The	  main	   string	  of	   literature	   chosen	   is	   the	   literature	  on	   “new	  wars”	   as	  well	   as	  some	   contemporary	   literature	   on	   international	   law	   and	   international	  organizations.	  	  
The	  main	  research	  questions	  This	  thesis	  will	  therefore	  try	  to	  answer	  several	  questions:	  
• How	   do	   the	   US	   and	   Europe	   relate	   differently	   to	   concepts	   of	  multilateralism?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Nobel	  Foundation,	  http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/	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• What	  role	  does	  the	  United	  Nations	  play	  in	  American	  and	  European	  foreign	  policies?	  Can	  it	  simply	  be	  summarized	  by	  the	  statement	  that	  the	  U.S.	  use	  the	  UN	  to	   legitimize	  military	  actions	  and	  to	   increase	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  sanctions,	  whereas	  the	  EU/European	  countries	  see	  the	  UN	  as	  an	  instrument	  to	  resolve	  regional	  conflicts,	  to	  foster	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  and	  to	  promote	  good	  governance?	  
• How	  do	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Europe	  influence	  the	  UN	  and	  to	  which	  extent?	  
• What	   has	   been	   done	   at	   UN	   level?	   Does	   it	   help	   to	   reach	   the	  counterterrorism	  goals	  identified	  by	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  the	  EU?	  
• Does	   the	   plurality	   of	   institutions	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   combatting	  terrorism	  produce	   synergy	  effects?	   Is	   there	  enough	  coordination?	  Or,	   to	  the	   opposite,	   is	   their	   effectiveness	   reduced	  due	   to	   duplication?	   In	   other	  words:	  Is	  there	  interlocking	  or	  interblocking?	  
Structure	  We	  will	   thus	   start	   first	  with	   a	   theoretical	   part	   focusing	   on	   the	   development	   of	  new	  forms	  of	  modern	  warfare	  in	  a	  world	  where	  the	  United	  Nations,	  after	  several	  fiascos	   in	   the	  1990s	   and	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  21st	   century,	   still	   have	   to	   find	  their	  adequate	  role.	  	  The	   second	   chapter	   reflects	   on	   the	   current	   state	   of	  multilateralism	   and	  the	  UN	  and	  reviews	  recent	  theories	  on	  international	  organizations.	  The	   third	   chapter	  discusses	   terrorism	  as	   a	  new	  global	   threat	  of	   the	  21st	  century	  and	  the	  immediate	  response	  of	  the	  international	  community.	  	  Chapter	  four	  will	  look	  at	  how	  the	  United	  Nations	  deal	  with	  this	  new	  threat	  and	  especially	   at	   the	   legal	   instruments	   at	   its	   hand.	  New	   institutions	  have	  been	  built	  and	  others	  extended.	  The	  focus	  will	  lie	  on	  the	  UN	  Office	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Crime	  based	  in	  Vienna,	  Austria.	  Chapters	   five	   and	   six	   will	   then	   look	   at	   counter-­‐terrorism	   strategies	   on	  both	  sides	  of	   the	  Atlantic.	  There	  are	  different	  ways	  to	  analyze	  a	  government	  or	  institution’s	   strategy,	   but	   the	   approach	   taken	   here	   was	   to	   look	   at	   important	  policy	   documents.	   These	   are	   for	   instance	   the	   American	   National	   Security	  Strategies	   (NSS)	   of	   2002,	   2006	   and	   2010,	   the	   American	   National	   Strategy	   on	  Combating	  Terrorism	  (NSCT),	  the	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  (ESS)	  of	  2003	  and	  the	  European	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Strategy	  (ECTS)	  of	  2005.	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A	  particular	   focus	  will	  have	   to	   rest	  on	   the	  aspect	  of	   sovereignty,	   that	   is,	  the	  methodological	   caveat	   lying	   in	   the	   fact	   that	  we	   are	   comparing	   a	   sovereign	  nation	   (the	   United	   States)	   with	   a	   rapidly	   integrating	   European	   Union,	   which	  nevertheless	   is	   by	   itself	   only	   an	   association	   of	   independent	   countries.	   The	   fact	  that	  Europe	  more	  and	  more	  speaks	  with	  one	  voice	  on	   the	   international	   sphere	  legitimizes	  this	  comparison.	  Finally,	   a	   conclusion	   –	   emphasizing	   the	   hypothesis	   of	   a	   globalization	   of	  trans-­‐Atlantic	   cooperation	   –	   will	   summarize	   the	   main	   findings	   and	   remaining	  questions	  for	  future	  research.	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New	  wars	  	  Before	   addressing	   the	   “war	   on	   terror,”	   some	   further	   inquiry	   into	   what	  constitutes	   a	  war	   and	   how	  warfare	   has	   changed	   in	   the	   last	   decades	   has	   to	   be	  conducted.	  Political	  scientists	  came	  up	  with	  various	  definitions	  of	  war.	  Killingsworth	  (2010)	  cites	  Quincy	  Wright’s	  argument	  that	  war	  “was	  a	  violent	  contact	  of	  distinct	  but	   similar	   entities”	   (Killingsworth	   2010,	   p.	   126).	   This	   definition	   has	   some	  serious	   shortcomings	   that	   shall	   not	   be	   discussed	   in	   further	   detail	   here.	   Other	  authors	   tried	   to	   find	  a	  quantitative	  definition	  of	  war	  –	  an	  approach	   that	   rather	  failed,	  though	  (see	  ibid.	  for	  a	  review).	  An	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  war	   is	  Carl	  von	  Clausewitz’s	  On	  War	   (1832)	  where	  war	   is	  defined	  as	   “an	  act	  of	  force	   to	   compel	   our	   enemy	   to	   do	   our	   will”	   (Clausewitz	   1976)	   and	   is	   seen	   as	  “nothing	  but	   the	  continuation	  of	  policy	  with	  other	  means”	   (ibid.).	  Hedley	  Bull’s	  definition	  of	  war	  emphasizes	   the	  presence	  and	   importance	  of	  political	   entities:	  therein,	   war	   is	   “organized	   violence	   carried	   on	   by	   political	   units	   against	   each	  other”	  (cited	  in	  Killingsworth	  2010,	  p.	  126).	  The	  Organization	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	  was	   founded	  at	   a	   time	   in	  which	  wars	  were	   fought	   between	   nations,	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   Second	  World	  War.	   As	  several	   authors	   point	   out,	   warfare	   has	   changed	   since	   World	   War	   II	   and	  international	  terrorism	  has	  become	  a	  new	  form	  of	  it.	  The	  following	  section	  thus	  presents	  a	  theory	  arguing	  that	  recent	  conflicts	  differ	  drastically	  from	  those	  that	  we	  knew	  before.	  The	  literature	  on	  this	  issue	  was	  started	  by	  the	  current	  Professor	  of	   Global	   Governance	   at	   the	   London	   School	   of	   Economics	  Mary	   Kaldor’s	   study	  “New	  and	  old	  wars”	  (Kaldor	  1998	  [2006])	  and	  quickly	   followed	  by	  the	  German	  political	   scientist	   Herfried	   Münkler,	   who	   introduced	   the	   discussion	   to	   the	  German-­‐speaking	  world	   (see	   e.g.	  Münkler	   2004	   and	  Münkler	   2006).	   The	  main	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  authors,	  who	  both	  discuss	  the	  same	  phenomenon,	  is	  their	  respective	  explanation	  of	  causality.	  While	  in	  Münkler’s	  view	  the	  new	  wars	  are	  mainly	  wars	  of	  state	  failure	  and	  are	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  weakness	  of	  central	  state	  authority,	  Kaldor	  sees	  them	  as	  a	  product	  of	  globalization	  and	  general	  trend	  towards	  privatization,	  even	  of	  violence.	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Old	  wars	  A	  starting	  point	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  warfare	  is	  the	  war	  of	  1618-­‐1648	  (Thirty	  Years’	  War),	  arguably	  one	  of	  the	  most	  destructive	  conflicts	  in	  European	  or	  even	  world	  history.	  	  In	   the	   Thirty	   Years’	   War,	   violence	   was	   mainly	   directed	   at	   the	   civilian	  population	  and	   less	  against	  military	  units.	  This	  happened	  because	  warfare	  was	  not	  led	  by	  a	  central	  authority	  with	  standing	  national	  armies,	  but	  was	  delegated	  to	  private	  warlords.	  Economic	  motives	  stood	  behind	  many	  decisions	  of	   the	  rulers,	  the	  motto	  so	  to	  say	  being	  “bellum	  se	  ipse	  alet”	  (the	  war	  nourishes	  itself).	  Around	  1,500	   war	   entrepreneurs	   (probably	   the	   most	   well-­‐known	   being	   Bohemian	  politician	  and	  soldier	  Albrecht	  von	  Wallenstein,	  who	  offered	  his	  army	  of	  30,000	  to	   100,000	   men	   to	   the	   Holy	   Roman	   Emperor	   Ferdinand	   II	   and	   became	   the	  supreme	   commander	   of	   the	   armies	   of	   the	   Habsburg	   monarchy)	   were	   directly	  involved	  in	  the	  war	  (Münkler	  2004).	  Mercenaries	   quickly	   discovered	   another	   form	   of	   income,	   next	   to	   their	  soldier’s	  pay:	  looting.	  An	  economy	  of	  war	  developed,	  consisting	  mainly	  in	  looting	  whole	  areas	  and	  displacing	  or	  killing	  the	  people	  living	  there.	  While	  the	  war	  was	  waged	  in	  the	  name	  of	  religion,	  this	  was	  more	  of	  a	  pretext	  to	  get	  rich	  at	  someone	  other’s	   expense.	   The	   subsequent	   loss	   of	   discipline	   among	   soldiers	   entailed	   a	  deadly	   vicious	   cycle	   of	   violence.	   The	   civilian	   population	   started	   to	   arm	   and	  defend	   itself	   against	   marauding	   mercenaries.	   The	   damages	   to	   the	   local	  economies	   were	   so	   high,	   that	   the	   only	   way	   to	   achieve	   an	   income	   allowing	  subsistence	  was	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  economy,	  be	  it	  as	  mercenary	  or	  as	  a	  merchant	  within	  the	  posse	  consisting	  of	  the	  soldiers’	  families,	  artisans	  and	  business	  people	  like	   smiths,	   tailors	   or	   innkeepers.	   A	   parallel	   society,	   a	   state	  within	   the	   (barely	  actually	   existing)	   state	   and	   only	   rarely	   in	   line	   with	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   state	  leadership	  developed.	  Those	  elements	  of	  the	  vicious	  cycle:	  erosion	  of	  the	  state’s	  monopoly	   on	   violence,	   loss	   of	   discipline	   among	   soldiers,	   assaults	   on	   civilians,	  self-­‐justice	  by	  the	  local	  populations,	  revenge	  by	  the	  soldiers,	  farmers	  joining	  the	  baggage,	  more	  people	  becoming	  part	  of	  the	  war	  economy;	  are	  seen	  again	  in	  new	  kinds	   of	   conflicts	   in	   the	   twenty-­‐first	   century.	   The	   actors	   in	   the	   war	   are	   not	  interested	   in	   any	   solution	  of	   the	   conflicts,	   as	   this	  would	  mean	   the	   loss	  of	   their	  main	   source	   of	   income.	  While	   the	   old	  wars	  were	   ended	  by	   a	  peace	   conference	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(e.g.	   the	   Congress	   of	   Vienna),	   nowadays	   the	   term	   “peace	   process”	   is	   more	  common	   and	   would	   also	   have	   applied	   to	   the	   process	   leading	   to	   the	   treaty	   of	  Westphalia	  (Münkler	  2004).	  What	  came	  after	  this	  war	  was	  what	  is	  considered	  a	  robust	  political	  system	  based	  on	   symmetry	  between	  nations.	  While	  wars	  were	   fought	   repeatedly	   after	  the	   peace	   of	   Westphalia,	   the	   system	   was	   able	   to	   prevent	   forms	   of	   warfare	  threatening	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  or	  at	  least	  to	  confine	  it	  to	  the	  periphery.	  This	  political	   system	   of	   symmetry	   proved	   itself	   successful	   on	   three	   levels:	   military	  strategy,	   political	   rationality,	   and	   legitimacy	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	  international	   law.	   By	   international	   law,	   the	   respective	   sovereignty	   and	   formal	  equality	   of	   countries	  were	   prescribed,	   regardless	   of	   their	   size	   and	   population.	  This	   prevented	   especially	   less	   powerful	   countries	   to	   fall	   back	   into	   asymmetric	  warfare	  as	  this	  might	  have	  entailed	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  “equality	  premium”	  (Münkler	  2004,	  121).	  Structural	  symmetry	  stabilized	  at	  the	  level	  of	  political	  rationality	  by	  making	   the	   power	   of	   countries	   comparable.	   By	   simply	   comparing	   the	   size	   of	  military	  expenditures	  or	  the	  size	  of	  armed	  forces,	  rulers	  could	  relate	  the	  powers	  of	  other	  countries	  to	  their	  own.	  Wise	  forging	  of	  coalitions	  then	  allowed	  balancing	  those	   powers.	   Countries	   could	   arm	   themselves	   according	   to	   rational	   facts	   and	  did	  not	  –	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  asymmetric	  warfare	  –	  have	  to	  arm	  themselves	  against	  any	  imagination	  of	  a	  threat.	  At	   some	   point	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   this	   system	   of	  symmetry	  burst.	  It	  is	  debatable	  whether	  this	  happened	  already	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  Second	  or	  only	  with	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  be	  the	  world’s	  only	  superpower	  (Münkler	  2004).	  	  Münkler’s	   ambivalence	   ought	   to	   be	   criticized	   here	   though.	   World	   War	   II	   is	  probably	  the	  most	  striking	  example	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Westphalian	  system.	  The	  proxy	  wars	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  are	  another	  one.	  Warfare	  was	  structurally	  changed	  not	  only	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Thirty	  Years’	  War,	   but	   also	   to	   concurrent	   technological	   changes.	   Artillery	   gave	   a	   huge	  advantage	   to	   the	   territorial	   sovereign	   over	   the	   feudal	   warrior.	   Yet,	   this	   new,	  expensive	  weaponry	  could	  only	  be	  afforded	  through	  a	  viable	  tax	  system	  (see	  e.g.	  Münkler	   2000).	   Cost	   of	   investment	   became	   too	   high	   to	   be	   affordable	   for	   the	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individual	  war	  entrepreneur.	  Since	   the	  new	  weapon	  systems	  required	   training,	  standing	  armies	  had	  to	  be	  erected.	  This	  entailed	  uniforms,	  drill,	  and	  exercising.	  As	  mentioned	   above,	   this	   new	   symmetry	   led	   to	  wars	   being	   ended	   by	   a	  decisive	  battle	  and	  a	  subsequent	  peace	  conference.	  In	  the	  all-­‐encompassing	  wars	  of	   the	   20th	   century,	   war,	   state,	   and	   society	   unified	   and	   together	   with	  technological	   advances	   led	   to	   the	   immense	   number	   of	   victims	   (see	   e.g.	   Kaldor	  2000).	  Especially	  World	  War	  II	  showed	  that	  Münkler’s	  thesis	  that	  war	  has	  been	  disciplined	  by	  the	  state	  does	  not	  tell	  the	  whole	  story	  (see	  e.g.	  Zelik	  2007).	  
The	  new	  wars	  
The	  term	  “war”	  –	  still	  a	  useful	  category?	  To	  begin	  with,	  it	  should	  be	  discussed	  whether	  the	  new	  wars	  are	  in	  fact	  wars.	  Mary	  Kaldor	  maintains	  the	  term	  “war”	  while	  saying	  that:	  “The	  new	  wars	  occur	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  state	  revenues	  decline	  because	  of	  the	  decline	   of	   the	   economy	   as	   well	   as	   the	   spread	   of	   criminality,	   corruption	   and	  inefficiency,	   violence	   is	   increasingly	   privatized	   both	   as	   a	   result	   of	   growing	  organized	   crime	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   paramilitary	   groups,	   and	   political	  legitimacy	   is	   disappearing.	   Thus	   the	   distinctions	   are	   breaking	   down	   between	  external	  barbarity	  and	  domestic	  civility,	  between	  the	  combatant	  as	  the	  legitimate	  bearer	  of	  arms	  and	  the	  non-­‐combatant,	  or	  between	  the	  soldier	  or	  policeman	  and	  the	  criminal.	  The	  barbarity	  of	  war	  between	  states	  may	  have	  become	  a	   thing	  of	  the	  past.	  In	  its	  place	  is	  a	  new	  type	  of	  organized	  violence	  that	  is	  more	  pervasive,	  but	  also	  perhaps	  less	  extreme.”	  (Kaldor	  1998	  [2006],	  6)	  and:	  “First	  of	  all,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  'war'	  to	  emphasize	  the	  political	  character	  of	  the	  new	  wars,	   even	   though	   they	   could	   also	   be	   described	   as	   organized	   crime	   (illegal	   or	  private	   violence)	   or	   as	   massive	   violations	   of	   human	   rights	   (violence	   against	  civilians).	   Because	   networks	   are	   loose	   horizontal	   coalitions,	   unlike	   vertical	  disciplined	   armies	   of	   the	   past,	   a	   shared	   narrative,	   often	   based	   on	   a	   common	  identity,	  ethnic	  or	  religious,	  is	  an	  important	  organizing	  mechanism.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  netforce,	  the	  networks	  engaged	  in	  the	  new	  wars,	  what	  holds	  them	  together	  is	  generally	   an	   extreme	   political	   ideology	   based	   on	   the	   exclusive	   claim	   to	   state	  power	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   identity	   -­‐	   ethnic	   chauvinism	  or	   religious	   communalism.”	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She	   stresses	   access	   to	   state	   power	   “because	   these	   ideologies	   are	   not	   about	  substantive	   grievances,	   such	   as	   language	   rights	   or	   religious	   rights,	   although	  these	  may	  be	   indirectly	   important;	   rather	   they	  are	  about	   control	  of	  power	  and	  resources	  for	  an	  exclusively	  defined	  group	  of	  people.”	  (Kaldor	  2001)	  It	  should	  be	  added	   though	   that	   Kaldor’s	   distinction	   between	   what	   she	   calls	   “substantive	  grievances”	   and	   the	   will	   to	   control	   of	   state	   power	   is	   not	   perfectly	   clear	   or	  warranted.	  	  
The	  low-­‐cost	  war	  	  Historically,	  war	  is	  something	  expensive.	  Modern	  weapons	  systems,	  be	  they	  war	  tanks,	  fighter	  planes,	  or	  even	  satellite	  reconnaissance	  and	  missile	  defense,	  were	  and	  are	  costly	  and	  thus	  only	  affordable	  by	  governments.	  Armed	  forces	  nowadays	  are	  therefore	  smaller,	  but	  better	  equipped	  than	  during	  the	  times	  of	  the	  large	  tank	  formations	  and	  naval	  forces	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Yet,	  the	  new	  wars	  are	  astonishingly	  cheap,	  at	  least	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  their	  preparation	  and	  execution.	  They	  are	  waged	  using	  light	  and	  relatively	  cheap	  weapons	   such	   as	   automatic	   rifles,	   landmines,	   or	   rocket	   launchers.	   Jeeps	   and	  pickup	  trucks	  serve	  as	  means	  of	  transportation.	  Heavy	  weapons,	  easily	  available	  especially	   shortly	   after	   the	   break-­‐up	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   are	   taken	   from	   the	  remainders	   of	   the	   arsenals	   received	  by	   the	   great	   powers	  during	   the	  Cold	  War.	  But	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  them:	  massacres	  and	  skirmishes	  can	  be	  conducted	  easily	  with	  light	  weaponry	  and	  quick	  transportation	  (Münkler	  2004).	  	  
Globalisation	  Kaldor	  sees	  globalizations	  as	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  conflicts	  that	  could	  be	  called	  new	  wars.	  “There	   are	   two	   aspects	   of	   the	   new	   wave	   of	   identity	   politics	   which	  specifically	  relate	  to	  the	  process	  of	  globalization.	  First,	  the	  new	  wave	  of	  identity	  politics	  is	  now	  local	  and	  global,	  national	  as	  well	  as	  transnational.	  In	  many	  cases,	  there	  are	  significant	  Diaspora	  communities	  whose	  influence	  is	  greatly	  enhanced	  by	  the	  ease	  of	  travel	  and	  improved	  communication.	  Alienated	  Diaspora	  groups	  in	  advanced	   industrial	   or	   oil-­‐rich	   countries	   provide	   ideas,	   funds	   and	   techniques,	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thereby	   imposing	   their	   own	   frustrations	   and	   fantasies	   on	  what	   is	   often	   a	   very	  different	   situation.	   Second,	   this	   politics	  makes	   use	   of	   the	   new	   technology.	   The	  speed	  of	   political	  mobilization	   is	   greatly	   increased	  by	   the	  use	   of	   the	   electronic	  media.	   The	   effect	   of	   television,	   radio	   or	   videos	   on	  what	   is	   often	   a	   non-­‐reading	  public	   cannot	   be	   overestimated.	   The	   protagonists	   of	   the	   new	   politics	   often	  display	   the	   symbols	   of	   a	   global	   mass	   culture	   –	   Mercedes	   cars,	   Rolex	   watches,	  Ray-­‐Ban	  sunglasses	  –	  combined	  with	   the	   labels	   that	   signify	   their	  own	  brand	  of	  particularistic	  cultural	  identity.”	  (Kaldor	  1998	  [2006],	  8)	  It	   is	   probably	   safe	   to	   say	   that	   international	   terrorism	   more	   than	   ever	  relies	  on	  the	  tools	  provided	  by	  globalization.	  The	  attacks	  of	  September	  11	  were	  almost	   televised	   live	   to	   a	   worldwide	   audience.	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   frequently	   uses	   the	  Internet	   or	   international	   news	   outlets	   like	   Al-­‐Jazeera	   to	   broadcast	   their	  propaganda.	  Many	   videos	   of	   alleged	   crimes	   against	  Muslims	   or	  messages	   from	  influential	  clerics	  can	  easily	  be	  found	  on	  YouTube.	  	  
International	  law	  In	   international	   law,	   the	   only	   actor	   is	   the	   state,	   as	   well	   as	   international	  organizations	  with	   an	   international	   legal	   status.	   It	   is	   based	   on	   the	   principle	   of	  equality	  among	  all	  those	  actors.	  Yet,	  in	  the	  new	  wars,	  the	  relevant	  actors	  are	  not	  states	   anymore.	   As	   an	   example,	   if	   we	   look	   at	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	   United	  States	  on	  one	  side	  and	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  on	  the	  other,	   it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  this	  cannot	  directly	  be	  settled	  through	  international	   law.	   It	  makes	  therefore	  sense,	   that	   the	  concept	  of	  “states	  harboring	  terrorism”	  had	  to	  be	  introduced2.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  On	  a	  side	  note,	  it	  should	  be	  remembered	  that	  this	  is	  what	  President	  Bush	  infamously	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “axis	  of	  evil”.	  While	  media	  coverage	  on	  Bush’s	  2002	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address	  suggested	  that	  Bush	  wrongly	  constructed	  an	  alliance	  between	  Iraq,	  Iran	  and	  North	  Korea,	  the	  exact	  wording	  of	   the	  address	   talks	  about	  an	   “axis	  of	  evil”	  between	   terrorists	  on	  one	  side	  and	  state	  harbors	  of	  terrorism	  (specifically	  the	  three	  countries	  just	  mentioned)	  on	  the	  other	  side.	  Bush	  also	  confirms	  this	  interpretation	  in	  his	  autobiography	  (Bush	  2010).	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Military	  discipline	  New	   wars,	   which	   do	   not	   rely	   on	   traditional	   standing	   armies	   anymore,	   are	  therefore	  also	  characterized	  by	  the	  loss	  in	  military	  discipline	  among	  its	  soldiers.	  While	  traditional	  guerillas	  such	  as	  those	  of	  Che	  Guevara	  or	  Mao	  Tse-­‐Tung	  thrived	  to	  win	  the	  “hearts	  and	  minds”	  of	  ever-­‐larger	  parts	  of	  the	  population,	  in	  order	  to	  eventually	   get	   in	   control	   of	   the	   country,	   in	   the	   new	   wars	   political	   control	   is	  obtained	   the	   creation	   of	   religiously	   or	   ethnically	   “clean”	   areas,	   through	   what	  Kaldor	   calls	   “identity	   politics”	   (Kaldor	   1998	   [2006]).	   Radical	   Islamism	   has	   a	  specific	   concept	   for	   its	   identity	   politics:	   the	   “ummah”	   (see	   e.g.	   Philip	   2010).	   In	  pan-­‐Arabism,	   this	   concept	   referred	   to	   the	   whole	   collective	   of	   Arabs.	   In	   pan-­‐Islamism,	   it	   refers	   to	   the	   community	   of	   the	   believers.	   Radical	   Islamism	   then	  distinguishes	  between	  Dar	  al-­‐Islam,	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  and	  Dar	  al-­‐Harb	  (literally:	  House	  of	  War),	  the	  geographical	  area	  where	  Muslim	  laws	  does	  not	  apply.	  	  
The	  media	  The	  role	  of	  the	  media	  has	  also	  changed	  in	  the	  new	  wars.	  Their	  role	  is	  henceforth	  to	  influence	  the	  international	  community.	  Conflicting	  parties	  thus	  systematically	  and	  concertedly	  use	  the	  media	  to	  spin	  the	  world	  opinion	  to	  their	  favor.	  They	  will	  then	  try	  to	  either	  avoid	  the	  media’s	  being	  present	  in	  the	  field,	  or,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  try	   to	  get	   reporters	  and	  cameras	   into	   the	  battleground,	  so	   that	   their	  version	  of	  the	  story	  gets	  heard	  and	  seen.	  Media	  have	  thereby	   involuntarily	  (or	  sometimes	  voluntarily)	   become	   an	   active	   actor	   in	   those	   armed	   conflicts.	   This	   is	   a	   direct	  consequence	   of	   the	   asymmetric	   structure	   of	   modern	   conflicts,	   that	   is,	   not	   the	  fight	   between	   soldiers	   and	   soldiers,	   but	   between	   a	   military	   and	   a	   civilian	  population.	   The	   world	   audience	   has	   thus	   become	   a	   valuable	   resource	   of	   war,	  behind	  which	   fighters	  of	   the	  perceived	  weaker	   side	   can	  hide.	  The	  political	   and	  military	   relevance	   of	   television	   cameras	   therefore	   increases	   with	   a	   conflict’s	  asymmetry.	  Any	  party	  involved	  in	  the	  fighting	  has	  an	  incentive	  to	  portray	  itself	  as	   the	   David	   fighting	   against	   Goliath.	   The	   most	   useful	   means	   to	   do	   so	   is	   by	  selectively	  presenting	  refugees,	  crying	  women	  and	  desperate	  children	  (Münkler	  2004).	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External	  support	  As	   it	   also	   became	   clear	   in	   Kaldor’s	   stressing	   the	   importance	   of	   globalization,	  external	   support	   is	   a	   key	   motor	   for	   new	   wars.	   Neighboring	   countries,	   which	  expect	   a	   strategic	  benefit	   from	   their	   involvement,	   or	   countries	  with	  historic	  or	  religious	   ties	   to	   the	   conflict	   zone	   will	   get	   involved.	   Kaldor	   used	   the	   war	   in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  as	  a	  case	  study	  of	  a	  new	  war.	  She	  therein	  identifies	  several	  forms	   of	   support	   by	   fellow	  Muslim	   states:	   secret	   service	   information,	   military	  equipment,	   diplomatic	   support	   in	   international	   organizations,	   infrastructure	  measures,	  humanitarian	  aid,	  and	  simply	  financial	  support	  (Kaldor	  1999	  [2006]).	  The	  other	  group	  of	   supporters	   consists	   in	   the	  diaspora	   communities	  dispersed	  around	  the	  world,	  which	  will	  give	   their	  support	   to	  and	   lobbying	   in	   favor	  of	   the	  faction	  they	  support	  (ibid.).	  
Financing	  of	  new	  wars,	  in	  particular	  terrorism	  Kaldor	   and	  Münkler	   both	   highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   looting,	   the	  misuse	   of	  humanitarian	   aid,	   the	   exploitation	   of	   a	   country’s	   natural	   resources,	   and	   cross-­‐border	  smuggling	  to	  the	  financing	  of	  new	  wars.	  Terrorists	  have	  repeatedly	  found	  ways	  of	  acquiring	  money	  for	  their	  endeavors.	  	  
Terrorism	  vs.	  guerilla	  warfare	  While	  new	  wars	  are	  definitely	   a	   form	  of	  war,	   there	  nevertheless	  needs	   to	  be	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  war	  (old	  or	  new)	  and	  terrorism.	  Both	  Münkler	  and	  Kaldor	  are	  aware	  of	  this	  issue,	  though	  only	  Münkler	  devoted	  a	  whole	  chapter	  to	  it.	  Depending	  on	  the	  setting,	  the	  distinction	  between	  terrorism	  and	   guerilla	   warfare	   is	   not	   clear-­‐cut	   anymore.	   Are	   the	   so-­‐called	   insurgents	   in	  Iraq3	  partisans	  using	  guerilla	  methods	  (in	  their	  view,	  they	  are	  representatives	  of	  a	  people	   fighting	   foreign	   invasion	  and	  occupation),	  or	  are	   they	   terrorists	   (after	  all,	   they	   use	   methods	   like	   suicide	   attacks	   deliberately	   targeting	   civilian	  populations	   and	   fall	   well	   under	   any	   definition	   of	   terrorism)?	   The	   answer	   is	  probably:	  both.	  While	  this	  distinction	  might	  seem	  at	  first	  purely	  academic,	  it	  has	  relevance	   at	   the	   legal	   level	   and	   thus	   decides	   as	   to	  whether	   and	  what	   kinds	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  is	  summarized	  quite	  well	  by	  Record	  (2003,	  p.34):	  “What	  started	  out	  as	  a	  short	  conventional	  war	  of	  choice	  has	  become	  an	  open-­‐ended	  unconventional	  war	  of	  necessity.”	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intervention	   against	   those	   insurgents	   is/are	   permissible	   to	   the	   UN	   and	   its	  member	   states.	   The	   simplest	   “test”	   to	   characterize	   an	   armed	   political	  organization	   or	  movement	   as	   either	   terrorists	   or	   guerilla	  warriors	   could	   be	   to	  look	   at	   its	   targets.	  Whether	   it	   uses	   violence	   against	   noncombatants	   or	   against	  lawful	  combatants	  of	   its	  opponents	  would	  make	  the	  crucial	  difference.	  Neuhold	  (2006)	   cautions	   that	   this	   distinction,	   which	   is	   also	   made	   in	   the	   1999	   UN	  Convention	   for	   the	  Suppression	  of	   the	  Financing	  of	  Terrorism	  and	   in	   the	  2004	  UN	   report	   “A	   more	   secure	   world:	   Our	   shared	   responsibility”,	   means	   that	   “an	  attack	  killing	  a	  politician	  and	  a	  high	  military	  officer	  sitting	  at	  the	  same	  table	  in	  a	  restaurant	  […]	  would	  only	  constitute	  a	  50	  per	  cent	  terrorist	  act”	  (ibid,	  p.	  25).	  	  
Terrorism	  as	  a	  communication	  strategy	  The	   difficulty	   of	   defining	   terrorism	   originates	   from	   the	   simple	   fact	   that	   it	   is	  highly	  political	  and	  subjective.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  old,	  somewhat	  cliché	  saying	  “one	  man’s	  terrorist	  is	  another	  man’s	  freedom	  fighter”,	  the	  designation	  “terrorism”	  in	  international	   relations	   is	   a	   mechanism	   of	   exclusion4.	   It,	   by	   definition,	  immediately	   renounces	   the	   opponent’s	   claims	   as	   non-­‐negotiable	   or	   at	   least	   as	  long	  as	  they	  recur	  to	  violent	  means	  (Münkler	  2004).	  Of	  course,	  the	  other	  side	  will	  refer	   to	   itself	   as	   freedom	   fighters	  who,	  due	   to	   their	  military	  weakness,	  need	   to	  make	  use	  of	  unconventional	  methods.	  Whether	  an	  organization	  is	  stigmatized	  as	  a	  terrorist	  organization	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  able	  to	  garner	  support	  as	  the	  legitimate	  advocates	   of	   a	   rightful	   cause,	   will	   be	   pivotal	   for	   its	   success	   (ibid.).	   What	   is	  paramount	  is	  that	  terrorism	  is	  a	  way	  of	  applying	  violence	  that	  earns	  its	  success	  indirectly.	   It	   is	  not	  about	   its	  physical	  effects,	  but	  of	   the	  psychological	  effects.	   In	  the	   armed	   struggle	   between	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   and	   the	   United	   States,	   destroying	   the	  World	   Trade	   Center	   did	   not	   provide	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   a	   direct	   military,	   physical	  advantage.	   Neither	   did	   its	   attacks	   on	   American	   soldiers	   in	   Iraq.	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	  the	  actions	  of	  partisans	  in	  other	  wars,	  say	  World	  War	  II,	  actually	  damaged	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Note	  that	  this	  view	  of	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  term	  terrorism	  and	  that	  said	  view	  is	  now	  considered	  „politically	   correct“	   	   is	   criticized	   by	   Ganor	   (2002)	   when	   he	   claims	   that	   „an	   objective,	  internationally	  accepted	  definition	  of	   terrorism	   is	  a	   feasible	  goal,	   and	   that	  an	  effective	   struggle	  against	   terrorism	   requires	   such	   a	   definition.	   The	   sooner	   the	  nations	   of	   the	  world	   come	   to	   this	  realization,	  the	  better.”	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the	  capacities	  of	  the	  opponent’s	  military	  –	  unlike	  terrorists,	  those	  partisans	  were	  also	   able	   to	   withstand	   surprise	   and	   short	   military	   confrontations.	  What	  made	  those	   attacks	   so	   successful	   for	   Al-­‐Qaeda	  was	   the	  message	   that	   it	   sent	   and	   the	  terror	  and	  fear	  that	   it	  spread.	  Münkler	  therefore	  emphasizes	  the	   importance	  of	  terrorism	  as	  a	  strategy	  of	  communication.	  The	  recipient	  of	  those	  messages	  is	  first	  the	  victim	  of	  the	  attack,	  who	  is	  shown	  its	  vulnerability	  to	  attacks	  and	  the	  political	  costs	   of	   a	   continued	   engagement	   in	   a	   specific	   region	   or	   the	   sustaining	   of	   its	  political	  will,	   and	  second	   to	  a	   third	  party	  of	  which	   the	   interested	   the	   terrorists	  try	   to	   garner.	   This	   third	   party	   is	   the	   group	   of	   people	   for	   which	   the	   terrorist	  organization	  claims	  to	  be	  waging	  the	  war.	  This	  third	  party	   is	  also	  the	  source	  of	  the	  terrorist	  group’s	  sense	  of	  legitimacy.	  	  
From	  a	  tactical	  element	  to	  a	  political	  and	  military	  strategy	  Terrorism	  has	  a	  longstanding	  tradition	  in	  the	  history	  of	  politics.	  It	  is	  only	  in	  the	  middle	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	   in	   the	   course	   of	   anticolonial	   liberation	  movements	   throughout	   the	  European	  colonial	  powers	   that	   terrorism	  became	  a	  successful	  strategy.	  Its	  social-­‐revolutionary	  counterpart	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  as	  an	  example	  for	  comparison,	   failed.	  Many	  politicians	  who	  were	   considered	   terrorists	   earlier	   made	   it	   into	   the	   United	   Nations	   General	  Assembly	   in	   the	   1960s5.	   The	   function	   of	   terrorism	   was	   to	   spark	   a	   broader	  partisan	   movement	   against	   the	   colonial	   power.	   As	   such,	   its	   usage	   was	   self-­‐restricted	   by	   its	   perpetrators.	   Targets	   were	   carefully	   chosen	   and	   the	  aforementioned	  third	  party	  was	  kept	  out	  of	  harm’s	  way	  as	  much	  as	  possible	   in	  order	   to	  prevent	   the	   colonial	  power	   from	  using	   it	   for	   its	  propaganda	   (Münkler	  2004).	  Münkler	  sees	  as	  –	  especially	  for	  this	  paper	  relevant	  –	  difference	  between	  social-­‐revolutionary	   and	   ethnic-­‐nationalist	   groups’	   terrorism	   on	   one	   hand	   and	  religious	  terrorism	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  The	  former	  is	  quite	  meticulous	  about	  said	  self-­‐restriction,	  whereas	  the	  latter	  has	  a	  much	  broader	  conception	  of	  the	  enemy.	  There	   is	   no	   distinct	   third	   party,	   but	   rather	   this	   has	   yet	   to	   be	   constructed.	  Additionally,	   it	   can	   draw	  upon	  millenarian	   or	   apocalyptic	   legitimizations	   of	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	   The	   PLO’s	   high-­‐wire	   act	   between	   seeking	   recognition	   as	   legitimate	   representatives	   of	   an	  oppressed	   people	   on	   one	   side	   and	   engaging	   in	   terrorist	   acts	   on	   the	   other	   side	   could	   also	   be	  mentioned	  as	  an	  example.	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acts.	   In	  a	  divine	   struggle	  against	   “evil”	  or	   the	   “infidels”,	   it	   cannot	  be	   taken	   into	  consideration	  on	  innocent	  victims.	  	  This	   is	   of	   importance	   to	   the	   strategies	   against	   terrorism	  and	   the	  United	  Nations	   insofar	   as	   it	   is	   religious	   terrorism	   that	   acts	   truly	   internationally	   and	  transnationally.	  The	  internationalization	  of	  terrorism	  (e.g.	  through	  hijackings	  of	  and	   attacks	   on	   commercial	   airliners	   –	   with	   the	   Landshut	   hijacking	   and	   the	  Lockerbie	  attack	  as	  probably	  the	  most	  notorious	  incidents)	  further	  extended	  the	  circle	  of	  potential	  victims	  and	  made	  the	  restrictions	  of	  terrorism	  more	  diffuse.	  Terrorism	  has	  furthermore	  become	  an	  independent	  strategic	  option	  that	  works	  independently	  of	  the	  “big	  war”	  and	  also	  independently	  of	  the	  “small	  war”,	  the	  guerilla.	  The	  new	  war	  against	  a	  foreign	  power	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  won	  on	  the	  battlefield	  by	  partisans	  anymore	  (as	  it	  was	  the	  strategy	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  or	  the	  Vietnam	  War),	  but	  the	  rationale	  is	  to	  keep	  the	  war	  going	  for	  as	  long	  as	  possible	   in	   order	   to	   render	   it	   excessively	   expensive	   for	   the	   enemy.	   Terrorism,	  unlike	   partisan	   warfare,	   though	   does	   not	   so	   much	   target	   the	   its	   enemy’s	  economy	  as	  it	  rather	  tries	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  enemy’s	  media,	  which	  exercise	  a	  strong	   leverage	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   terrorists’	   attacks.	   Usually	   (and	   with	   the	  exception	  of	  the	  attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001)	  the	  physical	  effects	  of	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  on	   the	  economic	   infrastructure	  of	  a	   country	  would	  be	   too	  small	  without	  the	   amplification	   by	   the	   media.	   The	   shift	   in	   warfare	   towards	   partisan	   and	  terrorist	   tactics	   and	   strategies	   also	   has	   another	   consequence,	   namely	   that	   the	  regular	  army	   likewise	  needs	   to	  recur	   to	  similar	   tactics	  and	  strategy	   in	  order	   to	  win	  the	  war	  –	  with	  very	  adverse	  effects	  on	  the	  civilian	  populations	  (ibid.).	  This	  has	   important	   legal	   implications	   though,	   given	   that	   international	   law	   does	   not	  sanction	  the	  use	  of	  such	  approaches	  by	  states.	  Terrorism	  has	  led	  to	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  asymmetric	  warfare	  in	  which	  even	  small	  groups	  can	  do	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  harm.	  Defending	   oneself	   against	   terrorism	   is	   almost	   impossible	   –	   religious	   terrorists	  cannot	  be	  prevented	  from	  their	  acts	  by	  monetary	  or	  political	  concessions.	  Since	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  United	  States	  by	  and	  large	  and	  to	   a	   lower	   extent	   the	  Western	   European	   countries	   stand	   unchallenged	   in	   any	  symmetric,	   conventional	   conflict.	   Therefore,	   anybody	  who	  wishes	   to	   challenge	  these	  powers	  needs	  to	  make	  use	  of	  asymmetric	  warfare.	  In	  this	  kind	  of	  warfare,	  even	   the	   United	   States	   can	   be	   defeated	   –	   the	   Vietnam	   War	   and	   the	   failed	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interventions	   in	   Somalia	   and	   Lebanon	   stand	   as	   examples.	   The	   diffusion	   of	   the	  imagery	  through	  the	  mass	  media	  contributes	  to	  the	  deterring	  effects	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  warfare	  on	  the	  attacked	  state.	  
The	  targets	  of	  terrorist	  groups	  The	  above-­‐mentioned	  shift	   in	  strategies	  and	  the	   importance	  of	   the	  media	   leads	  us	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  the	  targets	  of	  terrorist	  actions	  are.	  Religious	  terrorism	  (and	  this	  kind	  of	  terrorism	  is	  singled	  out	  here	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  this	  is	  the	  most	  transnational	  kind	  of	  terrorism	  and	  thus	  has	  the	  highest	  relevance	  for	  the	  topic	  of	   this	   thesis)	   presents	   a	   highly	   extended	   definition	   of	   what	   the	   enemy	   is.	   It	  targets	   not	   just	   power	   elites,	   but	  whole	   civilizations	   (or	   even:	   lifestyles).	   As	   it	  cares	  less	  about	  the	  third	  party,	  it	  produces	  far	  higher	  numbers	  of	  casualties.	  The	  fact	   that	   religious	   terrorist	   attacks	   usually	   come	   without	   specific	   political	  demands	   (they	   communicate	   through	   the	   imagery	   produced,	   not	   through	   the	  more	  “classic”	  letters	  claiming	  responsibility)	  that	  –	  if	  met	  –	  would	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	   terrorist	   campaign.	   The	   purpose	   is	   rather	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   general	  feeling	  of	  menace	  (by	  the	  American	  population	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  September	  11,	  2001,	   attacks)	   and	   the	   message	   to	   the	   third	   party	   that	   a	   war	   against	   an	  overwhelming	   power	   can	   be	   successful	   if	   the	   “weaker”	   side	   recurs	   to	   non-­‐conventional	   methods.	   But	   the	   attacks	   of	   9/11	   as	   well	   as	   several	   attacks	   on	  tourist	  destinations	  reveal	  that	  the	  target	  was	  also	  the	  economic	  infrastructure.	  	  The	  economic	  fabric	  of	  western	  economies	  can	  be	  very	  thin.	  Indeed,	  such	  attacks	   and	   the	  panic	   they	   create	  have	   immensely	  detrimental	   effects	   on	   stock	  markets	   and	   investors’	   expectations	   about	   the	   future.	   Especially	   smaller	  countries,	   which	   are	   oriented	   towards	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Europe,	   might	  thereby	  be	  forced	  to	  shift	  their	  orientation	  and	  keep	  at	  distance	  from	  the	  West.	  The	   damage	   produced	   by	   terrorism	   is	   thus	   not	   the	   destruction	   of	   economic	  infrastructure,	   but	   the	   tearing	   apart	   of	   the	   sensible	   psychological	   economic	  fabric	  of	  modern	  societies	  (ibid.).	  
Summary	  and	  criticism	  It	  will	  be	  seen	  later	  on	  that	  the	  United	  Nations	  do	  not	  have	  such	  a	  clear	  view	  of	  what	   exactly	   terrorism	   and	   the	   war	   against	   it	   are.	   Finding	   a	   definition	   of	  terrorism	  at	  the	  UN	  level	  has	  been	  a	  long	  and	  still	  on-­‐going	  process	  and	  relates	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directly	  to	  the	  topic	  at	  hand.	  The	  UN	  is	  not	  alone	  with	  this	  difficulty	  of	  definition:	  Schmid	  et	  al	  (1988)	  count	  109	  different	  definitions	  of	  terrorism.	  	  Thus,	  an	  old	  dictum	  by	  Clausewitz	  becomes	  once	  again	  relevant:	  “first,	  the	  supreme,	   most	   far-­‐reaching	   act	   of	   judgment	   that	   the	   statesman	   and	   the	  commander	   have	   to	   make	   is	   to	   establish	   the	   kind	   of	   war	   on	   which	   they	   are	  embarking,	  neither	  mistaking	   it	   for,	  not	   trying	  to	   turn	   it	   into,	  something	  that	   is	  alien	   to	   its	   true	  nature.	  This	   is	   the	   first	   of	   all	   strategic	   questions	   and	   the	  most	  comprehensive”	  (Clausewitz	  1976,	  p.88).	  For	   sake	   of	   completeness,	   it	   should	   also	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   literature	   on	  “new	  wars”	  faces	  some	  criticism.	  If	  new	  wars,	  which	  take	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  globalization	   and	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   state	   authority,	   are	   summarized	   as	  conflicts	   between	   state	   and	   sub-­‐state	   actors	   (thus	   emphasis	   being	   put	   on	   the	  privatization	   aspect)	   and	   characterized	   by	   their	   targeting	   of	   civilians	   and	  deliberate	  displacement	  of	  people(s),	   then	  the	  criticism	  of	   this	   literature	  points	  out	   that	   those	   are	   elements	   present	   throughout	   the	   last	   one	   hundred	   years	  (Killingsworth	  2010).	  While	   Killingsworth	   (2010)	   is	   critical	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   “new	   wars”	  (mainly	   because	   the	   differences	   to	   old	   wars	   are	   not	   clear-­‐cut	   enough	   and	   the	  nature	  of	  warfare	  as	  organized	  violence	  for	  political	  goals	  has	  not	  changed	  in	  his	  view),	  he	  recapitulates	  why	  the	  war	  on	  terror	  “appears	  to	  be	  the	  perfect	  example	  of	  a	  new	  war”	  (ibid,	  p.	  133):	  
• The	   war	   on	   terror	   confronts	   state	   and	   sub-­‐state	   actors.	   Sub-­‐state	  actors	  include	  the	  Taliban	  and	  various	  insurgents	  in	  Iraq,	  but	  also	  the	  private	   security	   contractors	   hired	   by	   the	   United	   States	   (such	   as	   the	  notorious	  Blackwater	  Group).	   
• The	  wars	   in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  (which	  are	  the	  main	  battlefields	  of	  the	   war	   on	   terror)	   lack	   definitive	   or	   even	   traditional	   battles.	   The	  predominance	  of	  airstrikes	  and	  ongoing	  ground	  skirmishes	  renders	  it	  difficult	  to	  declare	  winners	  or	  losers.	   
• Civilian	  deaths	  outweigh	  military	  deaths.	  There	   are	  high	  numbers	  of	  permanent	  refugees	  and	  displaced	  persons. 
• The	   casus	   bellum	   is	   disputed	   and	   ambivalent.	   This	   relates	   more	  generally	   to	   the	   problems	   involved	  with	   the	   concept	   of	   pre-­‐emptive	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wars	   	   (the	  United	  States	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  of	  2002,	  which	   is	  reviewed	  below,	  advocates	  this	  principle).	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Multilateralism	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  	  
Why	  rely	  on	  international	  organizations	  and	  international	  law?	  Before	  pursuing	  the	  question	  of	  how	  countries	  use	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  combat	  terrorism,	  a	  more	  fundamentally	  theoretical	  aspects	  need	  to	  be	  addressed:	  Why	  is	   it	  that	  states	  rely	  on	  international	   law	  at	  all?	  Why	  would	  they	  comply	  with	  it	  even	   though	   there	   are	  no	  obvious	   enforcement	  mechanisms?	  Why	  do	   they	  use	  international	  organizations?	  What	  is	  their	  purpose?	  We	  observe	   in	  reality	   that	   international	   legal	   rules	  affect	  state	  behavior.	  States	   react	   to	   judicial	   decisions	   and	   sometimes	   adapt	   domestic	   legislation	   in	  order	   to	   comply	   with	   international	   agreements.	   Those	   changes	   show	   that	  agreements	   sometimes	   do	   exert	   some	   influence	   (Guzman	   2008).	   If	   it	   is	  concluded	   that	   international	   law	   has	   an	   effect	   in	   some	   instances	   and	   under	  certain	  circumstances,	  then	  strategies	  against	  terrorism	  will	  have	  to	  take	  this	  fact	  into	  account.	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  that	  states	  invest	  a	  lot	  of	  resources	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  international	  rules	  and	  into	  debates	  about	  compliance	  with	  them.	  An	  example	  would	  the	  huge	  diplomatic	  and	  material	  effort	  that	  states	  exert	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  authorizing	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  States	  invest	  resources	  to	  obtain	  or	  to	  prevent	  international	  agreements	  (see	  for	  instance	  the	  field	   of	   environmental	   policy)	   and	   foreign	   ministries	   like	   the	   United	   States	  Department	   of	   State	   employ	   large	   and	   costly	   cadres	   of	   lawyers	   evaluating	   the	  legality	  of	  their	  country’s	  and	  other	  countries’	  conduct	  (ibid.).	  As	  Guzman	  (2008)	  notes,	  there	  is	  still	  an	  academic	  challenge	  in	  the	  field	  of	  international	   law:	   “Despite	   the	   important	  contributions	   from	  the	  authors	   listed	  here	   [in	   ibid.,	   PCH]	   and	   many	   others,	   the	   field	   of	   international	   law	   remains	  largely	  without	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  coherent	  theory	  that	  seeks	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  system	  works	  across	  its	  full	  spectrum.”	  He	  puts	  his	  emphasis	  of	  analysis	  on	  the	   enforcement	   and	   uses	   the	   approach	   of	   the	   “three	   Rs	   of	   compliance”:	  reputation,	  reciprocity,	  and	  retaliation.	  The	   study	   of	   international	   law	   –	   especially	   with	   this	   thesis’	   topic	   –	  confronts	   one	   particular	   exception,	   namely	   the	   European	   Union,	   which	   is	   an	  organization	   sui	   generis.	   “Because	   European	   states	   successfully	   delegated	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authority	   to	  European	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	  European	  Commission	   (EC),	   the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  and	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  consent	  of	  all	  EU	   members	   is	   not	   required	   to	   establish	   rules	   governing	   their	   conduct.	   This	  causes	  the	  EU	  to	  take	  on	  some	  characteristics	  we	  normally	  think	  of	  as	  belonging	  to	   states,	   including	   its	   own	   laws,	   regulations,	   and	   courts.	   Furthermore,	   the	   EU	  represents	   such	   a	   deep	   level	   of	   integration	   that	   matters	   of	   compliance	   and	  defection	  take	  on	  a	  different	  character.	  […]	  To	  the	  extent	  a	  new	  Europe	  offers	  all	  states	   significant	   benefits,	   there	   is	   a	   greater	   incentive	   to	   accept	   individual	  arrangements	  that	  are	  costly”	  (ibid,	  p.	  14).	  The	   problem	   of	   legality	   in	   a	   new	   kind	   of	   war	   is	   reflected	   upon	   in	  memorandum	  by	   President	   Bush	   (2002a)	  where	   he	   states	   that:	   “However,	   the	  war	   against	   terrorism	   ushers	   in	   a	   new	   paradigm,	   one	   in	   which	   groups	   with	  broad,	   international	   reach	   commit	   horrific	   acts	   against	   innocent	   civilians,	  sometimes	  with	  the	  direct	  support	  of	  states.	  Our	  Nation	  recognizes	  that	  this	  new	  paradigm	  –	  ushered	  in	  not	  by	  us,	  but	  by	  terrorists	  –	  requires	  new	  thinking	  in	  the	  law	   of	   war,	   but	   thinking	   that	   should	   nevertheless	   be	   consistent	   with	   the	  principles	  of	  [the]	  Geneva	  [Convention	  Relative	  to	  the	  Treatment	  of	  Prisoners	  of	  War	  of	  August	  12,	  1949].”	  	  
New	  multilateralism	  Neoliberals	   (in	   regard	   to	   international	   relations,	   not	   necessarily	   to	   economic	  policy)	   such	   as	   the	   influential	   Robert	   Keohane	   (1990)	   or	   John	   Ruggie	   (1993)	  describe	  multilateralism	  as	  a	  process	  that	  “coordinates	  behavior	  among	  three	  or	  more	  states	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  generalized	  principles	  of	  conduct”	  (Buggies	  1993,	  p.	  14).	  Hence,	  the	  problem	  is	  to	  find	  principles	  and	  norms	  that	  provide	  the	  rules	  to	  guide	   said	   behavior.	   These	   rules	   are	   crucial	   components	   of	   coordinated	  collective	  state	  action.	  The	  key	  to	  multilateralism	  is	  therefore	  the	  overcoming	  of	  collective	  action	  problems	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  enforcement.	  	  Other	  questions	  are:	  “How	  should	  the	  norms	  that	  shape	  behavior	  actually	  be	   operationalized	   and	   how	   should	   decision-­‐making	   authority	   be	   allocated?	  Empirically,	  we	  can	  observe	  that	  the	  institutionalization	  over	  time	  of	  bodies	  such	  as	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	  World	   Bank	   has	   seen	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	   decision-­‐making	  autonomy	   pass	   to	   the	   institution	   than	   their	   membership	   had	   almost	   certainly	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initially	   anticipated”	   (ibid.,	   p.	   226).	   In	   the	   last	   decades	   the	   number	   of	   state-­‐sponsored	   and	   non-­‐governmental	   international	   organizations	   has	   grown	  “dramatically”	   and	   this	   growth	  has	  been	  a	  defining	   feature	  of	   the	   international	  system	  for	  decades.	  International	  cooperation	  was	  spurred	  on	  one	  side	  because	  of	   technological	   advances	   (with	   the	   International	   Telegraph	  Union,	   founded	   in	  1865,	  being	  widely	  regarded	  as	  the	  first	  modern	  international	  organization)	  and	  on	  the	  other	  side	  by	  the	  pursuit	  of	  peace	  (Concert	  of	  Europe,	  League	  of	  Nations).	  After	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  organizations	  established	  at	  this	  time	  dealt	  with	  the	  management	  of	   the	   international	  economy.	  This	  process	  was	   led	  under	   the	  auspices	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  followed	  the	  idea	  that	  maintaining	  economies	  open	  and	   liberal	  was	   a	   solution	   to	  prevent	   future	  major	   conflicts.	  What	   is	   also	  important	   to	   note	   is	   that	   “there	   has	   been	   a	   continuing	   shift	   of	   authority	   from	  states	   to	   non-­‐government	   or	   government-­‐sponsored	   organizations	   which	   are	  assuming	  greater	   responsibility	   for	  making	  and	  enacting	  policy	   in	   their	  area	  of	  presumed	  competence”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  227).	  This	  is	  an	  important	  point	  when	  looking	  at	  institutions	   like	   the	   UN	   Office	   on	   Drugs	   and	   Crime	   (of	   which	   terrorism	  prevention	   is	   one	   of	   the	   mandates),	   which	   employs	   specialists	   and	   unelected	  technocrats	  who	  have	  some	  authority	  in	  policy-­‐making.	  The	   role	   of	   international	   organizations	   and	   the	   influence	   they	   can	   exert	  depends	   also	   on	   their	   composition	   and	   role.	   Such	   an	   organization	   can	   be	   very	  narrow	  in	  their	  scope	  but	  then	  is	  often	  broad	  in	  membership	  (take	  as	  an	  example	  the	   Universal	   Postal	   Union),	   while	   others	   can	   be	   broad	   in	   scope	   and	   narrow	  (read:	  more	  regional)	  in	  membership	  (the	  typical	  examples	  include	  the	  European	  Union,	   the	   Asia	   Pacific	   Economic	   Cooperation	   forum	   or	   the	   Organization	   for	  Economic	   Cooperation	   and	   Development).	   The	   broader	   an	   organization	   is,	   the	  easier	  it	  is	  to	  agree	  on	  deals.	  So	  if,	  for	  instance,	  anti-­‐terrorism	  is	  embedded	  with	  the	   UN	   organization,	   then	   it	   provides	   a	   forum	   where	   one	   state	   can	   agree	   to	  deeper	  cooperation	  in	  anti-­‐terrorism	  matters	  in	  exchange	  for	  concessions	  in,	  say,	  climate	  change	  agreements.	  A	  review	  of	  this	  thread	  of	  literature	  can	  be	  found	  for	  instance	  in	  Guzman	  (2004).	  In	  order	  to	  further	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  the	  UN	  in	  counter-­‐terrorism,	  a	  theory	   that	   tries	   to	   understand	   international	   organizations	   has	   to	   be	   built.	  Guzman	  (2011)	  tries	  to	  do	  so	  by	  understanding	  IOs	  as	  an	  analytical	  category	  and	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seeks	  to	  understand	  (a)	  why	  they	  are	  made	  the	  way	  they	  are,	  and	  (b)	  what	  they	  are	   doing.	   This	   analytical	   approach	   builds,	   among	   others,	   on	   Dunoff	   and	  Trachtman	  (1999)	  and	  Abbott	  and	  Snidal	  (1998).	  The	  first	  principles	  are	  that	  IOs	  are	  created	  by	  states	  and	  that	  these	  states	  can	  design	  them	  in	  any	  way	  they	  want.	  These	   IOs	   are	   only	   established	   if	   their	   creation	   makes	   all	   founding	   member	  states	  (represented	  by	  their	  heads	  of	  government	  or	  heads	  of	  state)	  better	  and	  states	  negotiate	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  the	  joint	  value	  of	  IO.	  	   Guzman	  (2011)	  identifies	  several	  design	  choices:	  
• Action	   v.	   policy.	   It	   can	   focus	   on	   specific	   tasks	   (WHO	   eradication	   of	  smallpox)	   or	   it	   can	   have	   a	   broader	   policy	   mandate	   (UN	   Human	   Rights	  Committee).	  
• Narrow	  v.	  broad	  scope.	  It	  can	  have	  a	  narrow,	  specific	  competence	  (e.g.	  the	  Universal	   Postal	   Union)	   or	   a	   broad,	   general	   competence	   (UN	   General	  Assembly).	  The	  “advantage”	  to	  states	  of	  narrow	  IOs	  is	  that	  it	  protects	  their	  sovereignty.	  Therefore,	   they	  might	  prefer	   several	   small	   IOs	   to	  one	   large	  one.	   Reasons	   for	   a	   broader	   IO	   can	   be	   their	   increased	   effectiveness,	   the	  linkage	  of	  policy	  fields,	  and	  economies	  of	  scale.	  
• Silence	  v.	   speech.	  An	   IO	   can	  have	   its	   own	  voice,	   that	   is,	   right	   to	   its	   own	  opinion	  (OECD),	  whereas	  some	  IOs	  do	  not	  have	  a	  distinct	  voice	  from	  their	  members	  (Commonwealth	  of	  Nations).	  	  
• Low	  v.	  high	  voting	  requirements.	  Decisions	  can	  be	  made	  by	  a	  unanimity	  rule	   (WTO,	   UNODC)	   or	   through	   a	   simple	   majority	   (UNGA,	   some	  international	   tribunals).	   The	   UN	   Security	   Council	   takes	   an	   in-­‐between	  position	   (unanimity	   among	   permanent	   members	   and	   majority	   of	   the	  council).	  
• Non-­‐binding	  v.	  binding	  rule	  making.	  Organizations	  like	  the	  ICJ	  or	  the	  ILO	  can	  only	  adopt	  non-­‐binding	  norms,	  whereas	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  EU	  can	  impose	  binding	  and	  enforceable	  rules.	  Hard	  laws	  exist	  only	  on	  very	   rare	   instances	   and	   often	   only	   where	   the	   IO	   can	   be	   constrained	   to	  narrow	  and	  technical	  areas.	  
• Easy	  exit	  v.	  hard	  exit.	  IOs	  can	  be	  distinguished	  upon	  whether	  it	  is	  legally	  and	   practically	   (that	   is,	   at	   a	   non-­‐excessive	   cost)	   possible	   to	   leave	   the	  organization.	  	  The	  UNESCO,	  for	  example,	  can	  be	  easily	  left,	  while	  there	  is	  
	   35	  
not	   even	   a	   formal	   procedure	   to	   leave	   the	   EU	   (and	  more	   drastically,	   the	  European	  Monetary	  Union).	  Therefore,	  states	  wishing	  to	  establish	  an	  international	  organization	  face	  what	  in	  economics	  and	  engineering	  is	  called	  an	  “optimization	  problem”.	  They	  can	  and	  have	   to	   choose	   between	   a	   weaker	   IO	   that	   protects	   the	   member	   states’	  sovereignty	   and	   a	   stronger	   IO	   that	   compromises	   national	   sovereignty.	   This	  choice	   has	   to	   be	   done	   along	   these	   six	   dimensions	   described	   above.	   It	   explains	  why	   there	   are	   so	  many	   international	   organizations,	  why	   they	   vary	   so	  much	   in	  size,	  scope	  and	  authority,	  and	  why	  states	  are	  reluctant	  to	  use	  dispute	  resolution	  in	   IOs.	   A	   lesson	   that	   Guzman	   (2011)	   draws	   about	   state	   preference	   is	   that	   the	  gains	  from	  allowing	  international	  organizations	  to	  create	  “hard”,	  that	  is,	  binding	  law	  seem	  to	  be	  small	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  perceived	  political	  costs	  of	  doing	  so.	  See	  the	  following	  page	  for	  a	  graphical	  representation.	  	  
A	  note	  on	  the	  wording	  	  In	  many	  instances,	   the	  United	  States	  was	  accused	  of	  unilateralism.	  Luck	  (2004)	  points	  out	  that	  the	  wording	  might	  often	  be	  inaccurate.	  For	  instance,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  blamed	  for	  leaving	  the	  negotiations	  on	  land	  mines	  or	  children’s	  rights.	  Yet,	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  unilateralism	  –	   in	   fact,	  Luck	  calls	  Washington’s	   stance	  on	   those	  issues	   “exceptional”,	   that	   is,	   out	   of	   line	   of	   the	   international	   consensus	   or	  majority.	   But	   the	   point	   is	   rather	   the	   process.	   And	   indeed,	   the	   U.S.	   was	  theoretically	  and	  factually	  willing	  to	  join	  the	  multilateral	  process	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  drafting	  conventions	  e.g.	  on	  said	  issues.	  Unilateralism	  instead	  would	  be	  if	  a	  state	  acted	  without	  even	  consulting	  widely	  beforehand	  or	  seeking	  to	  build	  a	  broader	  coalition.	  Thus,	  multilateralism	  and	  unilateralism	  mark	  “the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  policy	   option	   chosen,	   not	   […]	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   interests	   pursued	   through	   it”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  76).	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  The	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  (Guzman	  2011):	  
	  	  	   The	  UN	  Office	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Crime	  (own	  representation):	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Institutional	  design	  of	  the	  UNSC	  and	  UNODC	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The	  United	  Nations	  –	  an	  organization	  in	  discredit	  “The	   world	   has	   a	   love-­‐hate	   relationship	   with	   the	   UN.	   States	   turn	   to	   the	  organization	  when	   it	   suits	   their	   individual	   agendas,	   calling	   for	   its	   intervention.	  Others,	   conversely,	   either	  veto	  or	   ignore	   its	   authority	  or	   shun	   its	   involvement”	  (Chandler	  2007).	  	  The	   1990s	   were	   a	   decade	   where	   this	   finding	   was	   particularly	  corroborated.	   The	   organization	   came	   in	   serious	   criticism	   at	   various	   occasions.	  Three	  political	  events	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  have	  to	  be	  especially	  high-­‐lightened	  as	  the	  organization’s	  credibility	  and	  legitimization	  came	  under	  particular	  discredit:	  the	  1994	  genocide	  in	  Rwanda,	  the	  failure	  in	  Yugoslavia,	  in	  particular	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  events	  in	  Srebrenica	  in	  1995,	  and	  the	  genocide	  in	  Sudan.	  	  
Rwanda	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Rwanda,	  there	  was	  basically	  no	  political	  will,	  while	  the	  intervention	  which	  was	  eventually	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  Security	  Council	  came	  too	  late	  and	  was	  not	   determined	   enough	   (see	   e.g.	   Chandler	   2007).	   In	   a	   commemorative	   speech,	  then-­‐UN	  Secretary-­‐General	  Kofi	  Annan	  noted	  that	  “we	  must	  all	  acknowledge	  our	  responsibility	   for	   not	   having	   done	  more	   to	   prevent	   or	   stop	   the	   genocide”,	   and	  that	   “[p]erhaps	   more	   than	   any	   others,	   those	   questions	   have	   dominated	   my	  thoughts,	  since	   I	  became	  Secretary-­‐General.	   If	   there	   is	  one	   legacy	   I	  would	  most	  wish	   to	   leave	   to	  my	   successors,	   it	   is	   an	   Organization	   both	   better	   equipped	   to	  prevent	   genocide,	   and	   able	   to	   act	   decisively	   to	   stop	   it	   when	   prevention	   fails.”	  (Annan	  2004)	  
Yugoslavia	  In	  Yugoslavia,	  the	  UN	  was	  present	  through	  the	  United	  Nations	  Protection	  Force	  (UNPROFOR),	   originally	   intended	   to	   keep	   the	   peace	   in	   the	   four	  minority	   Serb	  enclaves	  in	  Croatia,	  the	  Krajina	  and	  East	  and	  West	  Slavonia.	  During	  the	  siege	  of	  Srebrenica,	  the	  Security	  Council	  designated	  it	  a	  so-­‐called	  UN	  Safe	  Area	  on	  6	  May	  1993,	  along	  with	  areas	  centered	  on	  Bihać,	  Goražde,	  Tuzla	  and	  Žepa.	  Yet,	  the	  UN	  did	  little	  to	  keep	  those	  areas	  safe:	  while	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  844	  (1993)	  authorized	  an	  additional	  5600	  infantry	  and	  2000	  support	  personnel	  to	  the	  troop	  strength	  of	  UNPROFOR,	  those	  reinforcements	  most	  of	   the	  time	  came	  in	   late,	   ill-­‐equipped	  for	  the	  task	  or	  fell	  well	  short	  of	  the	  numbers	  and	  capabilities	  required	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for	   the	   tasks	   (Chandler	   2007).	   “Other	   contingents,	   despite	   being	   trained,	  equipped	   and	   fully	   capable,	   had	   their	   deployments	   restricted	   by	   their	  governments	  to	  specific	  assignments	  rather	  than	  conforming	  to	  the	  operational	  priorities	   of	   the	   UN	   Mission’s	   Force	   Commander.”	   (ibid,	   101)	   “Despite	   the	  significant	   international	   presence,	   the	   eventual	   end	   to	   the	   armed	   conflict	   was	  achieved	  only	  with	  military	  muscle	  to	  back	  tough	  diplomacy.	  But	  the	  muscle	  was	  provided	  by	  NATO	  –	  not	  the	  United	  Nations	  mission	  itself.”	  (ibid,	  103)	  Chandler	  2007	  and	  many	  others	  summarized	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  failure	  of	  the	  UN	   in	  Yugoslavia	   as	   follows:	   in	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  war,	   the	  United	  States	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  the	  Balkans	  area.	  As	  James	  Baker,	  the	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  at	  the	  time,	  put	  it:	  “The	  US	  doesn’t	  have	  a	  dog	  in	  this	  fight!”	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  some	  of	   the	   European	   states	   involved	   –	   in	   agreement	   with	   the	   US	   –	   considered	  Yugoslavia	  to	  be	  their	  “backyard”	  and	  opposed	  US	  interference.	  Thus,	  there	  was	  an	   international	   consensus	   that	   the	  war	   in	   Yugoslavia	  was	   a	   purely	   European	  problem.	  As	  with	  Rwanda,	  the	  Kofi	  Annan	  reflected	  on	  this	  failure:	  “To	  ensure	  that	  we	  have	  fully	  learned	  the	  lessons	  of	  the	  tragic	  history	  detailed	  in	  this	   report,	   I	   wish	   to	   encourage	   Member	   States	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   process	   of	  reflection	   and	   analysis.	   […]	   The	   aim	   of	   this	   process	   would	   be	   to	   clarify	   and	  improve	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   to	   respond	   to	   various	   forms	   of	  conflict.	   I	   have	   in	   mind	   addressing	   such	   as	   […]	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   symbolic	  deterrence	   in	   the	   face	   of	   a	   systematic	   campaign	   of	   violence;	   the	   pervasive	  ambivalence	  within	  United	  Nations	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	   force	   in	   the	  pursuit	  of	  peace	   […]	   and	   a	   range	   of	   doctrinal	   and	   institutional	   issues	   that	   go	   to	   the	   very	  heart	   of	   the	  United	  Nations’	   ability	   to	   keep	   the	  peace	   and	  help	  protect	   civilian	  populations	   from	   armed	   conflict.	   The	   Secretariat	   is	   ready	   to	   join	   in	   such	   a	  process.”	  (UN	  GA	  A/54/549)	  Those	  words,	  while	  relating	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  UN	  to	   respond	   effectively	   to	   cases	   of	   civil	   war	   and	   political	   violence,	   can	   also	   be	  related	   to	   the	   ability	   and	   willingness	   to	   respond	   effectively	   to	   inter-­‐	   and	  transnational	  terrorism.	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Darfur	  Finally,	   the	   ongoing	   genocide	   in	   Darfur	   should	   be	   mentioned.	   In	   their	   report	  “Darfur,	  Sudan:	  The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect”	  of	  30	  March	  2005,	  Members	  of	  the	  British	  Parliament	  found	  clear	  words:	  “The	  UN	  Security	  Council	  has	  failed	  to	  fulfil	  its	   responsibility	   to	  protect	   the	  people	  of	  Darfur,	   and	   to	  maintain	   international	  peace	   and	   security.	  Driven	  by	  national	   interests,	   the	   Security	  Council	   has	  been	  divided,	   weak	   and	   ineffective.	   There	   should	   be	   a	   referral	   of	   Darfur	   to	   the	  International	   Criminal	   Court,	   targeted	   sanctions	   and	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   arms	  embargo	  to	  cover	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  Sudan.”	  This,	  again,	  can	  be	  connected	  to	  the	   issue	   of	   terrorism.	   The	   killings	   in	   Darfur	   seem	   to	   be	   conducted	   by	   the	  Janjaweed	  militias,	  apparently	  as	  “sub-­‐contractors”	  of	  the	  Sudanese	  government	  and	   thus	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   case	   of	   state-­‐sponsored	   terrorism	   within	   that	   same	  country.	  On	  Douglas	  Farah’s	   counter-­‐terrorism	  blog	  website,	   he	  underlines	   the	  link	   of	   those	   militia	   to	   international	   terrorism:	   “A	   recent	   international	  intelligence	  document	  says	  there	  are	  credible	  reports	  that	  a	  cadre	  of	  about	  15	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  operatives	   in	   Sudan	   is	  providing	   training	   to	   troops	  under	   the	   control	  of	  Janjaweed	  leader	  Musa	  Hilal.”	  (Farah	  2006)	  	  
The	  United	  Nations,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  September	  11	  Already	  years	  before	  the	  attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  U.S.	  intervention	   in	   Afghanistan,	   the	   country	   had	   been	   a	   recruiting	   and	   training	  center	  for	  Al-­‐Qaeda.	  The	  attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,	  and	  the	  worldwide	  surge	  of	   international	   terrorism	  were	  only	   a	   logical	   consequence	  of	   the	   international	  neglect	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Afghanistan.	  “Governments	  blamed	  the	  UN	  for	  inaction	  but,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  the	  UN	  is	  only	  as	  good	  as	  its	  members	  make	  it	  or	  want	  it	   to	   be.	   Long	  before	   9/11,	   before	   the	   threat	   reached	   a	   transnational	   level,	   the	  international	  community,	   through	  the	  auspices	  of	   the	  United	  Nations,	  had	  been	  playing	  a	  modest	  role	  against	  terrorism.”	  (Chandler	  2007,	  121)	  The	  UN	  General	  Assembly	   passed	   several	   non-­‐binding	   resolutions	   urging	   states	   to	   adopt	  measures	  against	  international	  terrorism,	  as	  well	  as	  resolutions	  directly	  against	  the	   Taliban	   and	   even	   sanctions.	   These	   latter	   resolutions	   called	   for	   an	   end	   of	  violence	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  against	  the	  provision	  of	  a	  safe	  haven	  for	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	   –	   and	   were	   of	   course	   ignored	   by	   the	   de-­‐facto	   rulers	   in	   Kabul.	   The	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sanctions	  were	  introduced	  in	  1999	  and	  tightened	  in	  2000.	  Furthermore,	  a	  panel	  of	  experts	  was	  tasked	  to	  recommend	  a	  mechanism	  by	  which	  the	  sanctions	  could	  be	  effectively	  monitored.	  While	  the	  panel	  was	  given	  60	  days	  to	  fulfill	  its	  task	  and	  report	   to	   the	   Security	   Council,	   it	   took	   three	   months	   until	   a	   final	   compromise	  regarding	   its	   composition	   was	   found	   and	   it	   could	   come	   together	   (Chandler	  2007).	  Pursuant	   to	   resolution	  1363	   (2001),	   the	  Security	  Council	   established	  an	  Analytical	   Support	   and	   Sanctions	   Monitoring	   Group	   to	   monitor	   the	   sanctions	  against	   “Al-­‐Qaida	   and	   the	   Taliban	   and	   associated	   individuals	   and	   entities”	  (Resolution	   1363,	   2001).	   This	   Analytical	   and	   Monitoring	   Team	   had	   a	   more	  restricted	   mandate	   than	   the	   original	   Monitoring	   Group	   of	   which	   the	   mandate	  was	   terminated	   in	   January	   2004	   after	   a	   series	   of	   reports	   “that	   had	   criticized	  member	  countries	  for	  not	  living	  up	  to	  their	  counter-­‐terrorism	  commitments	  and	  obligations”	  (Comras	  2010).	  
Summary:	  Impact	  on	  the	  UN’s	  role	  in	  counter-­‐terrorism	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  those	  above-­‐mentioned	  instances,	  the	  United	  Nations	  failed	  at	  several	  occasions	  to	  remain	  truthful	  to	  the	  spirit	  in	  which	  it	  was	  enacted	  in	  San	  Francisco	   of	   the	   year	  1945.	   	   It	  was	   thus	   a	   reasonable	   step	   that	   political	   actors	  would	  either	  regroup	  in	  other	  multilateral	  platforms,	  such	  as	  NATO,	  OSCE	  and	  a	  successively	  politically	   integrated	  European	  Union,	  or	   increasingly	  act	  not	  only	  outside	   of	   the	  UN	   system,	   but	   outside	   of	  multilateralism	   altogether.	   The	   crises	  the	   United	   Nations	   endured	   after	   1989	  were	   not	   only	   of	   a	   purely	   operational	  nature,	  but	  were	  rooted	  in	  fundamental	  problems	  of	  a	  multilateral	  organization	  with	  the	  claim	  of	  global	  inclusiveness.	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Terrorism	  as	  a	  new	  global	  issue	  This	   chapter	   looks	   at	  how	   terrorism,	  which	  has	   always	  been	  a	  political	   reality,	  has	  evolved	  in	  recent	  years	  from	  a	  purely	  national	  matter	  to	  a	  new	  global	  issue.	  
The	  90s	  and	  September	  11th,	  2001,	  as	  a	  pivotal	  event	  In	  its	  recent	  history,	  Europe	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  terrorism	  repeatedly,	  be	  it	  the	  Irish	  Republican	   Army	   (IRA)	   in	   the	   UK,	   Euskadi	   Ta	   Askatasuna	   (ETA)	   in	   Spain	   and	  France,	   several	   generations	   of	   the	   Rote	   Armee	   Fraktion	   (RAF)	   in	   Germany	   or	  others.	   Yet,	   European	   countries	   dealt	   with	   those	   threats	   solely	   on	   a	   national	  basis.	   Cooperation	   was	   rather	   informal,	   an	   example	   being	   TREVI,	   an	  intergovernmental	   network	   of	   European	   public	   officials	   from	   the	   national	  ministries	   of	   the	   interior	   and	   justice	  which	   evolved	   into	   the	   justice	   and	   home	  affairs	   pillar	   of	   the	   post-­‐Maastricht	   EU).	   TREVI	   was	   founded	   in	   1976	   as	   a	  consequence	  of	   the	  1972	  massacre	  at	   the	  Olympic	  games	   in	  Munich	  committed	  by	  the	  BSO	  (von	  Hippel,	  2004).	  Unlike	   terrorists	  of	   the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  who	   followed	  somewhat	  specific	  and	  defined	   political	   goals	   and	   aimed	   at	   pushing	   the	   governments	   to	   a	   particular	  political	   end	   by	   using	   violence	   (Armitage	   2007),	   radical	   Islamist	   terror	   groups	  such	   as	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   use	   violence	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   violence,	   glorify	   death	   and	   fight	  “Western”	  values6	  as	  a	  whole.	  Figure	  2	  illustrates	  the	  qualitative	  change	  in	  terrorism.	  In	  the	  1970s,	  the	  number	  of	   fatalities	   in	   terrorist	   attacks	   increased	  with	   the	  number	  of	   terrorist	  incidents.	  The	  historical	  high	  in	  the	  number	  of	  fatalities	  was	  reached	  in	  1986	  and	  the	  number	  terrorist	  attacks	  peaked	  in	  1988,	  which	  coincides	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  first	  intifada.	  What	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  years	  (particularly	  2001),	   is	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   fatalities	   to	   incidents	   ratio.	   Terrorist	   attacks	  have	  clearly	   become	   more	   large-­‐scale,	   most	   probably	   a	   result	   of	   the	   advent	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Western	  values	  is	  used	  in	  here	  to	  designate	  values	  that	  stand	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  the	  French	  and	  American	  revolutions,	  that	  is,	  freedom,	  democracy,	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  happiness.	  I	  acknowledge	   that	   this	   term	   is	   problematic	   for	   several	   reasons	   –	   yet,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   place	   to	  discuss	  them.	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suicide	  attack.	  It	  also	  reflects	  the	  ideology	  of	  modern	  Jihadism:	  terrorist	  attacks	  do	  not	  follow	  a	  specific	  goal,	  but	  intend	  to	  kill	  as	  many	  people	  as	  possible.	  
	  	  
Figure	  2:	  International	  terrorism,	  1968–2003,	  number	  of	  incidents	  and	  number	  of fatalities.	  Source:	  
Frey	  et	  al	  2007	  	   Globalization	   and	   technological	   advances	   in	   the	   1990s	   made	  communications	   and	   transportations	   easier.	   Small	   groups	   can	   more	   easily	  organize	  themselves	  around	  the	  globe.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  for	  Europe,	  where	  the	   creation	   of	   the	   Single	   Market	   during	   the	   late	   1980s	   and	   early	   1990s	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  people,	  services	  and	  capital	  –	  with	   all	   its	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   –	   and	   a	   strengthening	   of	   Europe’s	  external	  borders.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  subsequent	  reorganization	  of	  Europe	   have	   lead	   to	   an	   increased	   international	   cooperation.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  geopolitical	  events	  like	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Yugoslavia	  disrupted	  societies	  and	  created	  ungoverned	  areas	  and	  failed	  states7,	  where	  it	  became	  easy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	   Some	   research	   shows	   that	   the	   role	   of	   failed	   states	  might	   be	   overestimated.	   For	   instance,	   an	  empirical	   study	   conducted	   by	   Newman	   (2007)	   comes	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   actually	   terrorist	  groups	   emerge	   in	   and	   operate	   from	  within	   countries	   which	   have	   a	   strong,	   stable	   state	   and	   a	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for	   terrorist	   and	   organized	   criminal	   groups	   (those	   two	   often	   being	   linked)	   to	  operate	  (ibid.).	  As	   Phillips	   (2010)	   boldly	   states:	   “On	   September	   11,	   2001,	   history	  resumed”	  after	  Francis	  Fukuyama	  famously	  declared	  the	  “end	  of	  history”	  in	  1989	  (Fukuyama	  1989).	  Fukuyuma	  was	  wrong	  indeed,	  America	  had	  not	  defeated	  the	  last	   remaining	   totalitarian	   adversary	   in	   1989	   with	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Pact	   of	  Warsaw	   and	   subsequently	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   Open	   societies	   based	   on	   the	  pillars	  of	  parliamentary	  democracy	  and	  free	  market	  capitalism	  did	  eventually	  not	  celebrate	  their	  irrevocable	  global	  triumph	  in	  that	  year	  (Phillips	  2010).	  As	   September	   11th	   showed,	   terrorism	   has	   become	   a	   transnational	  phenomenon,	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  a	  global	  network.	  	  Recently,	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  has	  even	  been	  compared	  to	  a	  franchise	  system,	  where	  local	  groups	  take	  the	  name	  and	  ideology	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  yet	  operate	  independently	  from	  the	  group	  around	  Osama	  bin	  Laden.8	  The	  terms	  used	  to	  designate	  this	  new	  form	   of	   terrorism	   are	   numerous:	   “It	   is	   frequently	   called	   ‘catastrophic’,	   while	  others	  refer	  to	  it	  as	  ‘post-­‐modern’,	   ‘strategic’	  or	  ‘new	  style’	  terrorism”	  (Neuhold	  2006).	  Neuhold	  himself	  actually	  suggests	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “total	  terrorism”	  in	  analogy	  to	  the	  total	  war	  that	  was	  declared	  by	  Nazi	  Germany	  because	  it	  abandons	  and	  ignores	  all	  protective	  limits	  and	  restrictions	  imposed	  by	  international	  law	  in	  order	  to	  force	  the	  enemy	  into	  unconditional	  surrender.	  Figure	  3	  on	  the	  following	  page	  summarizes	  how	  terrorism	  has	  changed.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  variety	  of	   systems	  of	  government.	  Even	   though	   there	  are	   terrorist	  groups	   in	   failed	  states,	   state	  failure	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition.	  8	  For	  instance,	   in	  December	  2007,	  the	  Internet	  search	  engine	  Google	  finds	  about	  189,000	  pages	  that	  contain	  the	  words	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  and	  franchise.	  By	  January	  2012,	  this	  number	  rose	  to	  3.2	  million.	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  Terrorist	  environ-­‐ment	  
Activity	  profile	  Target	  selection	   Casualty	  rates	   Organizational	  profile	   Tactical/Weapons	  selection	   Typical	  motives	  The	   “old”	  terrorism	   Surgical	  and	  symbolic	  
Low	   and	  selective	   Hierarchical	  and	  identifiable	   Conventional	   and	  low	   to	   medium	  yield	  
Leftist	   and	  ethnocentric	  
New	  Terrorism	   Indiscriminate	   and	  symbolic	  
High	   and	  indiscriminate	  
Cellular	   Unconventional	  and	  high	  yield	   Sectarian	  
Figure	  3:	  Supplanting	  the	  old	  with	  the	  new.	  Source:	  Martin	  (2008)	  	  
A	  new	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States	  	  De	   Jonge	  Oudraat	   (2003)	   identifies	   five	   trends	  during	   the	  1990s	   that	   attracted	  U.S.	  and	  Security	  Council	  attention	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  terrorism:	  1. The	   United	   States	   has	   increasingly	   become	   a	   target	   of	   terrorist	   attacks.	  The	   share	   of	   U.S.	   targets	   increased	   from	   20	   percent	   of	   total	   attacks	   in	  1993-­‐1995	  to	  almost	  50	  percent	  in	  2000.	  2. Those	   attacks	   yielded	   a	   higher	   number	   of	   casualties.	   The	   number	   of	  casualties	  per	  attack	  quadrupled	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  1990s.	  3. Terrorist	  groups	   increasingly	  operate	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  worldwide	  network.	  Al-­‐Qaeda	   has	   proven	   to	   be	   able	   to	   conduct	   attacks	   in	   several	   countries	  (the	   bombing	   of	   U.S.	   embassies	   in	   East	   Africa	   in	   1998	   being	   a	   good	  example	  for	  that)	  and	  to	  recruit	  much	  higher	  numbers	  of	  trained	  fighters	  (4,000-­‐5,000	   as	   quoted	   in	   Jonge	  Oudraat)	   than	   e.g.	   Palestinian	   terrorist	  organizations,	  the	  IRA	  or	  ETA.	  4. The	   likelihood	   that	   terrorists	   acquire	   and	   use	   chemical,	   biological	   or	  nuclear	  weapons	  (as	  it	  happened	  in	  the	  1995	  sarin	  nerve	  gas	  attack	  in	  the	  Tokyo	  subway)	  has	   increased.	  Efforts	   to	  prevent	   states	   from	  developing	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  thus	  became	  necessary.	  5. The	   issue	   of	   states	   supporting	   and	   sponsoring	   terrorism	   has	   become	   a	  concern	  for	  the	  United	  States.	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The	  response	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  The	   main	   UN	   counterterrorism	   policy	   instruments	   in	   the	   1990s	   were	   mainly	  economic	  sanctions	  against	  state	  sponsors	  of	  terrorism.	  It	  imposed	  sanctions	  on	  Libya	  in	  1992	  for	  its	   involvement	  in	  the	  UTA	  and	  Pan	  Am	  bombings	  over	  Niger	  and	  Scotland,	  respectively,	  which	  seems	  to	  having	  been	  successful	  in	  pushing	  the	  Libyan	   government	   to	   cooperate	   in	   the	   prosecution	   of	   the	   individuals	   that	  committed	   those	   plots.	   In	   April	   1996	   it	   imposed	   sanctions	   on	   Sudan	   after	   an	  attempt	   to	   assassinate	   Egyptian	   President	   Husni	   Mubarak	   leading	   to	   Sudan’s	  expelling	   of	   some	   members	   of	   terrorist	   groups.	   In	   October	   1999,	   the	   United	  Nations	   imposed	  sanctions	  on	  Afghanistan’s	  Taliban	  regime,	  which	  –	  especially	  due	  to	  the	  country’s	  and	  the	  regime’s	  isolation	  –	  had	  no	  noticeable	  effect.	  While	   there	   were	   some	   success	   thanks	   to	   those	   sanctions,	   it	   has	   to	   be	  noted	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  sanctions	  were	  marginal	  and	  that	  the	  goals,	  namely	  to	   stop	   worldwide	   terrorist	   activities,	   were	   not	   reached.	   Yet,	   the	   sanctions	  regimes	  “helped	  to	  change	  at	  least	  the	  declared	  attitudes	  –	  what	  they	  [the	  states,	  PCH]	  say	  if	  not	  what	  they	  do	  –	  of	  states	  toward	  terrorist	  groups,	  particularly	  the	  attitudes	   of	   state	   sponsors	   of	   terrorism.”	   (ibid.,	   p.	   167)	   Terrorist	   activities	   are	  since	   then	   increasingly	   seen	   as	   “threats	   to	   international	   peace	   and	   security,”9	  thus	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  stronger	  responses	  to	  global	  terrorism	  after	  September	  11.	   This	   is	   also	   confirmed	   by	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   State,	   which	   noted	   the	  continuation	  of	  a	  slow	  trend	  away	  from	  state	  sponsorship	  of	  terrorism.	  Yet,	  this	  also	  led	  to	  a	  restructuring	  of	  terrorist	  groups,	  particularly	  Al-­‐Qaeda:	  lacking	  state	  support	   and	   in	   order	   to	   become	  more	   autonomous,	   they	  had	   to	  diversify	   their	  organizational	  structures	  and	  their	  funding	  sources	  (ibid.).	  	  
Immediate	  reactions	  after	  the	  attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001	  9/11,	  almost	  broadcast	  live	  on	  television,	  was	  an	  event	  that	  in	  some	  way	  or	  the	  other	  affected	  the	  whole	  world.	  The	  responses	  to	  it	  were	  numerous.	  The	  United	  States	   and	   its	   partners	   within	   NATO	   and	   the	   OAS	   immediately	   defined	   the	  attacks	  in	  their	  press	  releases	  as	  acts	  of	  war.	  This	  declaration	  brought	  into	  play	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This	  expression	   is	  used	   in	  various	  UN	  resolutions,	  e.g.	  UN	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  1368	  of	  September	  12,	  2001.	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both	  branches	  of	  the	  law	  of	  war,	  the	  ius	  ad	  bellum	  regulating	  the	  recourse	  of	  war	  and	  the	  ius	  in	  bello	  regulating	  the	  conduct	  of	  war	  (see	  Schrijver	  2004	  for	  a	  review	  of	  the	  legal	  challenges	  of	  September	  11	  to	  International	  Law).	  The	  Security	  Council’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  attacks	  of	  September	  11	  was	  quick	  and	   unanimous.	   Within	   one	   day,	   it	   passed	   resolution	   1368	   and	   two	   weeks	  afterwards	  resolution	  1373,	  which	  forced	  all	  member	  states	  to	  “take	  far-­‐reaching	  domestic	  legislative	  and	  execute	  actions	  designed	  to	  prevent	  and	  suppress	  future	  terrorist	   activities.”	   (de	   Jonge	   Quadraat,	   2003)	   Key	   elements	   of	   those	   two	  resolutions	   are	   the	   legitimization	   of	   military	   action	   against	   terrorism	   and	   the	  globalization	  of	   the	  ban	  on	   terrorism	  (ibid.).	  As	  Chandler	  2007	   interpret	   it,	   the	  fact	   that	   the	  Security	  Council	   called	   for	   the	   full	   implementation	  of	   the	   relevant	  antiterrorist	  conventions	  and	  resolutions	  is	  “a	  clear	  indicator,	  if	  one	  was	  needed,	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  states	  had	  done	  little	  or	  nothing	  to	  meet	  their	   obligations	   in	   this	   regard.	   When	   considering	   how	   long	   many	   of	   the	  conventions	   had	   been	   in	   existence	   this	  was	   a	   poor	   indictment	   of	   international	  response	  and	  political	  will”	  (Chandler	  2007,	  126).	  The	  sheer	  magnitude	  of	  the	  attacks	  led	  to	  reactions	  not	  only	  from	  the	  UN,	  but	   also	   from	  many	   bodies	   and	   institutions.	   Among	   the	   regional	   organizations	  were	  of	  course	  also	  the	  Europeans.	  	  
Reactions	  in	  Europe	  At	  its	  meeting	  on	  21	  September	  2001,	  the	  European	  Council	  adopted	  a	  “Plan	  of	  Action	   to	   Combat	   Terrorism,”	   containing	   measures	   intended	   to	   speed	   up	   and	  improve	   the	   European	   Union’s	   collective	   ability	   to	   combat	   terrorism.	   The	  measures	  outlined	  therein	  included:	  
• Extradition	  based	  on	  a	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  
• Establishment	  of	  a	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Task	  Force	  within	  Europol	  
• Improving	  commonality	  in	  judicial	  systems	  (Eurojust)	  As	   Chandler	   (2007)	   criticizes,	   those	  measures	  were	   not	   given	   priority	   and	   the	  collective	  will	   of	   the	   Union	  was	   only	   re-­‐energized	   after	   Jihadist	   terrorism	   had	  finally	  reached	  European	  soil	  in	  the	  morning	  of	  11	  March	  2004	  in	  Madrid.	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Reactions	  of	  the	  U.S.	  The	  U.S.,	   represented	  by	  Ambassador	   John	  Negroponte	   in	   the	   Security	  Council,	  was	   satisfied	   with	   the	   UN’s	   response.	   Negroponte	   called	   the	   UN	   “a	   unique	  partner	  in	  troubled	  times,”	  (quoted	  in:	  UNA-­‐USA,	  200710)	  stated	  that	  its	  response	  “alone	  indicates	  the	  value	  of	  the	  UN	  to	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  and	  global	  security”	  and	  that	   the	   U.S.	   has	   received	   “an	   extraordinary	   level	   of	   solidarity,	   support,	   and	  cooperation	  at	   the	  UN.”	  Resolution	  1373	  was	  considered	   the	  UN’s	   “single	  most	  powerful	  response”	  (all	  quotes:	  ibid.).	  William	  B.	  Wood,	   then	   Principal	  Deputy	  Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	  International	  Organization	  Affairs	  noted	  that	  one	  way	  the	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  of	  winning	   the	   war	   on	   terrorism	   and	   protecting	   American	   citizens	   could	   be	  achieved	   was	   “through	   our	   [the	   U.S.	   government’s]	   continued	   active	  participation	   in	   and	   support	   for	   the	   United	   Nations	   and	   other	   international	  organizations.”	   (ibid.)	   He	   agreed	   with	   Negroponte	   when	   he	   said	   that	  “[r]esolution	   1373	   has	   been	   the	   framework	   for	   unprecedented	   international	  consultation	  and	  coordination	  against	  terrorism.”	  (ibid.)	  The	  United	  States	  welcomed	   the	   resolutions	   for	   it	   gave	   legal	  grounds	   to	  use	  military	  force	  to	  combat	  terrorism.	  While	  it	  has	  used	  it	  on	  three	  occasions	  in	  the	   past	   (against	   Libya	   after	   the	   bombing	   of	   “La	   Boule”	   nightclub	   in	   Berlin	   in	  1986,	  against	   Iraq	   in	  1993	  after	   its	  attempt	   to	  assassinate	   former	  US	  President	  George	  H.W.	  Bush	  and	  the	  emir	  of	  Kuwait	  and	  against	  Afghanistan	  and	  Sudan	  in	  1998	   after	   the	   bombings	   of	   two	   US	   embassies	   in	   East	   Africa),	   it	   was	   now	  endowed	  with	  a	  legal	  basis.	  Similarly,	  Russia	  saw	  them	  as	  a	  legitimization	  of	  the	  use	   of	   force	   against	   Chechen	   terrorists	   (also	   on	   Georgian	   territory)	   and	   China	  made	  use	  of	  it	  in	  its	  fight	  against	  terrorist	  groups	  in	  Xinjiang	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	   Quoted	   in:	   UNA-­‐USA:	   “Negroponte	   Discusses	   Post-­‐9/11	   UN	   Agenda	   During	   House	  Appropriations	  Subcommittee	  Hearing,	  March	  26,	  2002,	  www.unausa.org,	  accessed	  on	  December	  5,	  2007	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UN	  instruments	  against	  terrorism	  	  
Terrorism,	  international	  law	  and	  the	  UN	  The	  international	  law	  governing	  terrorism	  is	  too	  extensive	  to	  be	  covered	  here	  in	  its	   entirety.	  As	   terrorism	   is	  by	   (most)	  definition(s)	   an	  act	   conducted	  by	  a	  non-­‐state	  actor,	  the	  relevant	  aspect	  of	  international	  law	  deals	  with	  the	  legal	  reactions	  to	  terrorist	  acts.	  This	  can	  refer	  to	  the	  variety	  of	  peaceful	  responses,	  but	  can	  also	  refer	   to	   the	   use	   of	   force.	   Several	   treaties	   regulate	   the	   peaceful	   responses	   (see	  next	   section).	   Legally	   speaking,	   there	   is	   an	   inherent	   conflict	   between	   the	  responding	   state	   actor	   and	   Article	   2(3)	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Charter,	   which	  states	   that	   “all	   Members	   shall	   settle	   their	   international	   disputes	   by	   peaceful	  means	   in	   such	   a	  manner	   that	   international	  peace	   and	   security,	   and	   justice,	   are	  not	   endangered.”	   Additionally,	   the	   use	   of	   armed	   force	   is	   also	   covered	   by	  customary	   international	   law,	   which	   has	   the	   characteristic	   of	   being	   more	  ambiguous	  than	  treaties.	  Yet,	  customary	  international	   law	  applies	  also	  to	  states	  that	  did	  not	   ratify	  or	  accede	   to	   the	   relevant	   treaties	  and	  does	   so	  not	  only	  on	  a	  strictly	  reciprocal	  basis.	  The	   1949	   Fourth	   Geneva	   Convention	   and	   the	   two	   Additional	   Geneva	  Protocols	   of	   1977	   include	   provisions	   on	   protecting	   civilians	   and	   prohibiting	  terrorist	  attacks.	  Apart	  from	  the	  specific	  conventions	  against	  terrorism	  brokered	  among	  the	  United	  Nations	  member	  states	  (see	  next	  section),	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  bi-­‐	  and	  multilateral	  treaties	  that	  –	  while	  not	  directly	  geared	  towards	  terrorism	  –	   facilitate	   anti-­‐terrorism,	   particularly	   relating	   to	   extradition	   and	   co-­‐operation	  between	  judiciaries.	  They	  can,	  for	  instance,	  be	  helpful	  in	  assuring	  the	  extradition	  of	  persons	  who	  committed	  terrorist	  acts	  and	  took	  shelter	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  other	  party	  to	  a	  bilateral	  treaty.	  An	  example	  of	  such	  an	  agreement	  would	  be	  the	  EU	   Council	   Framework	   Decision	   of	   13	   June	   2002	   on	   the	   European	   Arrest	  Warrant	   and	   the	   Surrender	   Procedures	   Between	   the	   Member	   States,	   which	  specifically	  includes	  terrorism	  among	  the	  offences	  for	  which	  the	  member	  states	  are	  allowed	  to	  issue	  a	  European	  arrest	  warrant	  (Article	  2(1)).	  	  As	   it	   is	   the	   case	   in	   international	   law	   just	   so	   often,	   enforcement	   and	  compliance	   play	   a	   key	   role.	  While	   international	   basically	   obliges	   states	   to	   take	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measures	   against	   terrorists	   within	   their	   territory,	   there	   is	   no	   way	   of	   actually	  enforcing	  this	  rule.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  according	  to	  customary	  international	  law	  it	   is	   acceptable	   to	   apply	   peaceful	   and	   proportionate	   countermeasures	   (for	  instance,	   international	   trade	   law	  allows	   the	   imposition	  of	   countervailing	  duties	  as	  a	  countermeasure	  against	  the	  breach	  of	  tariff	  or	  subsidy	  rules).	  Nevertheless,	   an	   important	   tool	   to	   establish	   legal	   peaceful	   responses	   is	  the	   United	   Nations	   Security	   Council.	   It	   can	   decide	   or	   recommend	   adopting	  sanctions	  or	  countermeasures	  that	  are	  directed	  at	  states	  that	  assist	  terrorists,	  or	  who	  are	  directly	  or	   indirectly	  taking	  part	   in	  terrorist	  activities.	  An	  example	  are	  the	   sanctions	   imposed	   by	   the	   Security	   Council	   against	   the	   Libyan	   government	  after	  it	  failed	  to	  assume	  responsibility	  for	  blowing	  up	  Pan	  Am	  flight	  103	  over	  the	  Scottish	   town	  of	  Lockerbie.	  The	  Security	  Council	   can	  also	  establish	  committees	  monitoring	   those	   sanctions	   (as	   it	   did	   after	   the	   Lockerbie	   attack	   and	   –	   to	   be	  discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  below	  –	  after	  the	  9/11	  attacks).	  In	   the	   late	   1990s	   there	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   a	   paradigm	   shift	   in	   the	  formulation	   of	   Security	   Council	   Resolutions:	   Resolutions	   1267(1999),	  1333(2000),	   1390(2002)	   and	   1445(2003)	   were	   not	   directed	   at	   states,	   but	   at	  non-­‐state	  actors	  such	  as	  the	  Taliban	  and	  Al-­‐Qaeda.	  As	  for	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  article	  51	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  states	  that	  	  “nothing	  in	  the	  present	  Charter	  shall	  impair	  the	  inherent	  right	  of	  individual	  or	  collective	  self-­‐defense	  if	  an	  armed	  attack	  occurs	  against	  a	  Member	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.”	  The	  legal	  problem	  with	   this	  provision	   is	   that	   the	   term	  “armed	  attack”	   is	   sometimes	  debatable.	   More	   specifically,	   it	   is	   sometimes	   difficult	   to	   distinguish	   an	   armed	  attack	   from	  a	   “normal”	   crime.	  Article	   51	   is	   furthermore	   not	   specific	   as	   to	  who	  conducted	   the	   armed	   attack.	   In	   other	   words:	   can	   one	   state	   retaliate	   against	   a	  terrorist	   group	   operating	   in	   another	   state	   (see	   for	   instance	   the	   case	   of	  Hezbollah’s	  attack	  against	  Israel	  and	  Israel’s	  subsequent	  intervention	  in	  Lebanon	  in	  2006,	  which	   is	   subject	  of	   an	  on-­‐going	   legal	  debate)?	   In	   fact,	   the	  article	   itself	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  any	  state	  involvement	  at	  all.	  	  Unfortunately,	  the	  whole	  discussion	  on	  the	  legality	  of	  self-­‐defense	  against	  non-­‐state	  actors	  cannot	  be	  re-­‐iterated	  here.	  What	   is	   important	  though,	  and	  this	  closes	   the	  ark	   from	   legal	   science	   to	  political	   science,	   is	   that	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  9/11	  and	  judging	  by	  the	  general	  reactions	  of	  states,	  there	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  a	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consensus	   that	   some	   kind	   of	   self-­‐defense	   against	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   is	  warranted.	  More	  specifically,	   this	   has	   also	   been	   expressed	   in	   the	   preambles	   to	   Security	   Council	  Resolutions	  1368	  (2001)	  and	  1373	  (2001).	  
Conventions	  and	  treaties	  against	  terrorism	  The	  United	  Nations	  has	  adopted	  14	  conventions	  against	  terrorism	  since	  1963,	  a	  15th	   international	   treaty	   (a	   comprehensive	   convention	   on	   terrorism)	   currently	  being	   under	   negotiation	   by	   the	  Member	   States11.	   Additionally,	   it	   amended	   one	  convention	  (the	  1980	  Convention	  on	  the	  Physical	  Protection	  of	  Nuclear	  Material)	  and	   passed	   three	   protocols	   (one	   amendment	   to	   the	   Convention	   for	   the	  Suppression	  of	  Unlawful	  Acts	  against	   the	  Safety	  of	  Maritime	  Navigation,	  one	   to	  the	   Protocol	   for	   the	   Suppression	   of	   Unlawful	   Acts	   against	   the	   Safety	   of	   Fixed	  Platforms	   Located	   on	   the	   Continental	   Shelf	   and	   the	   2010	   Protocol	  Supplementary	   to	   the	   Convention	   for	   the	   Suppression	   of	   Unlawful	   Seizure	   of	  Aircraft)12.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  These	  thirteen	  legal	  instruments	  are:	  (i)	  1963	  Convention	  on	  Offences	  and	  Certain	  Other	  Acts	  Committed	  On	  Board	  Aircraft	  (Aircraft	  Convention);	  (ii)	  1970	  Convention	  for	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Unlawful	   Seizure	   of	   Aircraft	   (Unlawful	   Seizure	   Convention);	   (iii)	   1971	   Convention	   for	   the	  Suppression	  of	  Unlawful	  Acts	  against	  the	  Safety	  of	  Civil	  Aviation	  (Civil	  Aviation	  Convention);	  (iv)	  1973	  Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  and	  Punishment	  of	  Crimes	  Against	  Internationally	  Protected	  Persons	  (Diplomatic	  Agents	  Convention);	   (v)	  1979	  International	  Convention	  against	   the	  Taking	  of	  Hostages	  (Hostages	  Convention);	  (vi)	  1980	  Convention	  on	  the	  Physical	  Protection	  of	  Nuclear	  Material	   (Nuclear	   Materials	   Convention);	   (vii)	   1988	   Protocol	   for	   the	   Suppression	   of	   Unlawful	  Acts	   of	   Violence	   at	   Airports	   Serving	   International	   Civil	   Aviation,	   supplementary	   to	   the	  Convention	   for	   the	   Suppression	   of	   Unlawful	   Acts	   against	   the	   Safety	   of	   Civil	   Aviation	   (Airport	  Protocol);	   (viii)	   1988	   Convention	   for	   the	   Suppression	   of	   Unlawful	   Acts	   against	   the	   Safety	   of	  Maritime	  Navigation	  (Maritime	  Convention);	  (ix)	  1988	  Protocol	  for	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Unlawful	  Acts	   Against	   the	   Safety	   of	   Fixed	   Platforms	   Located	   on	   the	   Continental	   Shelf	   (Fixed	   Platform	  Protocol);	  (x)	  1991	  Convention	  on	  the	  Marking	  of	  Plastic	  Explosives	  for	  the	  Purpose	  of	  Detection	  (Plastic	   Explosives	   Convention);	   (xi)	   1997	   International	   Convention	   for	   the	   Suppression	   of	  Terrorist	  Bombings	  (Terrorist	  Bombing	  Convention);	  (xii)	  1999	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Suppression	   of	   the	   Financing	   of	   Terrorism	   (Terrorist	   Financing	   Convention);	   (xiii)	   2005	  International	  Convention	   for	   the	   Suppression	  of	  Acts	  of	  Nuclear	  Terrorism	   (Nuclear	  Terrorism	  Convention);	   and	   (xiv)	   2010	   Convention	   on	   the	   Suppression	   of	   Unlawful	   Acts	   Relating	   to	  International	  Civil	  Aviation	  (New	  Civil	  Aviation	  Convention).	  12	  http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml,	  as	  of	  10	  January	  2008	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Note	  also	   that	   there	  are	   regional	   conventions	  against	   terrorism,	   such	  as	  the	  SAARC	  Regional	  Convention	  on	  Suppression	  of	  Terrorism	  of	  1988.	  
The	  accepted	  definition	  of	  terrorism	  General	   Assembly	   Resolution	   49/60	   notes	   that	   „criminal	   acts	   intended	   or	  calculated	  to	  provoke	  a	  state	  of	  terror	  in	  the	  general	  public,	  a	  group	  of	  persons	  or	  particular	   persons	   for	   political	   purposes	   are	   in	   any	   circumstance	   unjustifiable,	  whatever	   the	   considerations	   of	   a	   political,	   philosophical,	   ideological,	   racial,	  ethnic,	  religious	  or	  any	  other	  nature	  that	  may	  be	  invoked	  to	  justify	  them.“13	  The	   International	   Convention	   for	   the	   Suppression	   of	   the	   Financing	   of	  Terrorism	  includes	  the	  first	  invariable	  definition	  of	  terrorism	  in	  an	  international	  legal	   treaty	   (Weigend	   2006).	   UN	   Security	   Council	   Resolution	   1373	   from	   28	  September	   2001	   develops	   the	   prohibition	   of	   terrorism.	   Security	   Council	  Resolution	  1566	  of	  October	  8th,	  2004,	  calls	  upon	  all	  states	  to	  curb	  terrorism	  no	  matter	   what	   the	   cause	   or	   motivation.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   these	  resolutions	  do	  not	  provide	   for	  any	  exceptions	   for	   so-­‐called	   freedom	   fighters	  or	  “people’s	  legitimate	  struggle[s]	  for	  freedom	  or	  independence”	  (Weigend	  2006).	  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  GA	  Resolution	  49/60	  from	  9	  December	  1994	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Figure	  4:	  Counter-­‐terrorism	  at	  the	  United	  Nations.	  Source:	  Tardy	  (2004)	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The	  UN	  Global	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Strategy	  Kofi	   Annan’s	   broad	   plan	   for	   dissuading	   and	   combating	   terrorism	   focused	   on	  what	  he	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  terrorism:	  poverty,	  repression,	  and	  the	  world’s	  dispossessed	  (Comras	  2010).	  This	   is	   expressed	   in	   the	   UN	   Global	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	   Strategy,	   which	   was	  adopted	   by	   the	   member	   states	   on	   September	   8,	   2006.	   By	   form,	   it	   is	   a	   short	  resolution	   with	   an	   annexed	   plan	   of	   action14,	   aimed	   at	   enhancing	   national,	  regional	   and	   international	   effort	   to	   counter	   terrorism.	   It	   is	   the	   first	   time	   in	  history	  that	  the	  UN	  passes	  such	  a	  common	  strategic	  approach.	  It	  builds	  upon	  Kofi	  Annan’s	  2006	  report	  entitled	  “Uniting	  Against	  Terrorism:	  Recommendations	  for	  a	  Global	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Strategy.”	  The	  Action	  Plan	  elaborates	  on	  measures	  to	  
• Address	  the	  conditions	  conducive	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  terrorism	  
• Prevent	  and	  combat	  terrorism	  
• Build	  states’	  capacity	  to	  prevent	  and	  combat	  terrorism	  and	  to	  strengthen	  the	  role	  of	  the	  UN	  in	  this	  field	  
• Ensure	   respect	   for	   human	   rights	   for	   all	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   as	   the	  fundamental	  basis	  of	  the	  fight	  against	  terrorism	  
The	  UN	  as	  a	  victim	  of	  terrorism	  Repeatedly,	   UN	   missions	   and	   personnel	   in	   the	   field	   have	   become	   a	   target	   of	  terrorism.	  On	  19	  August	  2003,	  terrorists	  believed	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  bombed	  the	  Canal	  Hotel	  in	  Baghdad,	  which	  served	  as	  headquarters	  to	  the	  United	  Nations’	  mission	  to	  Iraq.	  22	  staff	  died,	  including	  the	  Special	  Representative	  of	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  Iraq,	  Sergio	  de	  Mello.	  Due	  to	  this	  tragic	  deterioration	  of	  the	   security	   environment,	   making	   it	   impossible	   for	   a	   UN	   mission	   to	   operate	  effectively,	  it	  had	  no	  other	  choice	  than	  to	  withdraw	  from	  Iraq	  (Chandler	  2007).	  	  On	  18	  December	  2007,	  the	  UN	  complex	  in	  Algiers	  was	  bombed,	  killing	  17	  UN	  staff	  members.	  
UN	  institutions	  dealing	  with	  terrorism	  Within	   the	   framework	  of	   the	  United	  Nations,	   there	   are	   several	   entities	   dealing	  with	   the	   topic	   terrorism.	   An	   important	   cornerstone	   of	   the	   UN’s	   anti-­‐terrorism	  activities	  is	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1373	  adopted	  on	  September	  28th,	  2001.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  A	  total	  of	  nine	  pages.	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The	  measures	  that	  it	  calls	  its	  member	  states	  to	  take	  include	  steps	  to:	  • “Criminalize	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism	  • Freeze	   without	   delay	   any	   funds	   related	   to	   persons	   involved	   in	   acts	   of	  terrorism	  • Deny	  all	  forms	  of	  financial	  support	  for	  terrorist	  groups	  • Suppress	  the	  provision	  of	  safe	  haven,	  sustenance	  or	  support	  for	  terrorists	  • Share	   information	  with	   other	   governments	   on	   any	   groups	   practicing	   or	  planning	  terrorist	  acts	  • Cooperate	  with	  other	  governments	  in	  the	  investigation,	  detection,	  arrest,	  extradition	  and	  prosecution	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  such	  acts;	  and	  • Criminalize	   active	   and	   passive	   assistance	   for	   terrorism	   in	   domestic	   law	  and	  bring	  violators	  to	  justice.	  The	  resolution	  also	  calls	  on	  States	  to	  become	  parties,	  as	  soon	  as	  possible,	  to	  the	  relevant	   international	   counter-­‐terrorism	   legal	   instruments.”	   (CTC	   website,	  quoting	  SCR	  1373).	  The	  CTC	  and	  the	  CTED	  conduct	  (consensual)	  country	  visits	  to	  monitor	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1373,	  it	  provides	  technical	  assistance	  therein,	  compiles	  country	  reports,	   identifies	  so-­‐called	  “best	  practices”,	   and	   organizes	   special	   meetings	   to	   deepen	   ties	   between	   various	  organizations.	  Resolution	  1624	  (2005)	  calls	  on	  UN	  member	  states	  to	  prohibit	  by	  law	  the	  incitement	   to	  commit	  acts	  of	   terrorism,	   to	  prevent	   such	  conduct	  and	  deny	  safe	  haven	   to	   anyone	   "with	   respect	   to	   whom	   there	   is	   credible	   and	   relevant	  information	  giving	  serious	  reasons	  for	  considering	  that	  they	  have	  been	  guilty	  of	  such	  conduct"	  (ibid.).	  	  	  
CTC/CTED/1540	  committee	  The	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	   Committee	   (CTC)	   was	   established	   in	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	  of	  9/11	  through	  Security	  Council	  Resolutions	  1373	  (2001)	  and	  1624	  (2005).	   It	   is	   currently	   chaired	   by	   Hardeep	   Singh	   Puri,	   Ambassador	   and	  Permanent	  Representative	   of	   India.	   The	   committee	   is	   assisted	   by	   the	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	   Committee	   Executive	   Directorate	   (CTED),	   “which	   carries	   out	   the	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policy	  decisions	  of	  the	  Committee,	  conducts	  expert	  assessments	  of	  each	  Member	  State	   and	   facilitates	   counter-­‐terrorism	   technical	   assistance	   to	   countries”	   (CTC	  website).	  	  
UN	  Office	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Crime	  (UNODC)	  
Basics	  The	  United	  Nations	  Office	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Crime	  (UNODC)	  was	  established	  in	  1997	  by	  the	  merger	  of	   the	  UN	  Drug	  Control	  Programme	  (UNDCP)	  and	  the	  Centre	   for	  International	  Crime	  Prevention	  (CICP).	  The	  work	  program	  of	  UNODC	  is	  organized	  in	  three	  pillars:	  
• “Field-­‐based	   technical	   cooperation	   projects	   to	   enhance	   the	   capacity	   of	  Member	  States	  to	  counteract	  illicit	  drugs,	  crime	  and	  terrorism	  
• Research	  and	  analytical	  work	   to	   increase	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	   drugs	   and	   crime	   issues	   and	   expand	   the	   evidence-­‐base	   for	   policy	   and	  operational	  decisions	  
• Normative	  work	  to	  assist	  States	  in	  the	  ratification	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	   international	   treaties,	   the	   development	   of	   domestic	   legislation	   on	  drugs,	   crime	   and	   terrorism,	   and	   the	   provision	   of	   secretariat	   and	  substantive	   services	   to	   the	   treaty-­‐based	   and	   governing	  bodies”	   (UNODC	  200815)	  Its	  budget	  for	  2006-­‐2007	  was	  $283	  million,	  which	  is	  less	  than	  one	  percent	  of	  the	   total	   UN	   budget.	   Almost	   90	   percent	   of	   this	   budget	   comes	   from	   voluntary	  contributions.	  Funding	  has	  seen	  a	  sharp	  rise	  in	  the	  last	  years	  (e.g.	  +25%	  percent	  in	  2006).	  About	  63	  percent	  of	  all	  voluntary	  contributions	  come	  from	  a	  so-­‐called	  major	  donor	   group.	   This	   group	   consists	   –	   among	   others	   –	   of	   the	  US	   ($11mn),	   13	   EU	  countries	  (total	  of	  42mn)	  and	  the	  European	  Commission	  ($16mn).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  www.unodc.org,	  as	  of	  9	  January	  2008	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UNODC	  and	  terrorism	  UNODC	   has	   identified	   several	   ways	   how	   the	   UN	   Global	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Strategy	  relates	  to	  it	  (TPB	  2009):	  
• The	   strategy	   encourages	   the	   office	   to	   enhance	   its	   technical	   assistance	  endeavors	  and	  encourages	  UN	  member	  states	  to	  recourse	  to	  the	  technical	  assistance	  delivered	  by	  UNODC.	  
• It	   encourages	   UNODC	   to	   facilitate	   the	   provision	   of	   assistance	   to	  strengthen	  counter-­‐terrorism	  mechanisms.	  
• It	   encourages	   UNODC	   to	   enhance	   cooperation	   with	   member	   states	   to	  assist	  in	  their	  full	  compliance	  with	  international	  norms	  and	  obligations	  to	  combat	  money-­‐laundering	  and	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism.	  	  
The	  Terrorism	  Prevention	  Branch	  (TPB)	  In	  2002,	  the	  General	  Assembly	  approved	  a	  comprehensive	  program	  of	  activities	  for	   the	   Terrorism	   Prevention	   Branch	   (TPB).	   It	   focuses	   on	   the	   provision	   of	  assistance	  to	  the	  Member	  States,	  upon	  request,	  in	  the	  legal	  and	  related	  aspects	  of	  counter-­‐terrorism,	   especially	   for	   ratifying	   and	   implementing	   the	   conventions	  and	  protocols	   against	   terrorism	  and	   for	   increasing	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	  national	  criminal	   justice	   systems	   to	   apply	   the	   provisions	   of	   those	   instruments	   in	  compliance	   with	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   Additionally,	   the	   program	   of	  work	  of	   the	  TPB	   entails	   the	  provision	  of	   substantive	   input	   on	   related	   counter-­‐terrorism	   issues	   to	   intergovernmental	   bodies,	   especially	   the	  General	   Assembly	  (GA),	   the	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Council	   (ECOSOC),	   the	   Commission	   on	   Crime	  Prevention	   and	   Criminal	   Justice	   (CCPCJ)	   and	   the	   UN	   congresses	   on	   crime	  prevention	   and	   criminal	   justice.	   It	   also	   provides	   specialized	   input	   on	   relevant	  counter-­‐terrorism	  issues	  for	  initiatives	  of	  the	  UN	  Secretariat	  and	  coordinates	  its	  activities	  with	  other	  entities	  and	  organizations.	  Since	  2002,	  the	  GA,	  ECOSOC	  and	  CCPCJ	  have	  reiterated	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  TPB	  in	  providing	  technical	  assistance	  to	  counter	  terrorism	  (TPB	  2009).	  UN	  GA	   resolution	   61/40	   requested	   the	  Terrorism	  Prevention	  Branch	   to	  continue	   its	   efforts	   to	   enhance	   the	   capabilities	   of	   the	   UN	   in	   the	   prevention	   of	  terrorism.	   The	   UN	   Global	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	   Strategy	   and	   Security	   Council	  
	   58	  
Resolution	   1373	   of	   2001	   acknowledged	   the	   TPB’s	   role	   in	   assisting	   states	   in	  becoming	   parties	   to	   and	   implementing	   the	   relevant	   international	   conventions	  and	  protocols	  relating	  to	  terrorism,	  including	  the	  most	  recent	  among	  them,	  and	  in	   strengthening	   international	   cooperation	   mechanisms	   in	   criminal	   matters	  related	   to	   terrorism,	   including	   through	   national	   capacity-­‐building	   (TPB	   2011).	  This	  mandate	   is	   reasserted	   by	   resolutions	   61/41,	   61/40,	   61/181,	   60/175	   and	  60/177.	  The	   objective	   of	   the	   technical	   assistance	   activities	   of	   the	   Terrorism	  Prevention	  Branch	  is	  to	  strengthen	  the	  legal	  regime	  against	  terrorism.	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  mandates	  contained	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  Global	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Strategy,	  UNODC	  and	   its	  Terrorism	  Prevention	  Branch	   seek	   to	   (TPB	  2009,	  2011):	  
• Reinforce	  the	  on-­‐going	  work	  to	  assist	  countries	  with	  the	  ratification	  and	  implementation	   of	   the	   universal	   counter-­‐terrorism	   instruments,	  especially	  through	  increased	  support	  to	  national	  criminal	  justice	  systems	  for	  related	  capacity-­‐building	  and	  specialized	  training;	  
• Develop	  new	   initiatives	   to	  promote	  counter-­‐terrorism	   legal	   cooperation,	  especially	   at	   the	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   levels,	   as	   well	   as	   good	  practices,	  legal	  research	  and	  academic	  training;	  
• Integrate	   pertinent	   counter-­‐terrorism	   aspects	   in	   other	   relevant	  substantive	  areas	  of	  UNODC	  work;	  
• Draw	  on	  and	  build	  upon	  UNODC's	  overall	   expertise	   in	   crime	  prevention	  and	  drug	  control;	  
• Utilize	  UNODC's	   field	   level	   capacities	   as	   an	  effective	   conduit	   to	   transmit	  and	  foster	  counter-­‐terrorism	  expertise	  to	  countries.	  At	   the	   regional/field	   level,	   the	   TPB	   seeks	   to	   reinforce	   the	   legal	   regime	   against	  terrorism	  by	  (TPB	  2009):	  
• Assisting	   countries	   to	   achieve	   full	   ratification	   and	   implementation	   of	   all	  the	  universal	  legal	  instruments	  against	  terrorism	  
• Strengthening	   national	   expertise/capacity	   to	   develop/apply	   domestic	  legislation	  that	  conform	  to	  universal	  legal	  instruments	  against	  terrorism	  
• Strengthening	   the	   capacity	   of	   national	   criminal	   justice	   systems	   to	  implement	   the	   universal	   legal	   instruments	   against	   terrorism	   in	   full	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conformity	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   training	   criminal	  justice	  officials,	  judges	  and	  prosecutors.	  
• Strengthening	   international,	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   cooperation	   in	  criminal	  matters	  relating	   to	   terrorism,	  especially	  extradition	  and	  mutual	  legal	  assistance.	  	  
The	  Terrorism	  Prevention	  Branch’s	  impact	  Several	   indicators	   are	   used	   to	   evaluate	   the	   Terrorism	   Prevention	   Branch’s	  success:	   the	   number	   of	   ratifications	   following	   assistance	   from	   the	   TPB,	   the	  number	  of	  states	  having	  received	  assistance	  in	  the	  implementation,	  the	  number	  of	   legislative	   amendments	   or	   new	   laws	   adopted	   by	   the	   member	   states,	   the	  number	   of	   officials	   trained	   and	   briefed,	   the	   number	   and	   quality	   of	   technical	  assistance	   tools	   (e.g.	   model	   laws),	   written	   and	   verbal	   comments	   by	   member	  states	   on	   the	   work	   of	   the	   TPB	   and	   the	   speed	   of	   program	   implementation	   as	  reflected	  in	  the	  level	  of	  expenditure	  (TPB	  2009).	  The	   technical	   assistance	   activities	   had	   –	   in	   the	   Terrorism	   Prevention	  Branch’s	   view	   –	   a	   noticeable	   impact:	   Since	   2002,	   there	   have	   been	   about	   467	  ratifications	  with	   technical	   assistance	  by	   the	  Terrorism	  Prevention	  Branch,	   the	  number	   of	   countries	   having	   ratified	   the	   twelve	   first	   universal	   instruments	  increased	  from	  26	  to	  85	  between	  January	  2003	  and	  December	  2006	  and	  to	  102	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2008.	  Around	  62	  countries	  have	  new	  or	  revised	  counter-­‐terrorism	  legislation	   in	  different	  stages	  of	  adoption.	  Approximately	  7,700	  criminal	   justice	  officials	  have	  been	  trained	  in	  some	  one	  hundred	  countries	  (TPB	  2009).	  	  
Criticism	  and	  conclusions	  Neuhold	   (2006)	   points	   out	   that	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   international	  response	   suffers	   from	   three	   main	   weaknesses:	   fragmentation,	   reactivity,	   and	  incompleteness.	   While	   there	   are	   thirteen	   international	   treaties	   dealing	   with	  terrorism,	   there	   is	   still	   no	   comprehensive	   convention	   as	   the	   negotiations	  therefore	   have	   been	   deadlocked	   for	   several	   years.	   Legal	   treaties	   tend	   to	   only	  react	   to	   new	   kinds	   of	   terrorism	   and	   lack	   goals	   of	   long-­‐term	   prevention	   of	  terrorism.	   The	   participation	   in	   those	   anti-­‐terrorism	  measures	   is	   not	   universal	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and	   struggles	   with	   the	   different	   concepts	   of	   terrorism	   prevalent	   in	   countries	  around	   the	   world.	   The	   crucial	   point	   is	   that	   in	   order	   to	   be	   truly	   effective,	   all	  countries	   would	   have	   to	   participate	   (including	   what	   Bush	   called	   the	   “rogue	  states”).	   Additionally,	   there	   are	   the	   so-­‐called	   “failed	   states”,	   which	   might	   be	  willing	  to	  join	  the	  anti-­‐terrorism	  measures	  but	  are	  not	  able	  to.	  Finally,	  there	  are	  states	   that	  are	  officially	  willing	   to	  combat	   terrorism	  and	  also	   theoretically	  able	  to,	  but	  for	  various	  reasons	  in	  practice	  turn	  a	  “blind	  eye”	  on	  it	  (Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Pakistan	   would	   be	   the	   typical	   examples,	   but	   even	   the	   United	   States’	   inaction	  against	  the	  IRA	  on	  its	  territory	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  could	  be	  mentioned).	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The	  EU	  as	  a	  global	  actor,	  terrorism	  and	  the	  UN	  	  This	  section	  reviews	  how	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  an	  institution	  is	  currently	  in	  an	  on-­‐going	  process	  of	   increasingly	  becoming	  a	  consolidated	  actor	  in	  international	  relations.	  While	   this	  process	   is	   gradual,	   it	   is	   at	   the	   same	   time	   characterized	  by	  some	   landmark	   events	   and	   milestones,	   such	   as	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   treaty	   of	  Lisbon.	  	  
Disparities	  in	  the	  terrorist	  threat	  between	  EU	  member	  states	  First	  of	  all,	  even	  though	  this	  thesis	  generally	  reviews	  strategies	  at	  the	  EU	  level,	  it	  needs	   to	   be	   reminded	   that	   the	   European	   Union	   consists	   of	   27	  member	   states	  with	  different	  experiences	  with	  terrorism.	  Bakker	  (2006)	  notes	  the	  differences	  in	  terrorist	   threat	  perceptions	   in	  Europe.	  As	  he	  points	   out,	   eleven	  member	   states	  have	   very	   limited	   experience	   with	   terrorism	   on	   their	   territory.	   Those	   are	  especially	   the	   ten	   new	  member	   states,	   of	  which	   Slovenia,	   Lithuania,	   the	   Czech	  Republic,	   Hungary	   and	   Latvia	   were	   never	   confronted	   with	   fatalities	   due	   to	  terrorism	   in	   the	   period	   1968	   to	   2005.	   Similarly,	   Portugal,	   Ireland,	   Denmark,	  Luxemburg	  and	  Finland	  experienced	  no	  or	  few	  terrorist	  incidents	  and	  fatalities.	  The	   problem	   is	   mainly	   concentrated	   in	   six	   countries:	   United	   Kingdom	   (868	  incidents,	   438	   fatalities),	   Spain	   (1,282/286),	   France	   (1,089/185),	   Greece	  (623/149),	  Germany	  (486/99),	  and	  Italy	  (421/87).	  These	  six	  countries	  account	  for	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  incidents	  and	  89.2	  per	  cent	  of	  fatalities.	  Thus,	  terrorism	  is	  not	  a	  pan-­‐European	  phenomenon.	  	  What	   matters	   for	   policy-­‐making	   though	   is	   whether	   terrorism	   is	   a	  perceived	  threat.	  After	  September	  11,	  2001,	  86	  per	  cent	  of	  Europeans	  said	  that	  they	  feared	  terrorism,	  an	   increase	  by	  12	  percentage	  points	  as	  compared	  to	  one	  year	  earlier.	  In	  2002,	  though,	  that	  number	  had	  reached	  the	  pre-­‐9/11	  level	  again.	  The	   attack	   in	   Madrid	   on	   March	   11th,	   2004,	   changed	   the	   public	   perception.	   It	  showed	   that	   “9/11”	   can	   also	   happen	   in	   Europe.	   Additionally,	   there	   were	  instances	   of	   so-­‐called	   homegrown	   terrorism	   in	   the	   period	   immediately	  afterwards:	  the	  assassinations	  of	  Theo	  van	  Gogh	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  in	  November	  2004	   and	   the	   bombings	   in	   London	   in	   July	   2005.	   Still,	   Bakker’s	   finding	   after	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analyzing	   Eurobarometer	   polls	   is	   that	   also	   the	   threat	   perception	   is	   not	   pan-­‐European.	  Generally,	  unemployment	  and	  the	  economic	  situation	  produced	  more	  fear	   than	   terrorism.	   In	   terms	   of	   threat	   perception,	   only	   Denmark	   and	   the	  Netherlands	  saw	  an	  important	  increase	  (the	  threat	  perception	  was	  already	  high	  in	   the	   UK	   and	   Spain	   before	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   attacks).	   The	   principal	  explanation	   for	   the	   differences	   in	   threat	   perception	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   some	  countries	  have	  recent	  experience	  with	  terrorism	  and	  others	  do	  not.	  The	  presence	  of	   sizeable	   Muslim	   communities	   is	   also	   factor	   as	   well	   as	   a	   country’s	   active	  participation	  in	  the	  U.S.-­‐led	  war	  against	  terrorism	  (ibid.).	  	   These	   differences	   might	   explain	   why	   it	   what	   so	   difficult	   for	   the	   United	  Kingdom	  and	  Spain	  to	  put	  the	  fight	  against	  terrorism	  on	  the	  top	  of	  the	  agenda	  in	  Brussels	  and	  why	  many	  measures	  were	  adopted	  so	  slowly.	  
Multilateral	  cooperation	  within	  Europe	  As	  already	  mentioned	  earlier,	   first	  steps	  to	  cooperate	  in	  terrorism	  matters	  date	  back	  to	  the	  1970s.	  TREVI	  brought	  together	  police	  officials	  to	  informally	  compare	  methods	  used	  to	  fight	  the	  IRA,	  the	  Brigate	  Rosse,	  or	  the	  Baader-­‐Meinhof	  gang	  (or	  RAF).	   Police	   cooperation	   formally	   became	   a	   pillar	   of	   the	   European	  Union	  with	  the	   adoption	   of	   the	  Maastricht	   Treaty	   of	   1992.	   Yet,	   this	   cooperation	   originally	  mainly	   focused	   on	   transnational	   organized	   crime	   and	   less	   on	   international	  terrorism.	   Immediately	   after	   9/11,	   the	   EU	   emergency	   Council	   meeting	   agreed	  upon	   an	  EU	  Action	  Plan	   to	  Combat	  Terrorism.	  This	   action	  plan	   contained	  over	  200	  measures	  and	  was	  revised	  and	  updated	  by	  the	  Plan	  of	  Action	  on	  Combating	  Terrorism	   of	   15	   June	   2004,	   that	   is,	   three	   months	   after	   the	   Madrid	   bombings	  (Nilsson	  2006).	  9/11	   brought	  more	   change:	   EU	   governments	   agreed	   on	   creating	   an	   EU	  Arrest	  Warrant,	  on	  a	  common	  definition	  of	  terrorism,	  a	  common	  list	  of	  terrorist	  groups,	  and	  on	  drafting	  rules	  for	  joint	  operations	  between	  national	  police	  forces.	  Furthermore,	   the	  EU	  police	  agency	  Europol	   saw	   its	  budget	   increase	  and	  a	  new	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Task	  Force	  consisting	  of	  national	  police	  officers	  was	  set	  up.	  Eurojust	  was	   created	   in	   order	   to	   facilitate	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	   cross-­‐border	  investigations.	   Gijs	   de	   Vries	   was	   appointed	   as	   the	   EU’s	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Coordinator	  (shortly	  after	  the	  Madrid	  bombings).	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Additionally,	   the	  member	  states’	  governments	  signed	  a	  solidarity	  clause,	  in	  which	   they	   pledge	   to	   help	   any	   fellow	  EU	   country	   that	   became	   a	   victim	   of	   a	  terrorist	   attack	   (Keohane	   2006).	   In	   2003,	   the	   European	   Security	   Strategy	  was	  agreed	  upon	  and	   in	  2005	  the	  European	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  strategy.	  Those	  two	  policy	  papers	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  sections	  further	  below.	  	   Nilsson	   (2006)	   claims	   that	  after	  9/11	  and	   the	  Madrid	  bombings,	   the	  EU	  has	  become	  "a	  major	  player	  in	  international	  cooperation	  against	  terrorism	  both	  at	  a	  global	  and	  at	  a	  European	  level"	  (ibid.,	  p.	  81).	  Its	  strategy	  though	  is	  that,	  even	  though	   no	   country	   is	   free	   from	   terrorism,	   "it	   remains	  wrong	   to	   turn	   the	   fight	  against	  it	  into	  a	  'war'"	  (ibid.).	  
The	  treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  After	   a	   lengthy	  negotiation	  process,	   the	   treaty	   of	   Lisbon	  was	   signed	  by	   the	  EU	  member	  states	  on	  13	  December	  2007	  and	  after	  some	  setbacks	  (such	  as	  the	  initial	  rejection	  by	  the	  Irish	  electorate	  in	  2008)	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  1	  December	  2009.	  Apart	   from	   a	   major	   revamping	   of	   the	   EU	   institutions,	   moving	   from	   required	  unanimity	  to	  a	  so-­‐called	  double	  majority	  voting	  system	  in	  several	  policy	  areas	  in	  the	   Council	   of	   Ministers,	   and	   e.g.	   the	   incorporation	   of	   the	   fundamental	   rights	  charter,	   it	   brought	   a	   couple	   of	   changes	   in	   regard	   to	   the	  Union’s	   foreign	  policy.	  The	  principal	  change	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  office	  of	  a	  High	  Representative	  of	  the	  Union	   for	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   Security	   Policy.	   The	   British	   Labour	   politician	  Catherine	  Ashton	  was	  appointed	  in	  2009	  with	  this	  position	  and	  will	  remain	  there	  through	  2014.	  According	   to	   the	   official	   narrative	   adopted	   by	   EU	   information	   outlets,	   the	  results	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  treaty	  will	  be	  that:	  
• “A	  new	  High	  Representative	  for	  the	  Union	  in	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Security	  Policy,	   also	   Vice-­‐President	   of	   the	   Commission,	   will	   increase	   the	   impact,	  the	  coherence	  and	  the	  visibility	  of	  the	  EU's	  external	  action.	  	  
• A	  new	  European	  External	  Action	  Service	  will	  provide	  back	  up	  and	  support	  to	  the	  High	  Representative.	  	  
• A	   single	   legal	   personality	   for	   the	   Union	   will	   strengthen	   the	   Union's	  negotiating	   power,	   making	   it	   more	   effective	   on	   the	   world	   stage	   and	   a	  more	  visible	  partner	  for	  third	  countries	  and	  international	  organizations.	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• Progress	   in	   European	   Security	   and	   Defense	   Policy	  will	   preserve	   special	  decision-­‐making	  arrangements	  but	  also	  pave	  the	  way	  towards	  reinforced	  cooperation	   amongst	   a	   smaller	   group	   of	   Member	   States.”	   (Lisbon	  Treaty16) At	   an	   earlier	   stage,	   when	  motivating	   the	   topic	   of	   this	   thesis,	   I	   brought	   up	   the	  question	  whether	   the	   European	  Union	   is	   a	   relevant	   actor	   in	   counter-­‐terrorism	  matters.	  This	  might	  be	  debatable	  among	  political	  scientists,	  but	  Article	  222	  of	  the	  TFEU	   gives	   a	   clear	   legal	   answer	   to	   this	   by	   including	   the	   so-­‐called	   solidarity	  clause:	  
“Article	  222	  
1. 	  The	  Union	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  shall	  act	  jointly	  in	  a	  spirit	  of	  solidarity	  if	  a	  Member	  State	  
is	   the	   object	   of	   a	   terrorist	   attack	   or	   the	   victim	   of	   a	   natural	   or	   man-­‐made	   disaster.	   The	  
Union	   shall	   mobilize	   all	   the	   instruments	   at	   its	   disposal,	   including	   the	  military	   resources	  
made	  available	  by	  the	  Member	  States,	  to:	  
(a)	   	  
–	  prevent	  the	  terrorist	  threat	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Member	  States;	  	  
–	  protect	  democratic	  institutions	  and	  the	  civilian	  population	  from	  any	  terrorist	  attack;	  
–	  assist	  a	  Member	  State	  in	  its	  territory,	  at	  the	  request	  of	  its	  political	  authorities,	  in	  the	  event	  
of	  a	  terrorist	  attack;	  
(b)	  assist	  a	  Member	  State	   in	   its	   territory,	  at	   the	   request	  of	   its	  political	  authorities,	   in	   the	  
event	  of	  a	  natural	  or	  man-­‐made	  disaster.	  
2. Should	  a	  Member	  State	  be	  the	  object	  of	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  or	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  natural	  or	  man-­‐
made	   disaster,	   the	   other	   Member	   States	   shall	   assist	   it	   at	   the	   request	   of	   its	   political	  
authorities.	   To	   that	   end,	   the	   Member	   States	   shall	   coordinate	   between	   themselves	   in	   the	  
Council.	  
3. The	   arrangements	   for	   the	   implementation	   by	   the	   Union	   of	   the	   solidarity	   clause	   shall	   be	  
defined	  by	  a	  decision	  adopted	  by	  the	  Council	  acting	  on	  a	  joint	  proposal	  by	  the	  Commission	  
and	   the	   High	   Representative	   of	   the	   Union	   for	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   Security	   Policy.	   The	  
Council	  shall	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  31(1)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  where	  
this	   decision	   has	   defense	   implications.	   The	   European	   Parliament	   shall	   be	   informed.	  	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paragraph	  and	  without	  prejudice	  to	  Article	  240,	  the	  Council	  shall	  
be	   assisted	   by	   the	   Political	   and	   Security	   Committee	   with	   the	   support	   of	   the	   structures	  
developed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  common	  security	  and	  defense	  policy	  and	  by	  the	  Committee	  
referred	  to	  in	  Article	  71;	  the	  two	  committees	  shall,	  if	  necessary,	  submit	  joint	  opinions.	  
4. The	  European	  Council	  shall	  regularly	  assess	  the	  threats	  facing	  the	  Union	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  
the	  Union	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  to	  take	  effective	  action.”	  (TFEU,	  Article	  222)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm	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The	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  The	   European	   Security	   Strategy	   abandons	   the	   scenario	   of	   a	   large-­‐scale	  aggression	   against	   an	   EU	   member	   state	   by	   an	   enemy	   country.	   Instead,	   it	  identifies	   five	   threats,	   which	   are	   all	   “more	   diverse,	   less	   visible	   and	   less	  predictable”	  than	  the	  scenario	  of	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war:	  
• Terrorism.	  The	  ESS	  sees	  the	  increasingly	  global	  scope	  of	  terrorism	  and	  its	  foundations	  in	  religious	  extremism.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  addresses	  what	  it	  is	   often	   called	   the	   “root	   causes”,	   which	   it	   considers	   to	   be	   “pressures	   of	  modernization,	   cultural,	   social	   and	   political	   crises,	   and	   the	   alienation	   of	  young	   people	   living	   in	   foreign	   societies”	   (ESS	   2003,	   p.	   3).	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   is	  specifically	   named	   as	   on	   organization	   having	   had	   logistical	   bases	  uncovered	  in	  the	  UK,	  Italy,	  Germany,	  Spain,	  and	  Belgium.	  
• Proliferation	   of	   Weapons	   of	   Mass	   Destruction.	   WMDs	   are	   seen	   as	  “potentially	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  our	  security”	  (ibid.).	  Dangers	  explicitly	  mentioned	  are	  a	  possible	  WMD	  arms	  race	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  (there	  is	  no	  reference	   to	  specific	   countries	  or	   regimes)	  and	   the	  acquisition	  of	  WMDs	  by	  terrorist	  groups	  (again,	  the	  threat	  is	  described	  in	  very	  general	  terms).	  
• Regional	   conflicts.	   Several	   regional	   conflicts	   that	  might	   have	   an	   “impact	  on	  European	  interests	  directly	  or	  indirectly”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  4),	  with	  the	  Middle	  East	  conflict	  being	  the	  one	  closest	  to	  Europe	  (i.e.,	  potential	  conflicts	  on	  the	  Balkans	   are	   not	  mentioned,	   which	   is	   surprising	   given	   that	   the	   ESS	  was	  adopted	  only	  a	  few	  years	  after	  the	  Kosovo	  war).	  It	  is	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  such	  regional	  conflicts	  can	  lead	  to	  extremism,	  terrorism	  and	  state	  failure	  and	  fuel	  the	  demand	  for	  WMDs.	  
• State	  failure.	  In	  this	  event,	  state	  institutions	  collapse.	  The	  examples	  given	  in	   the	   ESS	   are	   Somalia,	   Liberia	   and	  Afghanistan	   under	   the	   Taliban.	   It	   is	  considered	   a	   problem	   because	   it	   can	   lead	   to	   regional	   instability,	  undermines	   global	   governance	   and	   can	   be	   associated	   with	   organized	  crime	  and	  terrorism.	  
• Organized	  crime.	  The	  ESS	  sees	  Europe	  as	   the	  prime	  target	   for	  organized	  crime	  and	  notes	  the	   important	  external	  dimension.	   It	  also	  briefly	  evokes	  the	  possible	  links	  to	  terrorism.	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The	  combination	  of	   these	   threats	   (“terrorism	  committed	   to	  maximum	  violence,	  the	  availability	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction,	  organized	  crime,	  the	  weakening	  of	   the	   state	   system	   and	   the	   privatization	   of	   force”,	   by	   the	   way	   a	   wording	  reminiscent	   of	   Kaldor’s	   and	   Münkler’s)	   is	   considered	   a	   “very	   radical	   threat”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  5).	  	   After	  identifying	  the	  threats,	  the	  ESS	  sets	  out	  three	  strategic	  objectives:	  
• Addressing	   the	   threats.	  Here,	   the	  ESS	   reiterates	   the	   various	   steps	   it	   has	  already	   taken,	   such	   as	   the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant,	   its	  policies	   against	  proliferation	   of	  WMDs	   (i.e.,	  within	   the	   IAEA),	   or	   its	   involvement	   on	   the	  Balkans.	  
• Building	   security	   in	   the	   EU’s	   neighborhood.	   This	   section	   highlights	   the	  problem	   that	   EU-­‐enlargement	   brought	   the	   Union	   closer	   to	   areas	   of	  conflict.	   The	   EU’s	   task	   therefore,	   so	   the	   ESS,	   is	   to	   promote	   good	  governance	   in	   the	   countries	   surrounding	   the	   EU,	   that	   is,	   countries	   in	  Eastern	   European	   and	   around	   the	   Mediterranean.	   The	   “achievements”	  (ibid.,	   p.	   8)	   on	   the	   Balkans	   shall	   be	   consolidated.	   But	   the	   important	  problem	   to	   tackle	   –	   the	   ESS	   calls	   it	   a	   “strategic	   priority”	   –	   is	   the	  Arab/Israeli	  conflict,	  which	  (quite	  problematically17)	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  key	  to	  deal	  with	  other	  problems	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  The	  EU’s	  support	  of	  the	  two-­‐state	  solution	  is	  again	  emphasized.	  
• An	  international	  order	  based	  on	  effective	  multilateralism.	  Finally,	  the	  ESS	  emphasizes	   the	   EU’s	   commitment	   to	   International	   Law	   and	   that	   the	  fundamental	   framework	   for	   international	   relations	   is	   the	   UN	   charter.	  Therefore,	   the	   UN	   shall	   be	   strengthened	   and	   equipped	   to	   fulfill	   its	  responsibilities	  and	  act	  effectively.	  The	   transatlantic	   relationship	  and	   its	  importance	  to	  the	  international	  system	  is	  underlined18	  and	  NATO	  seen	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	   It	   is	   very	  doubtable	  whether	   solving	   the	  Arab/Israeli	   conflict	   really	   solves	   all	   hostilities	   and	  problems	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  18	  In	  the	  policy	  recommendations	  sections	  it	  repeats	  this	  point:	  „The	  transatlantic	  relationship	  is	  irreplaceable.	   Acting	   together,	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   the	   United	   States	   can	   be	   a	   formidable	  force	   for	   good	   in	   the	  world.	  Our	   aim	  should	  be	  an	  effective	   and	  balanced	  partnership	  with	   the	  USA.	  This	   is	  an	  additional	   reason	   for	   the	  EU	  to	  build	  up	   further	   its	  capabilities	  and	   increase	   its	  coherence.”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  13).	  It	  also	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  closer	  relations	  with	  Russia.	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an	   important	   expression	   of	   this	   relationship.	   Other	   international	  organizations	  mentioned	  are	  the	  WTO,	  the	  OSCE,	  the	  ICC	  and	  the	  regional	  groupings	   ASEAN,	   MERCOSUR,	   and	   African	   Union.	   In	   the	   end,	   it	   is	   also	  stated	   that	   some	   countries	   “placed	   themselves	   outside	   the	   bounds	   of	  international	  society	  (ibid.,	  p.	  10).	  Those	  states	  are	  warned	  that	  there	  is	  a	  “price	  to	  be	  paid,	  including	  in	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  European	  Union”	  (ibid.).	  The	  possibility	  of	  military	  interventions	  is	  not	  addressed.	  From	   this	   analysis,	   it	   derives	   several	   policy	   implications.	   Those	   policy	  implications	   do	   also	   include	   aspects	   of	   defense	   and	   military	   activities.	   It	  advocates	   a	  balance	  between	  military,	   diplomacy	  and	   civilian	   resources.	  Again,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  UN	  is	  stressed:	  	  “The	  EU	   should	   support	   the	  United	  Nations	   as	   it	   responds	   to	   threats	   to	  international	   peace	   and	   security.	   The	   EU	   is	   committed	   to	   reinforcing	   its	  cooperation	   with	   the	   UN	   to	   assist	   countries	   emerging	   from	   conflicts,	   and	   to	  enhancing	   its	   support	   for	   the	   UN	   in	   short-­‐term	   crisis	   management	   situations”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  11).	  The	  conclusion	  repeats	  the	  importance	  of	  multilateralism:	  	  “An	  active	  and	  capable	  European	  Union	  would	  make	  an	  impact	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  would	  contribute	  to	  an	  effective	  multilateral	  system	  leading	  to	  a	  fairer,	  safer	  and	  more	  united	  world”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  14).	  
The	  EU	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Strategy	  The	  ECTS	  was	  adopted	  in	  December	  2005	  (after	  the	  Madrid	  and	  London	  attacks).	  Its	   structure	   follows	   strongly	   the	   “4	   Ps”	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom’s	   national	  counter-­‐terrorism	  strategy	  (prevention,	  pursuit,	  protection,	  preparedness).	  The	  European	   version	   covers	   four	   strands	   of	   work	   or	   pillars,	   which	   fit	   under	   the	  over-­‐arching	   strategic	   commitment	   “to	   combat	   terrorism	   globally	   while	  respecting	  human	  rights,	  and	  make	  Europe	  safer,	  allowing	   its	  citizens	  to	   live	   in	  an	  area	  of	  freedom,	  security	  and	  justice”	  (ECTS,	  2005).	  The	  introduction	  puts	  the	  ECTS	   in	   the	  context	  of	   the	  ESS	  and	  emphasizes	   the	   importance	  of	   international	  cooperation,	  specifically	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  other	  regional	  or	   international	  organizations.	  The	  cooperation	  with	  states	   in	  North	  Africa,	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	   South	   East	   Asia	   is	   deemed	   important	   in	   order	   to	   address	   the	  “roots”	  of	  current	  international	  terrorism.	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• Prevent	   terrorist	   activities.	   The	   prevention	   of	   radicalization	   (which	   in	  turn	  can	  lead	  to	  terrorism)	  is	  considered	  a	  task	  of	  the	  member	  states.	  The	  EU	  sees	  its	  role	   in	  facilitating	  the	  knowledge	  exchange	  between	  member	  states.	  The	  prevention	  pillar	  aims,	   among	  others,	   at	   reducing	   incitement	  and	   recruitment	   and	   at	   promoting	   good	   governance,	   democracy,	   etc.	  through	  assistance	  programs.	  It	  also	  calls	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  “non-­‐emotive	  lexicon	  for	  discussing	  the	  issues”	  (ECTS,	  p.	  8).	  	  
• Protect	  citizens	  and	  infrastructure.	  This	  refers	  to	  European	  border	  control	  instruments	   like	   the	  Schengen	   Information	  System,	   the	  Visa	   Information	  System,	  and	  the	  European	  Borders	  Agency	  (FRONTEX).	   It	  also	  expresses	  the	   wish	   to	   assess	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   European	   cross-­‐border	  infrastructure	  to	  terrorist	  attacks.	  
• Pursue	  terrorists.	  Here,	  member	  states	  pledge	  to	  also	  take	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Union	  as	  a	  whole	  into	  account	  when	  preserving	  national	  security.	  The	  exchange	  of	  law	  enforcement	  information	  is	  crucial	  to	  this	  point	  (e.g.	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant).	   It	   is	   also	  noted	   that	  much	  of	   the	   terrorist	  threat	   originates	   outside	   the	   Union.	   It	   thus	   attempts	   to	   bolster	   the	  international	   consensus	   through	   the	   United	   Nations	   and	   other	  international	  organizations,	   to	  engage	   in	  dialogue	  with	  key	  partners	  and	  include	   counter-­‐terrorism	   clauses	   in	   agreements.	   A	   UN	   Comprehensive	  Convention	   Against	   Terrorism	   is	   an	   important	   goal.	   The	   Union	   will	  furthermore	  give	  assistance	  to	  priority	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  support	  them	  in	   introducing	   and	   implementing	   mechanisms	   against	   terrorism,	   in	  coordination	  with	  other	  donors	  (read:	  the	  U.S.).	  
• Respond	  to	  terrorist	  attacks.	  Measures	  for	  civil	  protection	  and	  managing	  the	  consequences	  of	  terrorist	  attacks	  fall	   into	  this	  category.	  The	  EU	  tries	  to	   coordinate	   its	   disaster	   response	   with	   related	   work	   in	   international	  organizations,	  particularly	  the	  UN.	  The	  European	  Union	  also	  has	  to	   justify	  why	  it	  should	  take	  any	  action	  at	  all	  and	  not	   leave	   the	   issue	   solely	   to	   the	   member	   states	   or	   other	   international	  organizations.	  The	  strategy	  paper	  claims	  that	  the	  EU	  can	  add	  value	  through	  four	  ways,	  which	  all	  cross-­‐contribute	  to	  what	  shall	  be	  referred	  to	  herein	  as	  the	  “4	  Ps”	  (though	  technically	  three	  Ps	  and	  one	  R):	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• Strengthening	  national	  capabilities.	  This	  first	  point	  refers	  to	  the	  exchange	  of	  “best	  practices”	  and	  knowledge,	  which	  includes	  the	  improved	  collection	  and	  analysis	  of	  information	  and	  intelligence.	  
• Facilitating	  European	  cooperation.	  This	  aims	  at	  establishing	  mechanisms	  that	   facilitate	   coordination	   between	   national	   police	   and	   judicial	  authorities	  and	  includes	  the	  possibility	  of	  legislation	  where	  necessary.	  
• Developing	  collective	  capability.	  This	  point	  tries	  to	  strengthen	  the	  Union’s	  ability	  to	  produce	  counter-­‐terrorism	  policy	  and	  includes	  more	  specifically	  EU	   agencies	   like	   Europol,	   Eurojust,	   Frontex,	   the	   Monitoring	   and	  Information	  Center	  and	  the	  SitCen.	  
• Promoting	   international	   partnership.	   This	   one	   is	   particularly	   important	  for	  this	  thesis.	  The	  strategy	  paper	  makes	  a	  point	  of	  endorsing	  cooperation	  with	  the	  United	  Nations,	  other	  international	  organizations	  and	  “key	  third	  countries”	  (ECTS	  2005,	  p.	  4).	  Another	  point	   that	   the	  paper	   stress	   repeatedly	   is	   the	   respect	   for	  human	   rights	  and	  democracy.	  In	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  response	  to	  the	  criticism	  that	  the	  United	  States	   often	   faces	   in	   its	   war	   on	   terror,	   the	   “strategy	   commitment”	   (which	   is	  reiterated	   several	   times)	   is	   not	   just	   to	   combat	   terrorism	  globally,	   but	   doing	   so	  “while	  respecting	  human	  rights”.	  	  The	   organizational	   chart	   on	   page	   5	   of	   the	   document	   notes	   that	   the	   EU	  “should	  pursue	  its	  goals	  in	  a	  democratic	  and	  accountable	  way.	  Political	  oversight	  of	   the	   Strategy	   and	   regular	   follow-­‐up	  will	   be	   essential”	   (ECTS	   2005,	   p.	   5).	   The	  political	  oversight	  is	  conducted	  by	  the	  European	  Council,	  which	  shall	  meet	  “once	  per	   presidency	   to	   ensure	   inter-­‐institutional	   governance”	   (ibid.).	   Furthermore,	  COREPER	   is	   monitoring	   the	   progress	   on	   the	   Strategy,	   while	   the	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	   Coordinator	   and	   the	   Commission	   follow-­‐up	   regularly	   and	   update	  thereon.	  	  As	  mandated,	   there	   is	   a	   report	   on	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   European	  Security	   Strategy,	   drafted	  under	   the	   responsibilities	   of	  EU	  High	  Representative	  Javier	   Solana	   and	   approved	   by	   the	   European	   Council	   on	   December	   11th/12th,	  2008	   (that	   is,	   five	   years	   after	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   strategy).	   The	   report,	   while	  acknowledging	   the	   challenges	   ahead,	   is	  mostly	   positive	   in	   its	   review	  and	   in	   its	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wording	   remains	   very	   close	   (at	   some	   points	   even	   identical)	   to	   the	   original	  strategy.	  	  In	   February	   2010,	   an	   Internal	   Security	   Strategy	   (ISS)	   for	   the	   European	  Union	  (“Towards	  a	  European	  Security	  Model”)	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  presidency19.	  The	   novelty	   of	   the	   ISS	   is	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   European	   Security	  Model.	   Due	   to	   the	   inward	   orientation	   of	   the	   ISS,	   it	   aims	  more	   at	   cohesion	   and	  streamlining	  in	  policies	  among	  European	  member	  states	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  relate	  to	  the	  UN	  or	  international	  organizations.	  
Implementation	  of	  the	  EU’s	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Strategy	  The	   breadth	   of	   the	   ECTS’	   approach	   brings	   along	   issues	   of	   implementation.	  Keohane	  (2006)	  cites	  an	  EU	  official	  who	  explained	  the	  problem:	  “It	  seems	  that	  if	  we	  are	  to	  truly	  tackle	  terrorism,	  then	  we	  need	  to	  solve	  all	  the	  world’s	  problems”	  (Keohane	  2006,	  p.	  64).	  Not	  only	  are	  the	  EU	  action	  plan	  and	  the	  strategy	  plan	  too	  unwieldy	  to	  work	  with,	  but	  they	  also	  lack	  prioritization.	  Even	  though	  the	  EU	  put	  counter-­‐terrorism	   on	   the	   European	   agenda,	   the	   actual	   powers	   to	   combat	  terrorism	  stay	  significantly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  member	  states.	  Much	  of	  the	  cross-­‐border	  cooperation	  still	  takes	  place	  bilaterally.	  A	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  national	  intelligence	   services	   are	   reluctant	   to	   cede	   sensitive	   information	   to	   a	   wider	  audience	   for	   fear	   of	   compromising	   operations	   and	   sources.	   Therefore,	   the	  European	   equivalents	   of	   American	   federal	   or	   EU	   member	   states’	   law	  enforcement	  agencies	  are	  generally	  weaker	  than	  their	  counterparts	  (e.g.	  Europol	  cannot	   oblige	   national	   police	   forces	   to	   cooperate	   and	   has	   by	   far	   not	   the	   same	  powers	  as	  the	  FBI).	  There	  is	  now	  an	  EU	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Coordinator,	  but	  he	  has	   few	   competences,	   a	   small	   budget	   and	   cannot	   propose	   EU	   legislation.	   He	  cannot	   even	   call	   meetings	   of	   national	   justice	   or	   foreign	   ministers	   to	   set	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  This	   strategy	  paper	   is	  a	   result	  of	  a	  mandate	  given	  by	   the	  Stockholm	  program	  („An	  open	  and	  secure	   Europe	   serving	   and	   protecting	   the	   citizens“):	   “An	   internal	   security	   strategy	   should	   be	  
developed	  in	  order	  to	  further	  improve	  security	  in	  the	  Union	  and	  thus	  protect	  the	  lives	  and	  safety	  of	  
European	  citizens	  and	  tackle	  organized	  crime,	  terrorism	  and	  other	  threats.	  The	  strategy	  should	  be	  
aimed	   at	   strengthening	   cooperation	   in	   law	   enforcement,	   border	   management,	   civil	   protection,	  
disaster	  management	  as	  well	  as	  criminal	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  order	  to	  make	  Europe	  more	  secure.	  
Moreover,	   the	   European	   Union	   needs	   to	   base	   its	   work	   on	   solidarity	   between	  Member	   States	   and	  
make	  full	  use	  of	  Article	  222	  TFEU.”	  (see	  e.g.	  Official	  Journal	  C115	  of	  May	  4th,	  2010,	  p.	  1)	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counter-­‐terrorism	   agenda.	   Thus,	   he	   can	   barely	   coordinate,	   but	   only	   make	   the	  case	   for	   coordination.	  More	   disconcerting	   is	   Keohane’s	   account	   of	   a	   senior	   EU	  official	  who	  claimed	  that	  “only	  ten	  of	  the	  25	  governments	  take	  his	  role	  seriously	  and	  listen	  to	  what	  he	  says”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  65).	  	  The	  main	  weaknesses	   that	  Keohane	  (2006)	  sees	   in	   the	  EU	  approach	  are	  the	   slow	   speed	   of	   implementation,	   the	   high	   degree	   of	   institutional	   complexity,	  and	  the	  emphasis	  on	  internal	  law	  enforcement,	  which	  attributes	  little	  importance	  to	  the	  matter	  in	  its	  relations	  with	  third	  countries	  (counter-­‐terrorism	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  led	  by	  the	  interior	  ministers,	  not	  the	  foreign	  ministers).	  	  A	   noteworthy	   point	   is	   also	   that	   the	   European	   governments’	   long-­‐term	  policies	  towards	  the	  Middle	  East	  might	  need	  to	  be	  re-­‐thought.	  While	  Europe	  has	  been	   very	   critical	   of	   the	   U.S.	   intervention	   in	   Iraq	   and	   the	   idea	   of	   thereby	  spreading	   democratic	   values,	   those	   critics	   tended	   to	   overlook	   American	   non-­‐military	   efforts	   in	   the	   region.	   For	   instance,	   the	   U.S.	   spent	   $300	   million	   on	   its	  Middle	  East	  partnership	  initiative	  between	  2002	  and	  2006	  to	  support	  economic,	  political,	  and	  education	  reform	  efforts	  in	  the	  region20	  (ibid.).	  	  	  
Summary	  of	  the	  European	  response	  to	  terrorism	  Monar	  (2006)	  tries	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  whether	  there	  is	  indeed	  a	  European	  response	  to	  terrorism.	  The	  term	  “European”,	  as	  it	  used	  in	  the	  title	  of	  this	  thesis,	  can	   refer	   to	  many	   things.	   It	   can	   refer	   to	   the	   individual	   European	   states,	   to	   the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  as	  the	  broadest	  and	  oldest	  organization	  of	  European	  countries,	  or	   (and	   this	   is	   how	   it	   has	   been	   used	   here)	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   the	   strategy	   of	   the	  European	  Union	  and	  its	  member	  states.	  This	  was	  done	  because	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  European	   political,	   legal	   and	   institutional	   integration	   and	   cooperation.	   The	  answer	   (along	   the	   lines	   of	   Monar	   2006)	   is	   ambivalent.	   The	   EU	   succeeded	   in	  formulation	  a	  European	   response	  by	  developing	   the	  Action	  Plan,	   the	  European	  Security	   Strategy	   and	   the	   European	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	   Strategy.	   It	   has	  considerably	  intensified	  and	  institutionalized	  the	  cooperation	  between	  member	  states.	  Yet,	  political	  divisions	  significantly	  slowed	  down	  this	  process.	  The	  EU	  has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	   One	   could	   also	   note	   the	   aid	   given	   by	   the	   U.S.	   to	   Egypt,	   which	   is	   contingent	   on	   the	   latter’s	  respecting	  the	  peace	  treaty	  with	  Israel.	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consistently	   tried	   to	   maintain	   a	   balance	   between	   unity	   and	   diversity,	   which	  renders	  the	  operations	  of	  EU	  institutions	  difficult	  at	  times.	  The	  EU	  anti-­‐terrorism	  system	  is	  rather	  cooperative	  and	  coordinated	  than	  integrated	  (ibid.).	  
The	  European	  Union	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  The	  European	  Union	   has	   increasingly	   become	   an	   actor	   even	   at	  United	  Nations	  level.	  It	  is	  represented	  through	  several	  ways:	  the	  27	  Member	  States,	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  Presidency	  and	  the	  European	  Commission.	  According	  to	  official	  EU	  information,	   those	   differently	   bodies	   meet	   regularly	   to	   coordinate	   their	  positions.	  	  “Coordination	  now	  encompasses	  the	  six	  main	  committees	  of	   the	  General	  Assembly	   and	   its	   subordinate	   bodies,	   including	   ECOSOC	   and	   its	   subsidiary	  functional	  commissions.	  More	  than	  1,000	  internal	  EU	  coordination	  meetings	  are	  conducted	   each	   year	   in	   both	   New	   York	   and	   Geneva.	   EU	   Member	   States	   work	  together	   with	   the	   Council	   and	   the	   Commission	   to	   prepare	   and	   finalize	   EU	  statements,	   and	   the	   Member	   State	   holding	   the	   Presidency	   presents	   the	   EU	  position	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  whether	  in	  negotiations	  or	  debates,	  in	  the	  form	  of	   a	   Presidency	   statement.	   The	   European	   Community,	   represented	   by	   the	  European	   Commission,	   can	   also	   take	   the	   floor	   as	   a	   permanent	   observer	   at	   the	  General	   Assembly.	   In	   cases	   involving	   trade,	   agriculture,	   and	   fisheries,	   the	  European	  Commission	  negotiates	  and	  makes	  statements	  at	   the	  UN	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	   EU	   and	   can	   also	   do	   so	   in	   other	   cases	   involving	   predominantly	   European	  Community	  competences.”	  (Europa-­‐EU-­‐UN.org,	  200821)	  The	   support	   of	   the	   European	   Commission	   to	   the	   United	   Nations	   was	  established	   through	   the	  Commission’s	  Communication	  of	  2001	  on	   “Building	   an	  effective	  partnership	  with	  the	  UN”	  and	  reinforced	  by	  a	  Communication	  of	  2003	  with	  the	  title	  “EU-­‐UN	  relations:	  the	  choice	  of	  multilateralism.”	  Wouters	   et	   al.	   (2006)	   argue	   that	   coordination	   between	   the	   European	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  has	  gained	  new	  impetus	  because	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	   the	   common	   ground	   of	   the	   two	   organizations,	   foremost	   due	   to	   the	  development	  of	  the	  European	  Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy	  (CFSP).	  The	  European	   Union	   (as	   well	   as	   the	   United	   Nations)	   not	   only	   covers	   trade	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  http://www.europa-­‐eu-­‐un.org/articles/articleslist_s30_en.htm,	  as	  of	  10	  January	  2008	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development	  only,	   but	   also	   the	  promotion	  of	   human	   rights,	   crisis	  management	  and	  of	  course	  the	  fight	  against	  terrorism.	  	  The	   European	   Security	   Strategy	   thus	   coins	   a	   new	   credo,	   the	   credo	   of	  “effective	   multilateralism”,	   and	   declares	   “strengthening	   the	   United	   Nations,	  equipping	   it	   to	   fulfill	   its	   responsibilities	   and	   to	   act	   effectively,	   […]	   a	   European	  priority.”	   (ESS,	   2003,	   p.	   9)	   This	   has	   generally	   been	   well	   responded	   to	   by	   the	  United	  Nations.	  As	  Wouters	  et	  al.	  put	  it,	  “[t]he	  strengthened	  	  emphasis	  from	  the	  EU	  side	  on	  supporting	  the	  EU	  stems	  not	  only	  from	  an	  altruistic	  desire	  to	  further	  UN	   goals,	   but	   also	   from	   the	   EU	  Member	   States’	   joint	   ambition	   to	   establish	   the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	   ‘global	  actor’	   in	  the	   international	  sphere.”	  (Wouters	  2006,	  2)	   This	   approach	   is	   also	   continued	   in	   the	   European	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Strategy,	   which,	   in	   its	   introduction,	   specifically	   refers	   to	   the	   UN	   and	   to	  international	  cooperation:	  	  “Acting	   through	   and	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   United	   Nations	   and	   other	  international	   or	   regional	   organizations,	   the	   EU	   will	   work	   to	   build	   the	  international	   consensus	   and	   promote	   international	   standards	   for	   countering	  terrorism.	  The	  EU	  will	  promote	  efforts	  in	  the	  UN	  to	  develop	  a	  global	  strategy	  for	  combating	   terrorism.	   Continuing	   to	   make	   counter-­‐terrorism	   a	   high	   priority	   in	  dialogue	  with	  key	  partner	  countries,	  including	  the	  USA,	  will	  also	  be	  a	  core	  part	  of	  the	  European	  approach”	  (ECTS	  2005,	  p.	  7).	  Rosand	  et	  al	  (2008)	  note	  the	  importance	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  given	  to	  the	  UN	  strategy	   paper:	   “With	   respect	   to	   the	   UN	   Strategy,	   the	   EU	   has	   been	   one	   of	   its	  strongest	  proponents,	  seeking	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  reinforce	  both	  the	  Task	  Force	  and	  implementation	   more	   generally”	   (ibid.,	   p.	   14).	   They	   note	   that	   the	   EU	  counterterrorism	   committee	   (COTER)	   “regularly	   includes	   strategy	  implementation	   efforts	   and	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   EU	   can	   advance	   them	   on	   the	  agenda	  of	   its	  monthly	  meeting	   in	  Brussels	  and	   invites	   relevant	  UN	  bodies	   (e.g.,	  CTED	  and	  UNODC)	  to	  attend”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  14).	  Furthermore,	  several	  member	  states	  provided	  voluntary	  contributions	   to	   the	  Task	  Force	   to	  support	   its	  work,	  and	   in	  2007	   the	   European	   Commission	   suggested	   that	   the	   EU	   adopt	   a	   number	   of	  measures	  to	  implement	  both	  the	  UN	  Strategy	  and	  the	  EU	  strategy.	  Additionally,	  the	   Secretariat	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   the	   EU,	   in	   cooperation	   with	   the	   European	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Commission,	  produced	  a	  matrix	  of	  the	  EU’s	  activities	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  UN	  Strategy	  (ibid).	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The	  American	  strategy	  against	  terrorism	  and	  how	  it	  involves	  the	  
UN	  
Multilateralism	  In	  many	  cases,	   the	  U.S.	   involved	  allies	  and	  IOs	  when	  going	   for	  war.	  This	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  several	  ways.	  Tierney	  (2010)	  for	  instance	  sees	  multilateralism	  as	  an	  insurance	   policy	   against	   loss	   for	   the	   U.S.	   Through	   a	   combination	   of	   simple	  bargaining,	   complex	   bargaining,	   and	   political	   cover,	   the	   presence	   of	   allies	   and	  international	   organizations	   in	   a	   U.S.	   coalition	   can	   contribute	   to	   compensate	  against	  making	  concessions	  to,	  negotiating	  with	  and	  accepting	  compromise	  with	  its	  adversaries.	  This	  view	  suggests	   that	  multilateralism,	   in	  a	  certain	  way,	   is	   the	  price	   that	   has	   to	  be	  paid	   as	   an	   insurance	  premium	   in	   case	   the	  war	   effort	   fails.	  This	   strategy	   still	   “pays	   off”	   even	   though	   there	   are	   no	  more	   conflicts	   between	  great	   powers.	   The	   example	   of	   the	   Vietnam	   War	   shows	   that	   even	   such	   an	  asymmetric	   war	   can	   be	   very	   costly.	   The	   examples	   of	   the	   war	   in	   Iraq	   and	  Afghanistan	  should	  be	  added	  here.	  	   The	   Clinton	   administration	   followed	   a	   doctrine	   of	   “assertive	  multilateralism.”	  This	  approach	  was	  challenged	  when	  George	  W.	  Bush	  came	  into	  office:	  his	  administration	   rejected	   the	  Kyoto	  protocol	  on	  greenhouse	  gases,	   the	  ABM	  treaty,	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  (Luck	  2004).	  	  
The	  “Bush	  doctrine”	  The	  various	  foreign	  policy	  principles	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Government	  during	  the	  Bush	  presidency	  are	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Bush	  doctrine.	  While	  the	  term	  might	  oversimplify	  or	  be	  problematic	   in	   certain	  aspects,	   it	   can	  nevertheless	  be	  used	  as	  an	  approach	   to	  U.S.	   foreign	  policy.	  The	   foremost	   issue	  with	   this	   term’s	  usage	  in	  a	  scientific	  context	  is	  its	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	  and	  concise	  definition.	  The	  term	  is	   very	  much	   coined	  by	   journalism,	   its	   substance	  partly	  defined	  by	   think	   tanks	  close	   to	   the	  US	  Government,	   as	   for	   example	   the	   Project	   for	   the	  New	  American	  Century	   (PNAC),	   of	   which	   many	   signatories	   of	   its	   founding	   Statement	   of	  Principles	  later	  took	  leading	  positions	  in	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  (Statement	  of	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Principles,	   199722).	   Another	   well	   of	   inspiration	   have	   been	   books	   like	   Natan	  Sharansky	  and	  Ron	  Dermer’s	  “The	  Case	  for	  Democracy”	  (Dickerson,	  200523).	  	  Several	   elements	   might	   be	   identified	   as	   core	   components	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	  Bush	  doctrine:	  1. Holding	   those	   who	   harbor	   terrorists	   accountable	   for	   terrorism	   (e.g.	  Weisman	   200224).	   This	   was	   especially	   of	   importance	   in	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	  of	  September	  11	  and	  the	  subsequent	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Taliban	  regime	   in	  Afghanistan:	  After	   the	  attacks,	  President	  Bush	  stated	   that	   "we	  will	  make	  no	  distinction	  between	  the	  terrorists	  who	  committed	  these	  acts	  and	  those	  who	  harbor	  them."	  (Bush,	  11.9.200125)	  	  2. The	   policy	   of	   preemption	   or	   preventive	   wars,	   which	   meant	   deposing	  regimes	   of	   other	   countries	   should	   there	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   they	  might	  become	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  U.S.	  or	  its	  citizens,	  even	  if	  this	  threat	  is	  not	  immediately	   immanent.	   This	   goes	   hand-­‐in-­‐hand	   with	   the	   policy	   of	  supporting	   democracy	   and	   democratic	   movements	   (the	   “Freedom	  agenda”)	  around	  the	  world	  and	  especially	  the	  Middle	  East	  in	  order	  to	  deal	  with	   terrorism	   at	   its	   root	   as	   well	   as	   the	   willingness	   to	   pursue	   U.S.	  (military)	  interests	  in	  a	  unilateral	  way	  (e.g.	  Allen	  200726,	  Page	  200327).	  	  Page	  (2003)	  argues	  that	  that	  this	  Bush	  doctrine	  is	  a	  “dramatic	  change	  from	  the	  policy	  of	  containment,	  adopted	  by	  President	  Truman	  in	  1947.”	  It	  is	  also	  a	  change	  from	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  doctrines	  such	  as	   the	  Powell	  doctrine	  (especially	   in	  regard	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  exit-­‐strategy,	  DuBrin28)	  or	  the	  Clinton	  doctrine.	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The	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  (2002	  and	  2006)	  A	   cornerstone	   policy	   paper	   of	   the	   Bush	   Administration	   gives	   a	   more	   concise	  outline	  of	  the	  Bush	  doctrine:	  the	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  of	  2002	  (for	  the	  first	  term)	   and	   2006	   (for	   the	   second	   term).	   This	   strategy	   has	   been	   updated	   by	   the	  Obama	  administration	  in	  2010.	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  the	  2006	  National	  Strategy	  for	  Combating	  Terrorism.	  The	   NSS	   addresses	   the	   “rise	   of	   terrorism	   fueled	   by	   an	   aggressive	   ideology	   of	  hatred	  and	  murder.”	  (Bush	  2006)29	  Its	  answer	  to	  that	  is	  to	  “fight	  and	  win	  the	  war	  on	  terror”	  and	  to	  “promote	  freedom	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  tyranny	  and	  despair.”	  To	  do	  so,	  every	  tool	  “in	  our	  arsenal”	  (Bush	  2002,	  p.	  1)	  ought	  to	  be	  made	  use	  of:	  military	  power,	  better	  homeland	  defenses,	  law	  enforcement,	  intelligence,	  and	  cutting	  off	  terrorist	  financing.	  	  The	  2002	  NSS	  is	  split	  in	  eight	  sections	  with	  strategic	  goals:	  
• Champion	  aspirations	  for	  human	  dignity	  
• Strengthen	   alliances	   to	   defeat	   global	   terrorism	   and	  work	   to	   prevent	  attacks	  against	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  friends	  
• Work	  with	  others	  to	  defuse	  regional	  conflicts	  
• Prevent	  U.S.	  enemies	  from	  threatening	  it,	  its	  allies,	  and	  its	  friends	  with	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  
• Ignite	  a	  new	  era	  of	  global	  economic	  growth	  through	  free	  markets	  and	  free	  trade	  
• Expand	   the	   circle	   of	   development	   by	   opening	   societies	   and	   building	  the	  infrastructure	  of	  democracy	  
• Develop	  agendas	  for	  cooperative	  action	  with	  the	  other	  main	  centers	  of	  global	  powers	  
• Transform	   America’s	   national	   security	   institutions	   to	   meet	   the	  challenges	  and	  opportunities	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  The	  2006	  NSS	  maintains	  those	  eight	  goals	  and	  adds	  a	  ninth	  one:	  
• Engage	  the	  opportunities	  and	  confront	  the	  challenges	  of	  globalization	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  Bush,	  George	  W.,	  Preface	  to	  the	  National	  Security	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  March	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The	  National	  Strategy	  for	  Combating	  Terrorism	  (2003	  and	  2006)	  During	  the	  Bush	  administration,	  the	  White	  House	  released	  two	  NSCTs.	  The	  two	  strategies	   differ	   mainly	   in	   that	   the	   more	   recent	   one	   sets	   slightly	   different	  priorities	  for	  the	  strategic	  elements.	  It	  puts	  further	  emphasis	  on	  democratization	  as	   a	  method	   of	   counter-­‐terrorism	   and	   on	   safe	   harbors	   provided	   by	   failed	   and	  rogue	  states.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   there	   is	   less	  emphasis	  on	   the	  use	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  tools	  to	  strengthen	  countries	  susceptible	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  terrorist	  influence	  (see	  e.g.	  Perl	  2007).	  The	  2006	  NSCT	  assesses	  successes	  and	  challenges	  in	  the	  war	  on	  terror,	  describes	  the	  terrorist	  enemy,	  lays	  out	  a	  strategic	  vision	  for	  the	  war	  on	  terror,	  describes	  a	  strategy	   for	   winning	   the	   war	   on	   terror	   and	   discusses	   institutionalizing	   the	  strategy	  for	   long-­‐term	  success.	  The	   long-­‐term	  approach	   is	   to	  “advance	  effective	  democracy”	   (NSCT	  2006),	  while	   the	   four	   short-­‐term	  priorities	   of	   action	   are	   (i)	  preventing	  attacks	  by	  terrorist	  networks,	  (ii)	  denying	  WMDs	  to	  rogue	  states	  and	  terrorist	   allies	   who	   seek	   to	   use	   them,	   (iii)	   denying	   terrorists	   the	   support	   and	  sanctuary	   of	   rogue	   states,	   (iv)	   denying	   terrorists	   control	   of	   any	   nation	   they	  would	  use	  as	  a	  base	  and	  launching	  pad	  for	  terror.	  
The	  Bush	  administration	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  President	  Bush	  summarized	   the	  challenge	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	  and	   the	   issues	  that	   the	   United	   States	   Government	   at	   the	   time	   had	  with	   the	   organization	   in	   a	  speech	  given	  to	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  at	  its	  meeting	  in	  December	  2002.	  The	  speech	   was	   held	   during	   the	   period	   in	   which	   President	   Bush	   was	   working	   on	  forging	  a	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  US-­‐led	  coalition	  for	  an	  intervention	  in	  Iraq	  and	  was	  also	  trying	  to	  garner	  a	  broad	  support	  worldwide:	  “All	   the	   world	   now	   faces	   a	   test,	   and	   the	   United	   Nations	   a	   difficult	   and	  defining	  moment.	  Are	  Security	  Council	  resolutions	  to	  be	  honored	  and	  enforced,	  or	  cast	  aside	  without	  consequence?	  Will	  the	  United	  Nations	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  its	   founding,	   or	   will	   it	   be	   irrelevant?	   […]	  We	   cannot	   stand	   by	   and	   do	   nothing	  while	  dangers	  gather.	  We	  must	  stand	  up	  for	  our	  security,	  and	  for	  the	  permanent	  rights	  and	  the	  hopes	  of	  mankind.	  By	  heritage	  and	  by	  choice,	  the	  United	  States	  of	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America	  will	  make	  that	  stand.	  And,	  delegates	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  you	  have	  the	  power	  to	  make	  that	  stand,	  as	  well”	  (Bush,	  9/12/200230).	  	   Luck	   (2004)	   comes	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   mix	   of	   unilateral	   and	  multilateral	   elements	   in	   U.S.	   counter-­‐terrorism	   policies	   suggests	   a	   way	   more	  calibrated	  and	  nuanced	  response	  than	  often	  described	  by	  the	  simplistic	  critiques	  of	  U.S.	  policy.	  Despite	  ideological	  predispositions,	  it	  seems	  that	  perceptions	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	   the	  threat	  and	  the	  range	  and	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  different	  policy	  options	  available	  guided	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  policy	  decisions.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Bush	   administration	   acted	   no	  more	   unilaterally	   than	   previous	   (and	   following)	  administrations.	  Remember	  for	  instance	  that	  Clinton’s	  missile	  strikes	  against	  Al-­‐Qaeda	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   an	   alleged	   chemical	   weapons	   factory	   in	   Sudan	   in	  retaliation	  for	  the	  bombings	  of	  American	  embassies	  in	  Nairobi,	  Kenya,	  and	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	   Tanzania,	   were	   launched	   without	   a	   UN	   mandate,	   while	   Bush	  immediately	  sought	  authorization	  for	  self-­‐defense	  from	  the	  Security	  Council	  after	  9/11	  and	  also	  unsuccessfully	  sought	  approval	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Iraq.	  	  Just	   as	   much	   were	   other	   countries	   skeptical	   to	   entrust	   their	   defense	  against	   terrorism	   to	   the	   UN	   or	   other	   multilateral	   institutions.	   Acting	  multilaterally	  was	   done	   by	   the	   Bush	   administration	   out	   of	   pragmatic	   needs	   to	  forge	   a	   broad	   international	   coalition	   against	   terrorism	   and	   thus	   a	   result	   of	  rationality,	   not	   political	   preference.	   The	   reason	   why	   multilateralism	   was	   not	  used	  more	  than	   it	  has	  been,	  were	   its	  political	  and	  structural	  weaknesses	   in	   the	  field	  of	  counterterrorism	  (ibid.).	  Luck	  sees	  five	  factors	  that	  weigh	  in	  in	  the	  choice	  of	  government	  policy:	  
• The	  disparity	   in	  military	  capabilities	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  
• Differences	  in	  both	  policy	  preferences	  and	  public	  attitudes	  on	  counter-­‐terrorism	  and	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  
• The	   degree	   of	   use	   of	   multilateralism	   or	   unilateralism	   by	   other	  countries	  when	  dealing	  with	  terrorism.	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  Bush,	  George	  W.:	   “President’s	  Remarks	  at	   the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly”,	   September	  12,	  2002	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• The	  role	  given	  to	  the	  UN	  and	  multilateral	  institutions	  by	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  counterterrorism	  experts31.	  	  
• The	  institutional	  challenges	  posed	  by	  the	  struggle	  against	  terrorism	  to	  the	  UN	  and	  IOs	  in	  general.	  
The	  paradigm	  shift	  under	  the	  Obama	  administration	  When	  Senator	  Barack	  Obama	  was	  running	  for	  presidency	   in	  2008,	  his	  platform	  ran	  on	  an	  agenda	  that	  was	  summarized	  by	  the	  (slightly	  vague)	  keywords	  “hope”	  and	  “change.”	  The	  wars	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,	  as	  well	  as	  unresolved	  issues	  like	  the	  Guantanamo	  Bay	  detention	  facilities,	  which	  the	  Bush	  administration	  used	  to	  incarcerate	   “enemy	   combatants,”	   that	   is,	   people	   accused	   of	   fighting	   the	  United	  States	   (through	   means	   of	   terrorism	   or	   guerilla	   tactics)	   not	   as	   members	   of	   a	  regular	  army	  and	  therefore	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  Geneva	  convention	  (see	  also	  page	  32	   on	   the	   application	   of	   the	   Geneva	   convention	   to	   enemy	   combatants),	   were	  crucial	  topics	  of	  discussion	  and	  disagreement	  during	  the	  electoral	  campaign	  (for	  a	  review	  of	  the	  security	  versus	  freedom	  debate,	  see	  e.g.	  Haarscher	  2006).	  	   Obama	   declares	   himself	   a	   fan	   of	   Christian	   realist	   Reinhold	   Niebuhr	   (“I	  love	  him.	  He’s	  one	  of	  my	  favorite	  philosophers.”).	  When	  asked	  what	  he	  took	  away	  from	  him,	  he	  answered:	  “I	  take	  away	  the	  compelling	  idea	  that	  there’s	  serious	  evil	  in	   the	  world,	   and	  hardship	  and	  pain.	  And	  we	  should	  be	  humble	  and	  modest	   in	  our	  belief	  we	  can	  eliminate	  those	  things.	  But	  we	  shouldn’t	  use	  that	  as	  an	  excuse	  for	  cynicism	  and	  inaction.	  I	  take	  away	  ...	  the	  sense	  we	  have	  to	  make	  these	  efforts	  knowing	  they	  are	  hard,	  and	  not	  swinging	  from	  naïve	  idealism	  to	  bitter	  realism”	  (both	  quotes:	  Brooks	  2007).	  	   While	  less	  prominent	  than	  the	  “Bush	  doctrine,”	  there	  were	  also	  attempts	  to	  formulate	  an	  “Obama	  doctrine.”	  E.	  J.	  Donne,	  for	  instance,	  sees	  it	  as	  "a	  form	  of	  realism	   unafraid	   to	   deploy	   American	   power	   but	   mindful	   that	   its	   use	   must	   be	  tempered	  by	  practical	  limits	  and	  a	  dose	  of	  self-­‐awareness."	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  For	  instance,	  Martha	  Crenshaw	  notes	  that	  „a	  quick	  non-­‐definitive	  review	  of	  post-­‐1995	  content	  of	   the	   major	   journal	   in	   the	   field,	   Terrorism	   and	   Political	   Violence,	   reveals	   no	   articles	   dealing	  specifically	   with	   the	   UN	   or	   with	   the	   general	   subject	   of	   international	   cooperation“	   (Crenshaw,	  quoted	  in	  Luck	  2004,	  p.	  79).	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   From	  this,	   it	  was	   just	  a	  natural	  consequence,	   that	   the	  White	  House,	  now	  under	   the	   Obama	   administration,	   would	   issue	   its	   new,	   post-­‐Bush	   National	  Security	  Strategy	  in	  2010.	  Susan	  Rice,	  who	  was	  appointed	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	   only	   a	   couple	   of	   days	   after	  Obama	   took	  office	   in	   January	  2009,	  called	   it	   “a	   rather	   dramatic	   departure	   from	   the	   most	   recent	   prior	   national	  security	  strategy”	  (Rice,	  quoted	  in:	  Sanger	  and	  Baker	  2010),	  	   The	  new	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  eliminated	  all	   references	   to	   “Islamic	  radicalism”	   and	   instead	   spoke	   of	   terrorism	   in	   more	   general	   terms	   (“violent	  extremism”	  –	  a	  term	  that	  purposely	  also	  encompasses	  what	  is	  called	  homegrown	  terrorism).	   In	   fact,	   countering	   terrorism	   is	   “only	   one	   element	   of	   our	   strategic	  environment	  and	  cannot	  define	  America’s	  engagement	  with	  the	  world.”	  It	  indeed	  includes	   references	   to	   climate	   change	   as	   a	   possible	   security	   threat	   as	   well	   as	  America’s	   dependence	   on	   fossil	   fuels.	   More	   specifically,	   it	   emphasizes	   the	  primacy	   of	   diplomacy	   over	   military	   actions:	   “Our	   long-­‐term	   security	   will	   not	  come	  from	  our	  ability	  to	  instill	  fear	  in	  other	  peoples,	  but	  through	  our	  capacity	  to	  speak	  to	  their	  hopes.”	  The	  Bush	  doctrine	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  pre-­‐emptive	  strikes,	  but	  Obama’s	  revision	  softened	  this	  principle.	  Even	  though	  it	  does	  not	  rule	  out	   first-­‐strikes,	   it	   sees	   it	   rather	   as	   a	   last	   resort:	   “While	   the	   use	   of	   force	   is	  sometimes	   necessary,	   we	  will	   exhaust	   other	   options	   before	  war	  whenever	  we	  can,	  and	  carefully	  weigh	  the	  costs	  and	  risks	  of	  action	  against	  the	  costs	  and	  risks	  of	   inaction.	  When	   force	   is	   necessary,	   we	   will	   continue	   to	   do	   so	   in	   a	   way	   that	  reflects	   our	   values	   and	   strengthens	   our	   legitimacy,	   and	   we	   will	   seek	   broad	  international	   support,	   working	   with	   such	   institutions	   as	   NATO	   and	   the	   U.N.	  Security	  Council.”	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  U.S.	  will	  seek	  permission	  before	  such	  an	  act	  is	  also	  softened	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  Bush	  NSS:	  “the	  United	  States	  must	  reserve	  the	  right	   to	  act	  unilaterally	   if	  necessary	   to	  defend	  our	  nation	  and	  our	   interests,	  yet	  we	  will	  also	  seek	  to	  adhere	  to	  standards	  that	  govern	  the	  use	  of	  force.”	  	   The	  spreading	  of	  freedom	  and	  democracy	  (the	  so-­‐called	  Freedom	  Agenda)	  was	  a	  top	  priority	  in	  the	  2002	  and	  2006	  National	  Security	  Strategies.	  In	  the	  2010	  NSS	  it	  is	  less	  so,	  even	  though	  the	  Obama	  administration	  promises	  to	  “welcom[e]	  all	   peaceful	   democratic	   movements”	   and	   to	   “support	   the	   development	   of	  institutions	  within	   fragile	  democracies”	   (all	  quotations	   in	   this	   section:	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  2010,	  unless	  specified	  otherwise).	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Anthony	  Cordesman	   emphasizes	   the	   pro-­‐multilateralism	   aspect	   of	   the	   strategy	  paper:	  "It	  gives	  foreign	  aid	  and	  partnership	  with	  other	  states	  as	  much	  emphasis	  as	  military	  security.	  It	  stresses	  that	  the	  U.S.	  is	  part	  of	  a	  multi-­‐polar	  world,	  rather	  its	   leader,	   emphasizes	   engagement	   with	   allies,	   sees	   the	   UN	   a	   key	   fact	   in	  international	   affairs,	   and	   sees	   improving	   relations	   with	   Russia	   and	   China	   as	  priorities,	   rather	   than	   rivalry	   and	   confrontation”	   (Cordesman,	   quoted	   in	  MacAskill	  2010).	  In	  reality,	  though,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  also	  much	  continuity	  to	  the	  Bush	  era.	  Obama’s	  plan	  to	  close	  Guantanamo	  is	  unfulfilled	  as	  of	   the	  time	  of	  writing.	   While	   Obama	   did	   end	   the	   war	   in	   Iraq,	   the	   one	   in	   Afghanistan	   is	   still	  ongoing.	  Pakistan	  repeatedly	  complains	  about	  the	  use	  of	  American	  drones	  on	  its	  territory	  without	  its	  consent,	  though	  one	  breach	  of	  Pakistan’s	  sovereignty	  led	  to	  what	   is	   probably	   the	   biggest	   success	   of	   the	  Obama	   administration,	   namely	   the	  killing	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  leader	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  in	  Abbottabad,	  Pakistan,	  on	  May	  2nd,	  2011.	  	  
	  
	  
	   83	  
The	  globalization	  of	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  cooperation	  –	  conclusions	  
and	  outlook	  	  A	   couple	   of	   conclusions	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	   various	   observations	   in	   this	  thesis.	  
Pivotal	  events	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  As	   some	   authors	   of	   the	   reviewed	   literature	  would	   argue	   (e.g.	   Chandler	   2007),	  there	   is	   a	   lag	   in	   counter-­‐terrorist	   activities	   between	   the	   United	   States	   and	  Europe.	   While	   11	   September	   2001	   was	   the	   pivotal	   moment	   for	   counter-­‐terrorism	  to	  top	  the	  political	  agenda,	  the	  European	  Union	  seems	  to	  have	  reacted	  in	  a	  decisive	  manner,	  that	  is,	  with	  measures	  going	  beyond	  addresses	  of	  solidarity	  and	  commemoration	  of	  the	  victims,	  only	  after	  the	  bombings	  in	  Madrid	  2004	  and	  London	  2005.	  	  
Anti-­‐terrorism	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  Victor	  Comras,	  who	  spent	  his	  career	   in	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  and	  who	  was	  recruited	   as	   a	   member	   on	   the	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   and	   Taliban	   Sanctions	   Committee	  charged	  with	  observing	  the	  steps	  taken	  by	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  UN	   sanctions	   against	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   and	   the	   Taliban	   concluded	   that	   the	   United	  Nations	   “has	  been	  hesitant,	   slow	  to	  act,	  and	   less	   than	  effective”	   (Comras	  2010)	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  terrorism.	  As	   of	   writing,	   the	   UN	   system	   has	   yet	   to	   come	   up	   with	   a	   clear	   and	  unambiguous	  definition	  of	  terrorism.	  Ten	  years	  after	  September	  11,	  2001,	  which	  gave	   momentum	   to	   anti-­‐terrorism	   at	   the	   UN	   (in	   fact,	   UN	   efforts	   to	   curtail	  terrorism	  date	  back	  to	  1998,	  when	  the	  Security	  Council	  started	  passing	  sanctions	  against	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   and	   the	   Taliban),	   a	   comprehensive	   counter-­‐terrorism	  convention	  is	  still	  not	  in	  sight.	  An	   important	   conclusion	   is	   that	   that	   UN	   can	   only	   be	   as	   effective	   as	   its	  member	  states	  allow	   it	   to	  be.	  Yet,	   the	   “cumbersome	  workings	  of	   its	  Secretariat	  and	  numerous	   organs	  make	   it	   difficult	   for	   the	   organization	   to	   effectively	   carry	  out	  its	  given	  mandates”	  (ibid.).	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The	   literature	   on	   the	   United	   Nations’	   anti-­‐terrorism	   work	   has	   to	   be	  criticized	  for	  one	  reason	  each,	  depending	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  “pro-­‐UN”	  or	  “anti-­‐UN”.	  The	   defenders	   of	   the	   UN	   tend	   to	   look	   too	   much	   at	   the	   proclaimed	   goals,	   its	  statements,	   its	  resolutions	  and	  its	  reports,	  but	   ignore	  the	  actual	  (often	  meager)	  results	   achieved.	   The	   critics	   of	   the	   UN	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   sometimes	   wrongly	  blame	   the	   UN	   institutions	   and	   their	   employees	   for	   something	   that	   is	   not	   their	  fault,	  but	  rather	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  member	  states	  failing	  to	  give	  them	  the	  proper	  mandate	  and	  failing	  to	  deliver	  their	  part.	  Comras	   (2010)	   claims	   that	   it	   is	   precisely	   the	   role	   given	   to	   the	   UN	   by	  Western	  democracies,	  their	  flawed	  diplomacy,	  that	  led	  to	  the	  UN’s	  anti-­‐terrorism	  record	   to	   rather	  be	  a	   failure:	  By	   lacking	   to	  demonstrate	  political	   resolve,	   these	  countries	   allowed	   the	   non-­‐aligned	   to	   maintain	   control	   over	   the	   handling	   of	  terrorism.	  These	  non-­‐aligned	  used	  terrorism	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  focus	  attention	  on	  other	  problems	   in	   the	   world	   (poverty,	   repression,	   what	   is	   perceived	   as	   Western	  neocolonialism,	  etc.).	  Simply	  focusing	  on	  what	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  “root	  causes”	  fails	  to	  eliminate	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  terrorism.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  measure	  what	  the	  exact	  impact	  on	  the	  UN’s	  work	  is.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  title	  of	  this	  thesis	  might	  have	  promised	  too	  much.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  counter-­‐factual:	  We	  do	  not	  know	  how	  many	  terrorist	  could	  have	  been	   thwarted	   or	   not	   if	   anti-­‐terrorism	   strategies	   around	   the	   world	   had	   been	  different.	  	  What	  remains	  in	  the	  end	  is	  the	  structural	  problem	  of	  an	  organization	  that	  was	   created	   to	   resolve	  disputes	   between	   states	   and	   is	   now	   challenged	   to	   cope	  with	   a	   problem	   between	   states	   and	   diffuse,	   trans-­‐national	   non-­‐state	   actors,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  supported	  or	  harbored	  by	  states.	  In	  a	  conflict	  between	  various	  states	  and	  terrorists	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  use	  extreme	  violence,	  it	  would	  be	  naïve	   to	   entirely	   rule	   out	   the	   use	   of	   force.	   Yet,	   the	   UN	   system,	   despite	   all	  commitments	   of	   support	   from	   its	   member	   states,	   has	   for	   various	   reasons	   not	  been	  endowed	  with	  the	  capabilities	  to	  contribute	  effectively	  against	  terrorism.	  
The	  United	  States,	  anti-­‐terrorism	  and	  the	  UN	  The	  United	  States	  has	  a	  difficult	  relation	  with	  the	  UN.	  Challenged	  by	  terrorism,	  it	  felt	   that	   the	   collective	   security	   institutions	   were	   insufficient	   to	   tackle	   this	  challenge.	   It	   therefore	   had	   to	   act	   unilaterally,	   proclaiming	   the	   need	   for	   pre-­‐
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emptive	   strikes	   and	   “regime	   change”,	   especially	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   the	  spreading	   of	  weapons	   of	  mass	   destruction	   to	   “rogue	   states”	   and	   terrorists	   (all	  quotes:	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  2002).	   It	  also	   followed	  what	  Bush	  called	   the	  “Freedom	  Agenda,”	  which	  aimed	  at	  spreading	  democracy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  but	  –	  quite	  ironically	  –	  contributed	  to	  anti-­‐democratic,	  terrorist	  groups	  such	  as	  Hamas	  winning	  elections	  and	  consolidating	  their	  power.	  The	  so-­‐called	  “Arab	  Spring”	  of	  2011	   might	   uncover	   some	   of	   the	   flaws	   of	   the	   Freedom	   Agenda.	   Contrary	   to	  Bush’s	  belief	   that	  people	  will	   always	  chose	   the	  path	  of	   freedom	  when	   they	  can	  (Bush	   2010),	   the	   Arab	   Spring	   rather	   led	   to	   a	   rise	   of	   Islamist,	   anti-­‐liberal	  movements	  by	  democratic	  means.	  	  
Europe,	  anti-­‐terrorism	  and	  the	  UN	  The	   sentiment	   in	   continental	   Europe	   was	   more	   critical	   about	   the	   U.S.’	  unilateralism.	   The	   European	   Union	   and	   many	   European	   countries	   preferred	  staying	  within	   the	  UN’s	   collective	   security	   system	  and	  did	   not	  want	   to	   set	   any	  precedents	  jeopardizing	  this	  system.	  
Differences	  in	  approaches	  between	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States	  Different	   authors	   on	   different	   ends	   of	   the	   political	   spectrum	   (and	   Atlantic)	  evaluate	   American	   and	   European	   approaches	   against	   terrorism	   differently.	  Neuhold	  (2006),	  for	  instance,	  sees	  four	  aspects	  in	  which	  the	  European	  response	  to	   terrorism	  differs	   from	  that	  developed	   in	   the	  United	  States	  or	  other	  places	   in	  the	  world.	  First,	  Europe’s	  immediate	  reaction	  to	  terrorist	  attacks	  is	  more	  muted.	  This	  is	  explained	  by	  a	  stronger	  sense	  of	  vulnerability	  in	  Europe,	  which	  is	  a	  result	  of	   the	   long	   history	   of	   major	   wars	   and	   numerous	   terrorist	   attacks	   in	   many	  European	  countries.	  Terrorism	  on	  American	  soil	   is	  still	  a	  novelty.	  Secondly,	   the	  European	   anti-­‐terrorism	   vocabulary	   is	   “softer.”	  While	   the	   Bush	   administration	  spoke	  of	  forces	  of	  evil	  and	  the	  global	  war	  on	  terrorism	  (which	  included	  terrorists	  and	  state-­‐harbors	  of	  terrorism),	  the	  European	  vocabulary	  on	  this	  issue	  does	  not	  include	   the	   word	   “war”,	   but	   rather	   terms	   like	   “fight”	   or	   “struggle”.	   Thirdly,	  Europe	   focuses	   more	   on	   non-­‐military	   measures	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	   roots	   of	  terrorism32.	  Yet,	  specific	  measures	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  development	  cooperation	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  What	   the	   roots	  of	   terrorism	  are	   is	  debatable.	   For	   instance,	  will	   reducing	  poverty	   really	  help	  against	  terrorists	  who	  accuse	  the	  West	  of	  materialism,	  hedonism,	  and	  decadence?	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the	   promotion	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   democracy	   do	   not	   show	   up	   in	   a	  comprehensive	   European	   anti-­‐terrorism	   strategy.	   The	   U.S.	   on	   the	   other	   hand	  attributes	   a	   higher	   role	   to	   armed	   forces.	   Fourthly,	   European	   countries	   and	   the	  United	   States,	   but	   not	   many	   other	   countries	   in	   the	   world,	   have	   adopted	   anti-­‐terrorist	  measures	  in	  institutional,	  multilateral	  frameworks,	  such	  as	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  CSCE/OSCE,	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  NATO,	  and	  others.	  The	  EU’s	  response,	  according	  to	  Neuhold,	  “has	  been	  characterized	  by	  an	  emphasis	  on	  lengthy	  action	  plans	  and	  institutions”	  (p.	  40)	  containing	  hundreds	  of	  measures	  but	  leaving	  their	  implementation	  to	  be	  desired.	  
Convergence	  between	  U.S.	  and	  EU	  counterterrorism	  strategies	  Armitage,	   2007,	   identifies	   seven	   areas,	   in	   which	   U.S.	   and	   EU	   perspectives	   on	  counterterrorism	  tend	  to	  converge:	  	  
• “the	  scope	  of	  the	  terrorist	  threat;	  	  
• the	  illegitimacy	  of	  terrorism	  as	  a	  form	  of	  political	  behavior;	  vulnerabilities	  caused	  by	  globalization;	  	  
• the	  need	  not	  only	  to	  disrupt	  but	  also	  to	  dismantle	  terrorist	  organizations	  over	  the	  longer	  term;	  	  
• a	  role	  for	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  international	  partners;	  	  
• the	  importance	  of	  conflict	  resolution,	  governance,	  and	  democracy;	  	  
• the	   importance	   of	   resolving	   the	   Israeli/Palestinian	   conflict.”	   (Armitage	  2007)33	  Den	  Boer	  (2006)	  summarizes	  the	  various	  views	  on	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  EU	   and	   the	   U.S.	  	   In	   Europe	   there	   is	   a	   view	   that	   it	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   go	   after	  terrorists,	   prevent	   their	   financial	   flows	   and	   that	   it	  would	   be	  wrong	   to	   put	   too	  much	  emphasis	  on	  coercion	  and	  force.	  There	  is	  rather	  a	  need	  to	  address	  the	  "root	  causes"	  of	   terrorism	  by	  non-­‐violent	  means.	  But	   in	   fact,	   there	  are	  similarities	   in	  the	  approaches:	  "both	  the	  American	  and	  European	  methods	  mix	  judicial,	  police,	  diplomatic	   and	  military	  means	  with	   a	   long-­‐term	   political	   approach	   to	   tackling	  terrorism"	   (Keohane,	   quoted	   in:	   Den	  Boer	   2006,	   p.	   109).	   Both	   sides	   believe	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	   Armitage	   Jr,	   David	   T.:	   “The	   European	   Union:	   Measuring	   Counterterrorism	   Cooperation”,	   in:	  Strategic	  Forum,	  No.	  229,	  November	  2007,	  Institute	  for	  National	  Strategic	  Studies	  of	  the	  National	  Defense	  University	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intensive	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  counter-­‐terrorism	  cooperation	  (which	  can	  be	  seen	  with	  e.g.	  the	  agreements	  on	  sharing	  airline	  passenger	  data,	  etc.).	  Also,	  the	  US	  DHS	  has	  an	  attaché	  at	  the	  U.S.	  mission	  to	  the	  EU	  in	  Brussels	  (Den	  Boer	  2006).	  Most	  importantly	  for	  this	  thesis,	  both	  sides	  attribute	  –	  at	   least	   in	  theory,	  but	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  also	  in	  practice	  –	  an	  important	  role	  to	  the	  UN.	  	  
EU-­‐U.S.	  relations	  On	   the	   third	   anniversary	   of	   the	   Madrid	   bombings,	   EU	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Coordinator	   Gijs	   de	   Vries	   held	   a	   speech	   that	   summarized	   a	   lot	   of	   the	   EU’s	  positions:	   he	   urged	   those	   countries	   who	   haven’t	   implemented	   the	   16	  instruments	  to	  do	  so,	  stressed	  the	  need	  to	  cooperate	  with	  moderate	  Muslims	  and	  to	  counter	  the	  terrorists’	  ideology,	  an	  ideology	  –	  as	  he	  says	  –	  rejected	  by	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  Muslims.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  also	  referred	  to	  the	  American	  concept	  of	  winning	  the	  battle	  for	  hearts	  and	  minds.	  Yet,	  he	  introduces	  this	  concept	  in	  his	  speech	  not	  to	  criticize	  Jihadism,	  but	  rather	  to	  criticize	  governments	  who	  do	  not	  practice	  what	  they	  preach,	   thereby	  more	  or	   less	  overtly	  referring	  to	  the	  United	  States	  (e.g.	  by	  mentioning	  “detention	  without	  trial”,	  an	  obvious	  allusion	  to	  the	  US	  detention	   camps	   in	  Guantanamo	  Bay)	   (De	  Vries	   2007)34.	  He	   finally	   calls	   for	   “a	  vision	  of	  a	  more	  just	  and	  equitable	  world	  and	  [calls	  to]	  act	  accordingly,	  at	  home	  and	  abroad”	  (ibid.)	  –	  as	  if	  terrorism	  and	  especially	  the	  bombings	  in	  Madrid	  were	  a	  mere	  result	  of	  injustice	  and	  inequity.	  	  	   There	   are	   conflicting	   views	   between	   the	   U.S.	   and	   Europe.	   Nevertheless,	  the	  cooperation	  between	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  is	  the	  closest	  within	   the	   international	   system	   in	   the	   field	   of	   terrorism.	   After	   all	   they	   share	  values	   and	   threats.	   This	   has	   been	   addressed	   both	   in	   the	   National	   Security	  Strategy	   and	   in	   the	   European	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	   Strategy.	   The	   core	   of	   this	  relationship	   is	   not	   the	   UN,	   but	   NATO.	   Trans-­‐Atlantic	   cooperation	   has	   been	  increasing	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  U.S.	  “was	  increasingly	  willing	  to	  choose	  multilateral	  responses	  to	   law	  enforcement	  and	   judicial	  problems”	  (Rees	  2006,	   p.	   115).	   Counter-­‐crime	   activities	   were	   readily	   adapted	   to	   counter-­‐terrorism.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  EU	  brought	  to	  fruition	  the	  UN	  Convention	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	   De	   Vries,	   Gijs:	   “Europe’s	   Fight	   Against	   Terrorism”,	   March	   2007,	   http://www.project-­‐syndicate.org/print_commentary/vries1/English	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Against	   Transnational	   Organized	   Crime.	   What	   can	   be	   observed	   (see	   e.g.	   Rees	  2006)	   is	   a	   globalization	  of	   transatlantic	   cooperation.	   Islamic	   terrorism	  made	   it	  clear	  to	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  that	  the	  security	  of	  the	  homelands	  is	  dependent	  on	  other	  states	  creating	  a	  hostile	  environment	  for	  terrorism.	  	  
And	  what	  about	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world?	  The	  global	  war	  on	   terrorism	   led	   to	  some	  changes	   in	   international	   relations.	  Up	  until	  to	  the	  1990s,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Europe	  considered	  Russia	  and	  China	  as	  archrivals.	  Yet,	   with	   transnational	   terrorism	   arising,	   new	   partnerships	   had	   to	   be	   built.	  Especially	  immediately	  after	  9/11,	  there	  was	  a	  “rapprochement.”	  For	  Russia,	  this	  was	  due	  to	  major	  attacks	  by	  Chechen	  separatists	   in	  Moscow	  (2002)	  and	  Beslan	  (2004),	   while	   the	   Chinese	   government	   felt	   that	   cooperation	   with	   the	   U.S.	   will	  help	  it	  economic	  and	  geopolitical	  ascent	  and	  therefore	  did	  not	  invest	  much	  effort	  into	  thwarting	  the	  coalition’s	  plans	  in	  Iraq	  (Phillips	  2010).	  This	  rapprochement	  did	  not	  last	  for	  long	  though	  as	  Russia	  and	  China	  became	  wary	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  Western	  influence	  in	  Central	  and	  South	  Asia	  (ibid.).	  
A	  new	  threat:	  Iran	  Despite	  some	  successes	  against	   international	  terrorism,	  many	  generations	  after	  us	  will	  probably	  still	  have	  to	  fear	  becoming	  victim	  of	  an	  attack.	  Loosely	  organized	  groups	  of	  militants	  will	  continue	  to	  operate	  on	  a	  worldwide	  basis.	  And	  they	  will	  also	  find	  support	  from	  regimes	  with	  sympathies	  to	  their	  cause.	  The	  big	  threat	  of	  the	   coming	   years	   will,	   without	   any	   doubt,	   come	   from	   the	   so-­‐called	   “Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran”.	  There	  are	  serious	  and	  widespread	  allegations	  that	  the	  Mullah	  regime	  is	  working	  on	  a	  nuclear	  bomb.	  	  Since	   Iran	   also	   has	   links	   to	   and	   actively	   supports	   terrorist	   groups	   like	  Hezbollah	   in	   Lebanon	   or	   Hamas	   in	   the	   Palestinian	   territories	   (see	   e.g.	   Martin	  2008),	   there	   is	   not	   only	   the	   fear	   that	   Iran	   might	   itself	   use	   nuclear	   weapons	  against	  Israel,	  but	  foremost	  that	  it	  might	  pass	  on	  nuclear	  technology	  and	  maybe	  even	   the	   final	  product	   to	   its	   terrorist	  allies.	  The	  United	  Nations	  system	  (in	   this	  particular	   case:	   the	   International	   Atomic	   Energy	   Agency)	   appears	   to	   be	   in	   the	  same	  stalemate	  that	   it	  was	   in	  so	  often	   in	  the	  1990s	  and	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  21st	  century.	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Negotiations	   on	   sanctions	   against	   the	   Iranian	   regime	   seem	   to	   have	  reached	  a	  stalemate.	  There	  are	  major	  discrepancies	  in	  views	  between	  the	  United	  States	  on	  one	  side,	  European	  countries	  on	  another,	  and	  Russia	  and	  China	  on	  yet	  another.	  The	   new	   administration	   of	   President	   Obama	   appears	   to	   be	   following	   a	  course	  more	  oriented	  around	  dialogue	  and	  multilateralism	  than	  President	  Bush’s	  did.	  His	   so-­‐called	  speech	   to	   “the	  Muslim	  world”	  might	  be	  one	   indicator	   for	   this	  change;	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  administration	  accepted	  the	  results	  of	  the	  2009	  Iranian	  presidential	  vote,	  despite	  protests	  inside	  and	  outside	  of	  Iran,	  another.	  	  
Some	  self-­‐criticism	  As	  a	  final	  thought,	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  paper	  should	  be	  pointed	  out.	  While	  the	  core	  of	   the	   topic,	  namely	   the	  role	  given	   to	  an	   international	  organization	   that	   is	  only	  as	  powerful	  as	   its	  members	  allow	  it	   to	  be,	   is	  relevant	  and	   interesting,	   it	   is	  not	  feasible	  to	  cover	  it	  in	  its	  entirety.	  	  Due	   to	   several	   restrictions,	   this	   thesis	   put	   its	   focus	   on	   strategy	   papers.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  actual	  political	  processes	  is	  missing	  though.	  As	  such,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  necessary,	  for	  instance,	  to	  conduct	  interviews	  with	  key	  diplomats	  and	  politicians.	   Unfortunately,	   this	   was	   not	   possible	   and	   would	   have	   excessively	  inflated	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  In	   fact,	   it	   might	   have	   been	   wise	   to	   separate	   the	   analysis	   into	   three	  independent	  papers	   (one	  each	   for	   the	  U.S.,	   the	  EU	  and	   the	  UN).	  The	  breadth	  of	  the	  topic	  would	  also	  require	  a	  broader	  theoretical	  part,	  which	  not	  only	  looks	  at	  the	   new	  wars	   and	   terrorism,	   but	   also	   at	   the	   political	   theory	   of	   and	   the	   actual	  political	  processes	  within	  international	  organizations.	  But,	  as	  a	  former	  professor	  of	  mine	  used	  to	  say:	  “One	  should	  keep	  the	  good	  topics	  for	  the	  PhD	  dissertation.”	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German	  abstract	  –	  Deutschsprachige	  Zusammenfassung	  	  Die	   vorliegende	   Diplomarbeit	   gibt	   einen	   Überblick	   über	   die	   Rolle,	   die	   die	  Vereinten	  Nationen	   in	  den	  Anti-­‐Terrorismus-­‐Strategien	  und	   -­‐Politiken	  der	  USA	  und	  der	  EU	  einnehmen.	  Die	  Arbeit	  weist	  zwei	  theoretische	  Ausgangspunkte	  auf.	  Der	   erste	   befasst	   sich	   mit	   den	   Veränderungen	   der	   Kriegsführung	   in	   den	  vergangen	  Jahrzehnten.	  Zur	  Erläuterung	  wird	  die	  Literatur	  zu	  den	  sogenannten	  Neuen	  Kriegen	  (mit	  Schwerpunkt	  auf	  den	  Werken	  von	  Mary	  Kaldor	  und	  Herfried	  Münckler)	   zusammengefasst	   und	   diskutiert.	   Der	   zweite	   widmet	   sich	   Andrew	  Guzmans	   neoinstitutionalistischer	   Theorie	   des	   Völkerrechts	   und	   der	  Internationalen	  Organisationen.	  	  Des	  Weiteren	  wird	  diskutiert,	  wie	  es	  im	  letzten	  Jahrzehnt	  um	  den	  Multilateralismus	  im	  Allgemeinen	  und	  die	  Vereinten	  Nationen	  im	  Speziellen	  bestellt	  war.	  Hierbei	  wird	  vor	  allem	  auf	  Macht	  und	  Ohnmacht	  der	  UNO	   in	   Konflikten	   wie	   Ruanda,	   Darfur	   und	   dem	   damaligen	   Jugoslawien	  eingegangen	  und	  die	  damit	  einhergehenden	  Konsequenzen	  für	  die	  Rolle	  der	  UNO	  im	   Kampf	   gegen	   den	   Terrorismus.	   Der	   elfte	   September	   2001	   hat	   Terrorismus	  letztlich	   endgültig	   als	   globale	   Gefahr	   etabliert	   und	   Reaktion	   in	   der	   gesamten	  internationalen	   Gemeinschaft	   hervorgerufen.	   Die	   UNO	   hat	   mittels	   mehrerer	  institutioneller	  Schritte	  auf	  die	  veränderte	  Gefahrenlage	  reagiert.	  Allerdings	  sind	  die	   Entwicklungen	   innerhalb	   der	   UNO	   gezeichnet	   von	   Uneinigkeit	   in	   der	  Definition	   von	   Terrorismus	   und	   in	   den	   Vorstellungen	   von	   den	   institutionellen	  Rahmenbedingungen	  für	  einen	  Kampf	  gegen	  Terrorismus	  auf	  UN-­‐Ebene.	  	  Die	   Europäische	   Union	   hat	   in	   den	   letzten	   zehn,	   zwanzig	   Jahren	  weitere	  Einigungsschritte	   vollzogen.	   Sie	   strebt	   damit	   eine	   Rolle	   als	   eigenständiger	  internationaler	   Akteur	   an	   und	   ist	   als	   solcher	   auch	   innerhalb	   des	   UN-­‐Systems	  engagiert.	  Ihre	  Anti-­‐Terror-­‐Strategie	  befindet	  sich	  eindeutig	  im	  Einklang	  mit	  den	  Ansätzen	  der	  UNO.	  	  Die	  Vereinigten	  Staaten	  haben	  tendenziell	  ein	  schwieriges	  Verhältnis	  zur	  Terrorbekämpfung	  auf	  UN-­‐Ebene.	  Generell	  herrscht	   in	  den	  USA	  das	  Gefühl	  vor,	  dass	  die	  Institutionen	  ungeeignet	  seien,	  um	  mit	  der	  Herausforderung	  durch	  den	  internationalen	  Terrorismus	  umzugehen.	  Anders	  als	  in	  Europa	  gab	  es	  vor	  allem	  während	   der	   Bush-­‐Präsidentschaft	   das	   Paradigma	   des	   Regime	   Change	   (die	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sogenannte	   Freedom	   Agenda)	   und	   der	   präemptiven	   Militäreinsätze.	  Nichtsdestotrotz	   nimmt	   der	   Multilateralismus	   eine	   wichtige	   Rolle	   in	   der	  amerikanischen	   Strategie	   ein,	   wenngleich	   vielleicht	   weniger	   aus	   ideologischer	  Überzeugung	  und	  mehr	  aus	  pragmatischen,	  vernünftigen	  Überlegungen	  heraus.	  Abschließend	   wird	   eine	   Konvergenz	   der	   Anti-­‐Terrorismus-­‐Strategien	  festgestellt.	  Beide	   Seiten	   erkennen	  das	  Ausmaß	  der	   terroristischen	  Bedrohung,	  die	  Wichtigkeit	  der	  Vereinten	  Nationen	  und	  anderer	  internationaler	  Partner	  und	  die	   Bedeutung	   der	   Lösung	   von	   regionalen	   Konflikten,	   insbesondere	   des	  Nahostkonflikts.	   Insgesamt	  wird	  die	  transatlantische	  Kooperation	  „globalisiert“,	  d.h.	   auf	   internationale	   Organisationen	   ausgeweitet.	   Allerdings	   bleiben	   die	  strukturellen	   Probleme	   eines	   Systems,	   das	   geschaffen	   wurde,	   um	  zwischenstaatliche	  Konflikte	  zu	  lösen,	  aber	  Schwierigkeiten	  damit	  hat,	  Konflikte	  zwischen	  Staaten	  und	  nicht-­‐staatlichen	  Akteuren	  wie	  terroristischen	  Gruppen	  zu	  lösen,	  bestehen.	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